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Development of Personality

A Phase of the
Philosophy of Education

BY
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WITH INTRODUCTION BY
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TO THE
RELIGIOUS TEACHERS OF AMERICA
WHOSE SUBLIME PRIVILEGE IT IS TO CONSERVE AND TO
DEVELOP THE GOD-GIVEN FAITH
OF THEIR PUPILS.

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INTRODUCTION.

THE following pages present some of the pedagogical aspects of an institution which, for twenty centuries, has devoted itself to the highest aims of teaching. The task of that institution has ever been to bring to fruition the noblest powers and capacities of human personality, to hold in check those tendencies which militate against this purpose.

Not hedged in by national boundaries nor restricted by considerations of race or class, this service has not been confined to children of from five to fourteen years, nor have its purposes been restricted to the earthly career of human kind.

At a period when educational foundations disclose an attack upon the religious belief of teachers and pay a premium to colleges and universities which will consent to make open profession that they have no religious creed but confine themselves to the exposition of ethical principles, the present treatise possesses, in addition to the cogency and clarity of a careful thinker, a certain timeliness in its call to the consideration of current tendencies.

Parallel with a marvelous expansion of educational service has come a widespread anxiety within and without the church regarding the dangers of a gross materialism in the work of schools. The eyes of a single generation see little enough. In every age minds which possess the inclination and ability to look backward

and forward beyond the limits of a narrow present, realize the growing errors and sound a note of warning.

At the very beginning of modern education, Comenius founds his system upon the assertion that "the chief aim of education is to live in the happiness of God and in harmony with His teachings." Pestalozzi would not have elevation of the intellect to be the chief end of education. Its first influence is moral and religious, which to him were identical. "Reformer" he was, protesting against mere systems and routine from which the spirit had been driven. "Everywhere," he said, "flesh predominates over spirit. Everywhere the divine element is cast into the shade. Everywhere selfishness and passions are the motives of action. Everywhere mechanical actions usurp the place of intelligent initiative. Man does not live by bread alone; every child must have religious growth, every child must learn to pray to God in simplicity, with faith and love." "If religion," he says, "does not permeate the whole of education, religion will have little influence on life. It will remain isolated, remote, formal, mechanical." His summary of the essentials of modern education is contained in these words: "The child accustomed from the earliest years to think, to work and to pray is more than half educated already."

The protests of the earnest pioneers of modern education were against the narrowness of teachers who were making the religious element, as they were making the intellectual aspect, of teaching a thing of words without the pulse of the spirit. There was not until a near yesterday any protest listened to against the utter

absence of religion from schools. In America, where popular education was growing in influence and extent beyond any degree ever attempted in any other part of the world, religion was, in the early days, an accepted part and aim of schooling. For our first colonial schools the Bible was the only book; the teacher had taken holy orders. The very grading of the children into the beginners' or psalter class, the testament class, and the Bible class, shows the essential religious basis of the service. For recruiting the ministry, for converting the Indians, for the promotion of religion and morality, under a sanction profoundly religious, every old American college was founded. The West India Company, to which was entrusted the settlement of New Amsterdam, was bound by the mother nation to maintain in the western wilderness "good and fit preachers who are schoolmasters, comforters of the sick." The laws of Pennsylvania required all children to be instructed "so that they may be able to read the Scriptures." In the programs of the school exercises, in the regulations for the governance of schoolmasters, in the contracts of teachers, in every aspect of this early education, the religious element appears.

In 1682, Johannes Van Eckkelen, accepted schoolmaster and church chorister of Flatbush, now a part of New York City, signs articles of agreement by which he engages that "when the school begins, one of the children shall read the morning prayer. The school shall close with prayer before dinner. The evening school shall begin with prayer and close by singing

a psalm. The schoolmaster shall instruct the children on every Wednesday and Saturday in the common prayers and the questions and answers in the catechism, to enable them to repeat them the better on Sunday before the afternoon service, or on Monday when they shall say them before the congregation." A hundred years later, in 1773, the Town of Flatbush makes the same agreement with Anthony Welp, schoolmaster.

The English colonists knew no other kind of education than religious. The school had been of, by, and for the church. Hoole's treatise on the *Art of Teaching* (1637), opens with the declaration that the "school is the place where, indeed, the first principles of religion and learning ought to be taught." The substitution of English authority for that of the Dutch relinquished no conviction as to the religious basis of instruction. Governor Dongan, a Catholic, received in 1686, directions that "noe schoolmaster bee henceforth permitted to keep school" without approval of the church at home. "You shall take especial care that God Almighty be devoutly and duly served." To Governor Sloughter, 1689, to Governor Fletcher, 1691, to Governor Bellemont, 1697, to Governor Hunter, 1709, similar injunctions regarding the religious duties of the school are given by the King.¹ When the Mayor, Alderman and Commonalty petitioned Governor Cornbury for a new free school in the City of New York, they specified that the master be a holy man of good learn-

¹ Cf. A. J. Hall, *Religious Education in the Public Schools of the State and City of New York—A Historical Study*; A. E. Palmer, *New York Public Schools*.

ing, mild temper, virtuous conversation and pious life.

The influence of free school societies unconnected with the churches, the agitation of educational promoters for independent public schools, brought the country into bitter controversy over the disposition of school monies. The famous contest between the Bethel Baptist Church and the New York Free School Society, a strife culminating in 1825, resulted in the isolation of the churches from governmental financial aid for education conducted under ecclesiastical auspices. By 1831 this bitter controversy resulted in a pronouncement upon the function of education in amazing contrast with the prevailing tenets of the community a generation before. The law committee of the New York Board of Aldermen reported that a public school "ought to teach only those branches of education which tended to prepare a child for the ordinary business of life. If religion be taught in a school, it strips it of one of the characteristics of a common school, as all religious studies have a direct reference to a future state and are not necessary to prepare a child for the mechanical or any other business." The controversy being carried to the state legislature, the committee on schools reported that religious instruction is foreign to the intentions of the school system. "Religion," it said, "is no part of the common school education." By 1853 the swing of the pendulum reaches a point indicated by a decision of the State Superintendent of Schools of New York, Randall, saying, "The position was early, distinctly and universally taken by our statesmen, legislators and prominent friends of edu-

cation that religious education must be banished from the common schools." In line with this decision all subsequent state superintendents have ruled. Originally religious institutions, the American schools in the course of a century have become completely de-religionized. No teacher of a public school may point out religious responsibilities to his pupils, may show the religious bearing of events, may emphasize the exhortations of religious masters, without violation of legal prohibition.

This survey, illustrative of an absolute change in the attitude of the people of New York regarding public instruction, is an example of a uniform trend throughout the colonies and the early states of the Union, culminating about the middle of the last century in the total exclusion of religious education from the public schools. The states thereafter admitted, enacted laws based upon the result of such ultimate development. Indeed, beyond a few ancient legal provisions, obsolete in practice, there exists no vestige of the expressed religious spirit pervading the colonies at the time of the republic's birth. So thoroughly has the excision been done, that even to Boston, at one time the centre of religious fervor and conviction, all that remains is the beautiful old motto of the city,

"*Sicut patribus, sic nobis Deus.*" (As God was with our fathers, so may He be with us.)

But the present century, young as it is, has been marked by a notable growth of conviction of the grievous loss the education of youth has sustained. It is

remarkable that, though it was the Free School Societies, public education officials, common school men, and educators, who pronounced so decidedly against religious instruction as an essential of education, it is from the same order of men that there comes the expression of loss and the desire for restoration.

Before the century is three years old, Robert Herbert Quick, than whom probably no educational writer is better known, raises the question, "Can we afford to neglect religious instruction?" His answer is a plea for worship, for prayers, for study of the Scriptures, for the singing of psalms and hymns, that boys may increase in wisdom and reverence. President Butler, of Columbia University, editor of an educational magazine which purports to administer authoritative correction to the educational world, admonished teachers that religion is one of the inheritances of mankind which it is the function of teachers to make real to the child. He calls it the preponderant influence in shaping civilization, an influence due in part to the universality of religion itself and in part to the fact that it was beyond dispute the chief human interest at the time when the foundations of our present superstructure were laid. It is hard now to dignify, he says, "with the names, influence or instruction, the wretchedly formal religious exercises which are gone through in the American Public Schools. The result is that religious teaching in schools is a thing of the past. Two solutions are proposed. That the state shall permit all existing forms of religious instruction in its own schools, or that it shall aid by money grants schools maintained

by religious corporations. Bitterness of controversy has made both propositions difficult. Yet the religious element may not be permitted to pass wholly out of education unless we are to cripple education and to render it hopelessly incomplete. For the religious element of human nature is essential. By some effective agency, it must be presented to every child whose education aims at completeness or proportion."

Theodore Roosevelt, in an address "On Reading the Bible," speaks as follows:

"In this country we rightly pride ourselves upon our system of widespread popular education. We most emphatically do right to pride ourselves upon it. It is not merely of inestimable advantage to us, it lies at the root of our power of self-government. But it is not sufficient in itself. We must cultivate the mind; but it is not enough only to cultivate the mind. With education of the mind must go the spiritual teaching which will make us turn the trained intellect to good account. A man whose intellect has been educated, while at the same time his moral education has been neglected, is only the more dangerous to the community because of the exceptional additional power he has acquired. Surely what I am saying needs no proof; surely the mere statement of it is enough, that education must be education of the heart and conscience no less than of the mind."

From still another angle, Muensterberg sees the lack. In 1910, in his "Psychology and the Teacher," he finds not only that there is a pressing need for school inspiration, but also that religion realizes for the human soul the highest desire in which truth, happiness, morality, progress and beauty are blended, while all contradictions and struggles are removed. He thinks no teacher can afford to teach without implanting in young souls a religious longing.

In 1914 Paul Monroe declares the greatest danger

in the secular school to be the failure to learn to think of the world religiously,—that is, profoundly and humanly. In that he finds “justification of the paramount place given to religion in education by educators like Arnold of Rugby and the Roman Catholics in all periods.”

In the same year, Joseph Swain, President of the National Education Association, addressing the Convention of the Nation’s Public School Teachers, argues that if we are to have the proper type of citizens we must have teachers of the highest training. If we are to have exalted character, we must have teachers of faith and religion. “It is the chief business of men and women in the school to perform religious acts and to lead others to perform them.”

In the speeches preserved in the records of the proceedings of teachers’ associations and conventions, we also find this decided tendency to deplore the loss of religion and to plan for its return. The stone which the builders rejected may yet be the head of the corner.

Whatever may be the merits of any discussion concerning practical religious teaching, there are few today who will not question the completeness of a system of education that has no religious element. Every person, though he may be unaware of the fact, possesses a religious feeling and follows some sort of religion. To many it may seem a curious religion, but, whatever it may seem to be, it is yet an attempt to express the religious spirit. It is, therefore, one of the curiosities of an education which aims to train the whole

child, which at every stage emphasizes the necessity of complete development, that it should deliberately exclude any provision for this great, fundamental characteristic. Scientists recognize that the religious instinct is as real and as "natural" as the desire for food or for survival. Man is religious by nature. Even the savage expresses himself most finely in his religious impulses when he attributes a spiritual agency to the trees, to the winds, and to the weapons he uses. Having no organized conception of deity, he creates for the satisfaction of his own inner being, one god or many.

When man comes into the larger possession of those beliefs and conditions we say he has become civilized. It seems strange indeed that we should leave to chance the development of one of the qualities through which our civilization has become possible.

It must be recognized that no system of public education can teach a religion. The same liberty of conscience that secures for each citizen the practice of his own belief, forbids that those who follow a different religion should have the privilege of interpreting a creed or of giving religious instruction to his own children. Nor will any American permit public schools to establish through their own agents a system of sectarian instruction. Yet, equally, is it the truth that no child is well taught who in some wise is not religiously taught. This is the great truth which after a few decades is emerging from the confusion of ideas. This plea for adequate religious training is no longer a preachment of the pulpit alone, Teachers of all

creeds recognize the necessity. The lack of this training has produced its own evil results.

It is true now, and always will be true, that a community without religious life will itself evolve various individual creeds to express some form of emotional life and desire. These creeds will not always preach worship of God, service to the state, or sacrifice of the individual to society, but they will preach, notwithstanding. It may be a preachment of individualism in terms of our brief material existence; of the glorification of the lower appetites and the baser instincts. There are people who call this sort of thinking intellectual freedom. If it may be called a religion, it is a religion of selfishness.

The reconciliation of religious education in terms of precise beliefs with the development of religious emotion must prove a very difficult thing to realize in any system of public education. There is no question but that some type of reconciliation or adjustment should be made. Whether the ultimate solution will be a method of organization that will permit the absence from school of children for religious instruction at stated intervals; whether it will involve separate hours and separate teachers and places set apart; or whether it will be something entirely different from this, will be determined by the intelligence and reciprocal tolerance of those who dedicate themselves to the solution of the problem. The method is a secondary thing.

The important thing is that all of us are beginning to realize—whatever our particular creeds or faiths—that whether in the school, in the church, or in the

home, whether through teachers or parents, some form of religious training in education is essential to any enduring civilization and most of all to a civilization based on ideals of democracy. The wonderful conception that religion gives us—that men are brothers, that God is the father of us all—a conception of reciprocal duty and common responsibility, must become a conscious motive in living if we are to succeed and progress. It was true in ancient times; it was true in medieval times; it is true in modern times. It will always be true—because the need of religious motive is as constant and permanent as is civilization itself. Civilization touches its highest level as it most fully expresses the religious conception; religion finds its finest expression in the existence of the highest civilization.

The author of the following pages has a sublime philosophy of life—service and sacrifice and self-effacement. He has grasped the large view that the end of education is the actualization of the capacities of the human soul; that teaching is no mere conformity to system, no mere covering of courses of study. He accepts no smaller duty than that of perfecting manhood. To him each child is a complexity of possibilities, an organization of developing faculties of which reason and conscience are the controlling force and the crowning glory.

He would teach not only by methods, but with the sense of a sacred mission. The solemn fact is never absent that the regeneration of spiritual and national life depends in a superlative degree upon the ideals fostered in the classroom.

From him might have come, as an expression of what he thinks and believes, the noble words of Emerson, "For the spirit only can teach. Not any profane man, nor any sensual, not any slave, not any liar can teach, but only he can give who has. The one through whom the soul speaks, alone can teach. Courage, piety, love, wisdom, can teach. But he who aims to speak as books enable, as systems use, as the fashions guide, and as interest commands, merely babbles. Let him hush."

"The undevout astronomer is mad." Faith is indispensable to all true teaching. Without faith, education is dross. Without faith, the poetry of life is transformed into satire. With faith, teaching is the continuous baptism of the world.

In this book, Brother Chrysostom demonstrates that the character, spirit and faith of the teacher should be deemed the vital force in education and that all other considerations are subordinate. Through the progression of logical steps he unfolds the comprehensive means by which schools may realize their spiritual function and teachers their exalted mission.

It is the work of a teacher of long experience who has tested the theories of philosophy and pedagogy in the living laboratory of the classroom and whose mind, accustomed to a daily business of making matters clear, finds expression in a medium of language marked with lucidity, precision and charm.

THOMAS W. CHURCHILL.

NEW YORK CITY,

October 14, 1916.

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

THIS book is dedicated to religious teachers. It treats of a subject which, by deliberate choice, they have made their life-work. But it makes a direct appeal also to all teachers who, respecting the dignity of their profession, live and labor for the propagation, the consecration, and the development of the highest ethical ideals. Even for such as do not make profession of the Christian religion, but who sincerely love their fellow-man, this book should possess some interest, since it emphasizes certain methods of education which have been put to the test and which, on trial, have been found not utterly wanting. There is, then, presumptive evidence that the principles here set forth are possessed of an inherent fitness to produce and to develop in the teacher qualities which are to-day universally admitted to be among the most highly prized of the fruits of education. It is on this ground that the book puts forth a claim for an attentive reading and a careful consideration of the facts involved.

With a view to extending the utility of the following chapters to a wider circle of readers and through them to larger groups of pupils, the general plan has been adopted of rather citing the exact words of the authors referred to, than of presenting merely the substance of their thought. Such a method has also the advantage of affording occasions to the reader for deeper reflec-

tion on the really vital issues in education without unduly taxing his time and his opportunities. Should he desire to pursue further the line of thought followed by the author cited, he will find the necessary reference indicated in the proper place.

To keep the book within due limits, it became necessary to give a very summary treatment of the Sociological Section. By way of compensation, the reader's attention is repeatedly called, in the successive chapters to social values and social points of view. In consequence, he will find that the social aim of education, in the best meaning of that phrase, is emphasized throughout.¹

In the preparation of these pages the author has incurred many debts: first of all, to the members of his own Order, the Brothers of the Christian Schools; then, in a special manner, to Dr. Thomas Edward Shields, dean of the department of pedagogy at the Catholic University of America, who proposed the subject for investigation, examined the general plan of treatment, and directed the preparation of Book I. This section was submitted to the University, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, under the title, "The Pedagogical Value of the Virtue of Faith as Developed in the Religious Novitiate." Valuable suggestions were received from Rev. Drs. Edward A. Pace, Edmund T. Shanahan, William J. Kerby, George M. Sauvage, C. S. C., Thomas Vernon Moore, C. S. P., and from Rev. Leo L. McVay, of the

¹ See "Social," "Social Value," and "Sociological Aspects" in the Index of Subjects.


University; also from Rev. Drs. John J. Mitty and Joseph C. Herrick, of St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie. Special thanks are due to Rev. Francis P. Siegfried, of St. Charles' Seminary, Overbrook, for careful reading of the manuscript and for giving generously of his time and experience.

The book does not advocate the substitution of the novitiate for the normal school. It does maintain that teachers' ideals can not be adequately developed and cherished without some method similar to that used in the novitiate. For the religious teacher, the period of the novitiate in general precedes that of the normal school training and lays a broad and secure foundation for the latter.

If the perusal of these pages should awaken in religious teachers, and more particularly in novices, a deeper appreciation of the resources which they possess, the author's labor will not have been in vain.

AMMENDALE, MD.,

July 16, 1916.



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BOOK I.

THE NORMAL SCHOOL AND THE NOVITIATE.

CHAPTER I.

THE NORMAL SCHOOL.

Article I.—The Normal School in General.

IT is the function of the normal school to train teachers for service in the public schools. In order to form an estimate of the Pedagogical Value of the Virtue of Faith as developed in the Religious Novitiate, we will take the normal school as a term of comparison.

For the year ending June, 1913, 284 normal schools in the United States, if we include in that number both public and private schools, reported to the Bureau of Education in Washington.¹ In the regular training courses for teachers these schools had a total enrollment of 94,455 students. If to this number we add 21,425 students pursuing like courses in 931 high schools, and 5,626 students similarly engaged in 265 private high schools and academies, we have a grand total of 121,506 students preparing to fix the ideals and form the conduct of the nation as far as the public schools are concerned. It is true that many of our colleges and universities have departments of education. It is also true that, while they are particularly well equipped to train teachers for high school work, yet they often

¹ See Bulletin, 1914, No. 16, U. S. Bureau of Education, *The Tangible Rewards of Teaching*, compiled by James C. Boykin and Roberta King, pp. 416 ff.

extend their courses both above and below this domain. They train some students for college teaching, and others for teaching in the grade schools. However, even when they give courses for the teaching of subjects in the grammar schools, these courses are patronized largely by men and women who are already actively engaged in the work of teaching. As a result it frequently happens that such courses in pedagogy given in universities as are suited to grade-school teachers are either extension courses conducted in the late afternoon or the evening or on Saturdays, or summer courses when the general facilities and resources of the universities are opened to the ambitious teacher. We are, then, justified in taking the normal school as a term of comparison.¹

From another viewpoint it likewise appears that the normal school is a proper term of comparison. We quote from Professor Thorndike's *Elimination of Pupils from School*.²

"I estimate that the general tendency of American cities of 25,000 and over is, or was at about 1900, to keep in school out of 100 entering pupils 90 till grade 4, 81 till grade 5, 68 till grade 6, 54 till grade 7, 40 till the last grammar grade (usually the eighth, but sometimes the ninth, and rarely the seventh), 27 till the first high school grade, 17 till the second, 12 till the third, and 8 till the fourth. . . . It will be remembered that figures for the public schools in the country as a whole are probably much lower than this."

¹ On the new Normal School movement, see *Educational Review*, Vol. XLV, pp. 195, 198, 304, 409, 509.

² Thorndike, *U. S. Bureau of Education, Bulletin No. 4*, 1907, Whole No. 379, p. 11.—Add this passage from *Moral Training in the Public Schools* (The California Prize Essays): "Now at least

From this it follows that the destinies of the nation are largely shaped by the normal school graduates. Is there justification for placing so much responsibility in their hands? For the present let us content ourselves with applying the principle of selection to the case.

"All environmental agencies, and especially our educational agencies, are a great system of means, not only of making men good and intelligent and efficient, but also of picking out those who for any reason are good and intelligent and efficient. In the latter sense they may be said to improve not the production, but the distribution of mental and moral wealth. They help to put the right men in the right places. . . . To have gone to school at all means not only that you have perhaps learned to read and write, but also that you were not an invalid, idiot, or runaway. To have progressed halfway through the grade schools means not only that you have learned somewhat, but also that you were not one of the ten or twenty per cent. who, by lack of means or ambition or health or mental ability, have been eliminated from the school system. To have graduated from a high school means that you are one of a very small percentage of the group who entered school with you, a percentage picked for survival not by chance, surely. And so on with the college and professional schools."¹

nine-tenths of our children leave school at the dawn of adolescence, the most critical period of their lives, when moral guidance is more necessary to them than at any other time between birth and death; when the methods of childhood are becoming obsolete; when responsibility begins, but judgment is immature; when moral storms tear up the moral growths of childhood and dreams float in the air; when children seem strange to themselves; when they are morally more lonely than ever before or afterwards; when they must not only face the great temptations of life, but make its great decisions without experience; when they least desire others to penetrate their thoughts or mold their judgments. The greatest need of this period is a moral one. What provision do the schools make for it?" "Fourth Essay," pp. 135, 136, by Frank Cramer.

¹Thorndike, *Educational Psychology*, pp. 94 f.

This passage shows that the student who enters the normal school may have at least the negative requirements of a teacher. It remains then for the normal school to develop the positive qualities. This task becomes more difficult as the years go on. There are many forces at work tending to the disintegration of family ties, to the transfer of home activities from the fireside to the factory, and to the transfer of home sympathies from the children to social acquaintances, to business friends, and to club policies. All these factors react in turn upon the plastic minds of the young. Hence it is that many of our school problems of to-day were undreamed of fifty years ago. In this crisis what agency shall save our public schools? What, indeed, if not our normal schools? To them therefore does the nation look for the imparting to the young of loyalty to high ideals and unswerving devotion to duty. Can the normal schools discharge this high office? To answer this question it is necessary to consider the aim of the normal school.

Article II.—The Aim of the Normal School.

The fifth resolution at the Cleveland Meeting of the National Education Association in 1908 (Normal School Department) reads:

*"Resolved, That while the normal school is not the only agent for the training of teachers, it is the State's chief agent, and as such it should set up the standards of teaching, determine the ideals, and train the men and women whose call is to educational leadership."*¹

¹ *Proceedings of National Education Association*, 1909, p. 551.

The normal school aims, therefore, to give the teacher his professional preparation. This view is confirmed by Professor Gordy in *The Rise and Growth of the Normal School Idea*.¹

"I hold, with the Massachusetts Board of Education, that the design of the normal school is strictly professional; that is, to prepare in the best possible manner the pupils for the work of organizing, governing, and teaching the public schools, and that this professional preparation includes the most thorough knowledge, first, of the branches of learning required to be taught in the schools; second, of the best methods of teaching these branches; third, of right mental training; and I hold that in our system of schools the normal school is not only the proper agency for undertaking the whole of the professional training of intending teachers of a certain grade, but that it is the only institution which really professes to supply any of his professional needs. The theory that normal schools have no business to give instruction in the subjects their pupils are preparing to teach, I regard as a survival of the fallacy of the monitorial system (of Bell and Lancaster), which held that the bare knowledge of a fact qualifies its possessor to teach it."²

In the realization of its aim of training for professional service, the normal school must depend chiefly upon its faculty; for "the faculty is the soul of the institution."³ There are four qualifications which every member should possess: character, teaching-ability,

¹ Published as *Bulletin No. 8*, 1891, Bureau of Education.

² P. 130. It is well to bear in mind that this study was published in 1891. In more recent years not a few universities have divided the field with the normal schools, among them New York University where Professor J. P. Gordy taught for several years before his death.

³ See "Function of Normal School," Report of Special Committee on Normal Schools, *Proceedings of National Education Association*, 1899, p. 838.

scholarship, and culture;¹ and of these character stands first. "Nothing can take its place." A like judgment is pronounced by James E. Russell, Dean of Teachers' College, Columbia University, as a result of many years of practical experience in preparing teachers for the proper discharge of their office.

"The first qualification for professional service, therefore, is good character, the conscious striving for high ideals. The professional worker looks to the future and is pledged by his vocation to make the future better than the present. Such an aim implies in these days the possession of two other qualifications, each potent and indispensable. One of these is specialized knowledge, and the other is skill. These three—an ethical aim, specialized knowledge, and technical skill—are the trinity upon which professional service rests. The stone-cutter may have superior skill, but with only a modicum of specialized knowledge and lacking an ethical aim, he remains the artisan; the physician who is ignorant of his subject, however high his aim or however skillful in practice, is still a quack; if he is learned in high degree but lacks professional skill, he is a confirmed bungler; the lawyer who is versed in the subtleties of the law and adroit in legal procedure, but who disregards the ethics of his profession, is a charlatan despised of men.

"The teacher may be a professional worker. But he who puts himself in the professional class must know accurately what he is to do, have the requisite skill for doing it, and do his work under the guidance of high ethical principles. The teacher who is ignorant of his subject is a quack; the teacher who lacks professional skill is a bungler; the teacher who is not inspired by high ideals is a charlatan."²

What, then, is this ethical aim which every teacher should possess and which therefore should pre-eminently

¹ Ibid.

² "Professional Factors in the Training of the High School Teacher," *Educational Review*, Vol. XLV (March, 1913), pp. 218, 219.

direct the actions of every member of the normal school faculty? According to Dean Russell, it is "intelligent self-direction."¹ In this art the normal school professor is presumed to be expert when he is placed over normal students; for must he not train them to follow high ideals? In this difficult yet inspiring work he must so impart moral principles that they will become dynamic factors not only in shaping the conduct of each and every one of the normal students with whom he comes into personal relations, but likewise and especially in molding through them the lives of all their future pupils. In his endeavor to reach this result, what resources can the professor command?

Fundamentally these are the same as the resources available for the teacher of the grade school or the high school.

"What we need in education is a genuine faith in the existence of moral principles which are capable of effective application. . . . The teacher who operates in this faith will find every subject, every method of instruction, every incident of school life pregnant with moral possibility."²

From this it follows that moral principles should dominate every moment of school life. This they cannot do unless they be knit into every fiber of the teacher's conscious life. It is only through the teacher's personality that they can (1) pervade the curriculum, (2) shape the methods, (3) determine and enrich the spirit of the school, as Professor Dewey so earnestly

¹ Op. cit., p. 229.

² Prof. Dewey, *Moral Principles in Education*, pp. 57, 58.

recommends. It is by seeing moral principles exemplified in the daily conduct of his teacher that the pupil's "faith" in these principles is to be fostered and developed. This was fully appreciated by the International Committee on Moral Training, when its Executive Chairman, Clifford W. Barnes, presented this statement to the National Education Association, in 1911:

"The teacher, through his personality, should bring religion to the aid of morality. Considering my words very carefully, I have no hesitation in affirming that an irreligious person has no right to teach in a public school. . . . I mean by 'irreligious' a person who fails to perceive any relation between the finite and the infinite, who recognizes no supreme good in the universe, who has no consciousness 'of a power not himself that makes for righteousness.' Such men are often caught by the tide of wholesome life which surrounds them on every side, and are carried on to the achievement of a noble career. But as teachers of the young they lack in the spirit of reverence, in the discernment of true values, in the power to quicken high ideals, and in that love for self-sacrifice which the Great Teacher taught his disciples."¹

Furthermore, "the most dangerous man to-day, socially, is the religionless man, because he is the rudderless man, a derelict upon life's sea."² Religion "shifts the individual's attention from self to society, and in so doing makes him a better citizen."³ The

¹ *Proceedings of National Education Association*, 1911, pp. 399, 400.

² Wm. W. Elwang, *University of Missouri Studies, Social Science Series*, Vol. II, "The Social Function of Religious Belief," p. 96.

³ *Ibid*, p. 93.

State relies on the school to train the young for loyal and upright service in society.¹ The common school in turn appeals to the normal school for deeply religious teachers of forceful personality. By what means can the normal school supply this demand other than through the personality of its teaching staff? We have quoted above the words of Professor John Dewey. In his judgment there are three sources of moral training: (1) the curriculum, (2) methods of teaching, (3) the atmosphere of the school, its social spirit. Let us consider the curriculum.

Article III.—The Curriculum of the Normal School.

Historically, the first classes for the training of teachers in the United States made no attempt to give any professional preparation, in the proper meaning of that term.² They were concerned simply with imparting to the candidates a knowledge of the subjects which they would have to teach.³ So meager a program

¹ Cf. Dewey: "The moral responsibility of the school, and of those who conduct it, is to society." *Moral Principles in Education*, p. 7. See also his "Course of Study, Theory of," and C. A. Perry's "School as a Social Center," in Monroe's *Cyclopedia of Education*.

² Concerning the first normal schools in Europe, see Gordy, op. cit. pp. 17, 18. Monroe's *Cyclopedia of Education*, in the articles, "Training of Teachers" and "Normal School," makes no mention of the work of St. John Baptist de la Salle in establishing normal schools in 1681 and 1684.

³ See Gordy, op. cit. Chaps. I, II.

was soon found to be inadequate; and to it were added mental philosophy, psychology, and moral philosophy.¹ In 1899 the Committee on Normal Schools recommended the following course as the ideal at which the normal school should aim:²

I.—*Man in himself*, embracing: physiology, psychology, ethics, religion. II.—*Man in the race*, embracing: history, anthropology, literature, general psychology. III.—*Man in nature*, embracing: physics, chemistry, biology, mathematics, physiography, astronomy. IV.—*Man in society*, embracing: sociology, government, home economics. V.—*Man in expression*, embracing: language, drawing, construction, physical culture, music, art. VI.—*Man in school*, embracing: philosophy of education, science and art of teaching, history of education, school economics.

It is significant that this committee looked upon religious teaching not only as necessary for “man in himself,” but also as the most important of the four subjects grouped under that heading: this is indicated by the order in which they named it.³ In the estimation of the members, ethics without religion would not be sufficient for the future teacher. This phase of the matter under consideration at once raises the question: What is the criterion that should determine the selection of subjects for the curriculum? An answer has been given by Professor Dewey in discussing this topic with reference to the common school. With slight modification it may be applied to the normal school also.

¹ Ibid., chap. IV.

² *National Education Association Proceedings*, 1899, p. 841.

³ See also *The Modern High School*, by Johnston and others, pp. 753, 754.

"A study is to be considered as a means of bringing the child to realize the social scene of action. Thus considered, it gives a criterion for selection of material and for judgment of values. We have at present three independent values set up" [viz., culture, information, discipline].¹

If, in this statement, the phrase "social scene of action" be interpreted broadly, the "ideal" course mentioned above will be found to measure up to this requirement. However, the general lines of the curriculum which every school should aim to include have been sketched more briefly and indicated more clearly under these five topics: literature, science, art, religion, and institutions.² Collectively they constitute what is sometimes spoken of as man's "five-fold spiritual inheritance." We conclude, therefore, that the normal school as a school must either presuppose or provide training in these five subjects; that is, in the first five divisions of the "ideal" scheme outlined above. As a normal, or professional school it must likewise include the theory and the practice of teaching.³ The theory is provided for in the sixth division of the "ideal" plan, and the practice is realized in classes for the observation of model lessons and methods, and for the teaching given by normal students under direction and subject to criticism.

In concluding this section we again call attention to

¹ Op. cit., p. 21.

² Butler, *Meaning of Education*, p. 17; Shields, *Psychology of Education*, Lesson IX, pp. 111-114.

³ Cf. Ruediger, *Principles of Education*, pp. 5, 10; Gordy, op. cit., pp. 129, 130; Elmer E. Brown, *Education*, Vol. XXIX, pp. 1-6.

the fact that the special committee appointed in 1898 by the National Education Association to prepare a report on the Function of the Normal School regarded religion as an essential study in the curriculum. The quotation which we have given from Professor Dewey suggests the value of the moral viewpoint as a determinant of the method of teaching. It is unequivocally asserted by Prof. F. W. Foerster:

"It is not what we know, but for what purpose we know it, and in what relation it stands to the Most High and Almighty, that is of importance in genuine education. It is not the fact that we can read and write that really matters, but what we read and write."¹

Yet in spite of this, we find the following "Summary of Inferences and Conclusions" given by Prof. W. C. Bagley, in 1911, on "The Present Status of Moral Education in Institutions for the Training of Teachers":²

"1. Explicit instruction in the principles of moral education is provided for by separate courses in relatively few universities, colleges, and normal schools. Such courses are found much less frequently in the normal schools than in the colleges and universities.

¹ *Jugendlehre* (p. 7): "Nicht dass man etwas weiss, sondern wozu man es weiss und in welchem Zusammenhang mit dem Allerhöchsten und Allerwichtigsten—das macht echte Bildung aus. Und nicht dass man lesen und schreiben kann, sondern was man liest und was man schreibt, darauf kommt es an."

Although not a Catholic, Dr. Foerster, formerly of the University of Zurich, now of the University of Vienna, has been brought, by his studies and his experience in the training of youth, from the tenets of Ethical Culture "to the very doors of Rome."

² See *Religious Education*, February, 1911, "Training Public School Teachers," pp. 639 f.; also pp. 633, 634.

"2. Courses in ethics are offered in seventy per cent. of the colleges and universities, and in twenty-two per cent. of the normal schools. In neither type of institution are the courses in ethics frequently required of intending teachers.

"3. Instruction in the principles and methods of moral education seems to be chiefly provided for by the courses in the history and theory of education, and in school management. Although more than a majority of the instructors in these institutions believes that, in the lower schools, indirect moral instruction through literature, history, and science has a very important place, there seems to be little explicit effort to emphasize, in presenting these subjects to intending teachers, the methods through which their moral values may be realized. It is to be inferred that this is done mainly in the instruction which is provided in the history and theory of education, and possibly also in connection with observation and practice teaching.

"4. A majority of those engaged in the teaching of teachers for the elementary and secondary schools place the greatest emphasis upon school life as a source of moral education, although indirect but systematic instruction through literature, history, and science is also deemed to be of very great importance. A strong minority favors explicit instruction through principle and precept illustrated by concrete cases. The prevailing opinion is that religious instruction in any form has no place in the elementary and secondary schools.

"5. There is noticeable among many of those engaged in the training of teachers a feeling that the problems of moral education are particularly intangible and elusive, and that a concerted effort to untangle at least some of the strands in this web is essential to the next step in educational progress."

From these citations we seem to be justified in concluding that, in the discharge of its function of training intending teachers for the work of developing the social efficiency of their future pupils, the normal school relies chiefly (1) upon forming the normal students to right methods of teaching, and (2) upon subjecting the personality of the normal students to the inspiring

personality of the normal staff. Let us now briefly consider the question of method.

Article IV.—Method in the Normal School.

Method in general signifies a way of doing something. In both its etymology and its application the term implies at least a possible choice of ways. It is also inseparably and essentially bound up with the idea of a goal to be reached, a purpose to be attained. The value of a method of education must therefore be determined first of all by its intrinsic connection with the end and aim of education. Its actual efficiency must depend upon the knowledge and the skill of the teacher who applies it. What method is most highly recommended to-day by educators of repute and influence?

It is the genetic method. Its vogue is due to the doctrine of evolution, whose principles and methods have seeped through every stratum of the educational system. We may sum up its functions in three words: Study present conditions, trace their origin in the past, make a forecast of the effects which they are likely to produce in the future. In the words of Professor Dewey:¹

"The method, as well as the material, is genetic when the effort is made to see just *why and how* the fact shows itself, what is the state out of which it naturally proceeds, what the conditions of its manifestation, how it came to be there anyway, and what

¹ Introduction, pp. xiii, xv, to Irving King's *Psychology of Child Development*. Cf. also Dr. Pace, "Survey of the Problems," Lesson III, in Dr. Shields' *Psychology of Education*.

other changes it arouses or checks after it comes to be there. . . . In a truly genetic method, the idea of genesis looks both ways; this fact is itself generated out of certain conditions, and in turn tends to generate something else."

The graduate of the normal school must be equipped to grasp the significant relations of the various school studies to the realities of life, to trace their connections with the activities in which the pupils of the grade schools are interested; in a word, to make the knowledge that is of most worth function in building up in the pupils, both as individuals and as members of a group, the habits that make for honorable citizenship. In the words of Dr. Foerster:¹

"The training of the educator and teacher must follow two lines: on the one hand, it must observe and study in detail the actual world as the child experiences it; and on the other, it must examine what moral action is to be required of the child—for this purpose not only investigating in a general way the philosophical or religious basis of such action, but also and especially thoroughly grasping its concrete meaning and content, its bearings on all other spheres of life, and its sociological and biological aspects."

The school, therefore, must function as a social in-

¹ *Jugendlehre* (p. 21): "Die Schulung des Erziehers und Lehrers muss dementsprechend nach zwei Richtungen gehen: Einmal jene wirkliche Welt des Kindes eingehend zu beobachten und zu studieren—und andererseits die geforderte sittliche Leistung nicht etwa nur in ihrer philosophischen oder religiösen Begründung zu erforschen, sondern sie vor allem in ihrem konkreten Sinn und Gehalt, ihren Bedingungen zu allen andern Lebensgebieten, ihrer soziologischen und biologischen Seite erschöpfend aufzufassen." See also E. J. Swift, *Learning and Doing*, Chap. II, "Efficient Teaching;" Joseph K. Hart, *A Critical Study of Current Theories of Moral Education*, pp. 27, 28; G. H. Betts, *Social Principles of Education*, p. 91.

stitution. To be able to co-operate in making this phase of school life effective, the intending teacher must receive preparation in the normal school. What, then, is the atmosphere of the normal school? Does it favor the development, by the teacher, of a genuine social spirit in the schoolroom in which he begins to teach?

Article V.—The Spirit of the Normal School.

We again quote from what has been termed the "Normal School Bible,"¹ viz., the Report of the Special Committee on the "Function of the Normal School." In the section on the "Inner Life of the Normal School" we read:

"In the school life of normal schools there is probably collected a larger percentage of serious-minded, thoughtful, earnest people than in any other kind of an educational institution. The majority of these have a definite purpose and are prepared to do very much for each other socially, morally, religiously. Wherever the student organizations known as the Young Men's Christian Association and the Young Women's Association are encouraged and authorized to exist, there great benefit has always come to the moral and religious life of the general student body."²

The worth of a right spirit in the school is clearly indicated in the following lines:

"The first requisite in the discharge of its function is that the normal school shall inspire the student with the spirit of the true teacher. Its atmosphere must be such that he will be continually

¹ *National Education Association Proceedings*, 1909, p. 561.

² *National Education Association Proceedings*, 1899, p. 862.

breathing in this spirit. He is to consider the acquisition and use of knowledge, the exercises of the school, his own purpose, manners, and conduct from the point of view of the teacher. It is vitally important to awaken in the normal student a just appreciation of the work of the teacher, that he must have the spirit of service, must love his work, love his pupils, feel that he has a mission which he must accomplish, and come to his pupils, as the Great Teacher comes to men, that they may have life abundantly. This end can be accomplished only by a school whose sole purpose is the education of teachers, and whose faculty is consecrated to this service."¹

These are noble words. Their acceptance makes it obligatory on the faculty of the normal school (1) to cherish a high ideal of their profession, (2) persistently to endeavor to live up to it with a view to inspire and to train the normal students under their guidance. In other words, the spirit of the normal school depends chiefly on the personality of the teachers.² And so we are brought back to our first topic, the aim of the normal school, which we saw depends for its realization on the personality of the teaching staff. The words of Archbishop J. L. Spalding are true: "As the heart makes the home, the teacher makes the school."³ Now personality spells character. In the words of Col. Francis W. Parker: "No matter how much educators may differ in regard to the means and methods of teaching, upon one point there is substantial agreement;

¹ Ibid., pp. 884, 885.

² Cf. Rt. Rev. T. J. Conaty, D. D., "The Personality of the Teacher," in *National Education Association Proceedings*, 1907, pp. 77-87; also *Moral Training in the Public Schools*. Essay by Charles E. Rugh, p. 20.

³ *Means and Ends of Education*, p. 135.

viz., that the end and aim of all education is the development of character.”¹

What is character? This unmistakable stamp upon the moral fiber of the individual has two distinctive marks: unity and stability of purpose. They are acquired through self-knowledge and self-dominion.² They are the product of intellectual and moral habits. Character therefore implies a comprehension of the meaning of life, a clear vision of end and means and values. Does the present tendency to secure moral training by organizing the child's experiences give due recognition to the elements of character? May education be adequately defined as “the progressive reconstruction of experience, with a growing consciousness of social values and an increasing control over the processes of experience?”³ Does not this view suggest Herbert Spencer's definition of the moral sense; viz., “the experiences of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race?”⁴ Is the experience of the race to be the sole guide of the teacher in the discharge of his apostolic functions? Who or what shall interpret this experience? More-

¹ *Talks on Teaching*, p. 164, ed. 1893.

² See Gillet, *The Education of Character*, pp. 16 ff., 30 ff. Arthur Holmes somewhat inadequately defines character as “the total customary reaction of an individual to his environment.” *Principles of Character Making*, p. 28. His fundamental principles are opposed to Catholic teaching. Cf. *Catholic Educational Review*, Jan., 1915.

³ Betts, *Social Principles of Education*, p. 164.

⁴ Letter to John Stuart Mill, quoted in Bain's *Mental and Moral Science*, p. 722, ed. 1868.

over, if the interpreter of experience lack the confidence that springs from the assured possession of the truth, how can he stir the deeper emotions that direct the current of one's life? In the words of St. Paul: "If the trumpet give an uncertain sound, who shall prepare himself to the battle?"¹ Whoever accepts Spencer's appraisal of the moral sense, logically admits also his definition of life as "the continuous adjustment of internal relations to external relations."² Yet, by 1898, Spencer had come to the conclusion that "in its ultimate nature Life is incomprehensible."³ We are here face to face with difficulties.

Article VI.—Limitations of the Normal School.

We have considered the aim, the curriculum, the method, and the spirit of the normal school. We have found that in all these respects the absolutely indispensable factor is the personality of the teacher—of the teacher that is, forming and developing the personality of the teacher that is to be. Modern pedagogy refers this fact to the principle of "expression through action"; that is, the teacher's mental attitude is expressed in his conduct.⁴ The formation of a noble character is dependent on the development of right mental and moral habits. But habit-

¹ I Cor. xiv, 8.

² *Principles of Biology*, Vol. I, p. 30.

³ See his letter in *Nature* (London), October 12, 1898, Vol. LVIII, pp. 592, 593.

⁴ Cf. Thorndike, *Education*, p. 186.

building demands more than frequent and regular repetition of acts. These acts must be performed under the stress of deep emotion if they are to contribute their share to the life, the higher life, of either intending teacher or prospective pupil. Professor Starbuck says it "seems to be one of the great streams of religious development, to give those deeper racial instincts which are consistent with self-development and the development of society the fullest possible expression, and gradually to transform and enlarge them into spiritual forces."¹ Supplementing this is the statement of Frank Cramer in the fourth of the California Prize Essays:

"Without either insisting or desiring that the religious sanctions of morality be directly taught in the schools, we may here admit the secret of the perennial power of the religious sanctions of morality as it is generally understood in our country. It is based not on the power to command and the duty to obey, but on a personal, spiritual relation between the individual and his God—a relation that is immediate, constant, and worthy, and that no changes in life or environment can modify. History has proved this Hebrew-Christian view to be the only one that can hold common men intellectually and spiritually true to the best ideals of the race."²

The reflections of Archbishop J. L. Spalding are here pertinent:

"If education is a training for completeness of life, its primary element is the religious, for complete life is life in God. Hence we may not assume an attitude toward the child, whether in the home, in the church, or in the school, which might imply that life apart from God could be anything else than broken and frag-

¹ *Psychology of Religion*, p. 347.

² *Moral Training in the Public Schools*, p. 139.

mentary. A complete man is not one whose mind only is active and enlightened; but he is a complete man who is alive in all his faculties. The truly human is found not in knowledge alone, but also in faith, in hope, in love, in pure-mindedness, in reverence, in the sense of beauty, in devoutness, in the thrill of awe which Goethe says is the highest thing in man. If the teacher is forbidden to touch upon religion, the source of these noble virtues and ideal moods is sealed. His work and influence become mechanical, and he will form but commonplace and vulgar men. And if an educational system is established on this narrow and material basis, the result will be deterioration of the national type, and the loss of the finer qualities which make men many-sided and interesting, which are the safeguards of personal purity and of unselfish conduct.”¹

How does this restriction affect the normal school?

1. In the first place, it lowers the aim. The teacher may not officially look upon the Great Teacher of mankind as the divine Exemplar of his office. Indeed many of the books written by prominent educators of our age place the Founder of Christianity in the same rank with Socrates, Plato, Locke, and Milton. This very attitude narrows the vision of the intending teacher and lessens the nobility of his profession, whose worth, on the other hand, the Christian projects into a world beyond time. The development of both his own and his pupils' character is no longer fraught with such teeming interest, for the results are virtually limited to the brief span of a human life. Yet the Christian believes firmly that these effects are everlasting. Even though the teacher profess as an individual the faith established by Jesus Christ, yet as teacher he continually finds his religious freedom circumscribed in its natural exercise and ex-

¹ *Means and Ends of Education*, pp. 168, 169.

pression by the formal prohibition against the teaching of religion.

2. This restriction affects the curriculum. It is indeed true that Christianity, for example, is not a mere body of doctrine to be learned; it is pre-eminently a code of perfection to be lived. Yet the very omission of a subject from the curriculum is in itself a judgment against the relative value of that subject. Neither teacher nor pupil in the normal school is completely immune against such a deadly innuendo.¹ This prohibition likewise extends to the positively religious aspects of other subjects in the curriculum, and it falls with a special severity upon one field of English literature.

"Knowledge of the English Bible is passing out of the life of the rising generation, and . . . with this knowledge of the Bible there is fast disappearing any acquaintance with the religious element which has shaped our civilization from the beginning. . . . Teachers all over this land are trying to teach Chaucer and Spenser, Shakespeare, Tennyson, and Browning. How are they to understand men who refer to the Bible, that veritable treasure-house of literature, on every page, if they cannot take the children to the source from which the supply is drawn? How are they to discuss and interpret the style of Ruskin, of Carlyle, of Emerson? How are they to teach the history of the heroes of our own independence, many of whom were religious in every fiber of their being, and whose work will continue to bear the stamp put upon it in the beginning, utterly regardless of what has become of religious faith in the interval? How is one to teach the truth as history reveals it, unless he teaches the whole truth?"²

¹ Cf. E. A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, pp. 18, 19.

² N. M. Butler, "Some Pressing Problems," p. 74, in *National Education Association Proceedings*, 1902.

3. This prohibition against the teaching of a definite faith in the State normal schools has its effect upon method also. "The fact that religious instruction is excluded makes it all the more necessary," says Archbishop Spalding, "that humanizing and ethical aims should be kept constantly in view."¹ In every subject, in every lesson, the teacher must strive to keep the ethical content and viewpoint well to the fore. Not, indeed, that this is sufficient for a thoroughly Christian scheme of education, but it is all that the law allows. And yet book after book, review after review that touches upon this theme, tells of how inadequate are the means at hand to fit the young generation for life's trials and temptations. The "self-realization" of the play-ground, the school-city, and vocational training must be crowned by "self-mastery." Of old it was termed self-denial, by Christian writers.² That it is not less necessary to-day than when it was fed by living faith, may appear from the statement of the Head Master of Eton, that "the most certain result" of separating a child's morality from his religious belief, is "the perishing of the latter and the weakening of the former."³ He adds: "If, on the other hand, there have been no religious beliefs implanted, I should say that, with a normal child, good moral instruction would very often secure chastity during boyhood, but would be an

¹ *Means and Ends of Education*, p. 141.

² Cf. Matt. xvi, 24.

³ Edward Lyttleton, *Educational Review*, Vol. XLVI (Sept., 1913), p. 137. See also p. 138,

insufficient protection during adolescence and early manhood, when deeply laid principles are required to take the place of simple obedience to parents."

The method that meets with greatest favor to-day is the genetic method already described; but its scope is greatly circumscribed by the exclusion of religion and the religious viewpoint. The value of the exact sciences is not comparable to the worth of an exact knowledge of man's origin, nature, and destiny; and this knowledge is given by dogmatic Christianity. Yet it is not easy to overestimate the value of such living moral methods as are sketched by Professor Foerster in his *Jugendlehre* (Instruction of Youth). Could they be applied by thoroughly Christian teachers full of intelligent zeal for their calling and free to follow the inspirations of their faith, these methods would prove to be beyond price. Just as Cardinal Newman has paid high tribute to the value of natural religion,¹ so, since "Grace completes nature," every Christian should desire to have the best natural conditions obtain as affording a richer opportunity for the action of grace. We therefore commend three other books of Dr. Foerster: *Schule und Charakter* (School and Character), which he calls a "contribution to the pedagogy of obedience and to the reform of school discipline"; *Lebensführung* (The Conduct of Life), "a book for young people"; and *Sexualethik und Sexualpädagogik*, the English transla-

¹ *Grammar of Assent*, pp. 389-408. Baudin, "La Philosophie de la Foi chez Newman" (June, July, Sept., Oct., 1906), in *Revue de Philosophie*, thinks that Newman magnifies the scope of natural religion.

tion of which bears the title "Marriage and the Sex-Problem." Yet, great as is the favor with which these books have been received, and however dynamic their methods, the author has confessed that they are very inadequate for present needs. "He has no doubt that the more pedagogy is really concerned with the concrete problem of character-formation, with the dark enigma of man's self-seeking, with his tragic dissension of will, with the psychology of experimentation, and with the dynamics of self-conquest, the safer will it be to recognize again the pedagogically indispensable character of religious inspiration and the insufficiency of the modern substitute." These words are taken from his address at the Second International Congress of Moral Education, held at The Hague in 1912.¹

The method which Dr. Foerster and others have advocated is at best a help. It is not a substitute for religion.

4. The spirit of the school also suffers from this restriction. It is a fact of experience, which the psychologist has endeavored to explain, that the average man will express his religious feelings and convictions freely only in the presence of those who share his faith or at least regard it with no unfriendly eye.² Such an attitude tends to dim the luster of faith and to lower the pulse of charity. The supernatural ceases to be the great motive power in life, and the longing for the

¹ *Mémoires sur l'Education Morale présentés au deuxième Congrès*, August, 1912, p. 5.

² Cf. Father Faber, *Notes on Doctrinal and Spiritual Subjects*, Vol. II, "English Catholicism," pp. 97-116.

better and nobler activities dies down to contentment with an ordinary existence. This in turn reacts on our associates and through them also upon others.¹ And so it is that the illumination of supernatural faith is wanting to the teaching staff and to the students in their mutual relations, to the subjects of study, and even to the profession of teaching. Hence it is that the best fuel for life-long consecration to the work of education is often wanting and the professional spirit may wane.²

Article VII.—Summary.

Fortunately we have received from the past a rich heritage of Christian doctrine, Christian ideals, and Christian standards. Even non-Christians cannot escape their influence. But if we would be true to our trust, we must accept this faith, cherish these ideals, and square our lives by these standards. The public school system of this country is an act of faith in the efficacy of universal education. It is an act of faith in the loyalty of the public school teachers. It is an act

¹The reverse of this picture is well described by Foerster: "Eine Ahnung von der Heiligkeit dieser Kunst bekommt man manchmal, wenn man einmal so einem begnadeten Menschen begegnet, dessen blosse Nähe so wirkt, dass wir das Beste sagen was in uns ist und uns besser fühlen in seiner Gegenwart—ein Mensch, der alles von uns erreichen kann, was er will, weil sein Ton es bewirkt, dass wir alles vergessen, was hart und wild in uns ist, und nur noch atmen und leben mögen mit dem was ihm ähnlich ist." *Jugendlehre*, p. 52. Cf. Cardinal Newman on the "Idea of a Saint," *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations*, pp. 94, 95.

²Cf. G. H. Betts, *Social Principles of Education*, p. 111.

of faith in the possibility of equal opportunity to all. It is faith, for it is "the evidence of things that appear not."¹ But the faith is human; it does not rise to the fatherhood of God; it does not grasp the deeper meaning of the brotherhood of man. May not divine faith be incorporated in the work of education? This question we will consider in the next chapter.

¹ Heb. xi, 2.

CHAPTER II.

THE RELIGIOUS NOVITIATE.

Article I.—The Religious Life in General.

SINCE the Religious Novitiate is the period of preparation for entrance into a religious order, its value is to be estimated in terms of the religious life for which it prepares. It is therefore necessary to consider briefly the nature and the purpose of the religious life as developed in and by the orders and congregations of the Catholic Church. However much these societies may differ in the aim peculiar to each, they all agree in their endeavor to procure the glory of God by laboring for the salvation of the souls of the individual members. Moreover, since they possess a unity analogous in kind, but superior in efficacy, to that of the living organism, the welfare of the whole society redounds to the benefit of each individual member, and *vice versa*. Furthermore since each order or congregation seeks to apply in a special way the principles of Christian teaching and practice promulgated by the Catholic Church, it follows that the excellence which it attains or the good which it works, becomes part of the common treasury of the whole Catholic Church. Hence it is that each such religious society is a genuinely social institution, contributing generously to the welfare not only of the

Catholic Church, but also of mankind at large. This point will be developed more fully later. Let us in passing note this fact of history, to which Balmes invites our attention,¹ that wherever the Church thrives and the spirit of her message to the race takes deep root, there also springs up a crop of generous souls who long for the more perfect realization of the life exemplified in the person of our Saviour. This very longing, if persistent, becomes, for its possessor, a kind of tangible proof of his latent ability to pursue this higher life. Among Catholics such a person is said to possess a "vocation" to either the priesthood or the religious life.^{2, 3}

¹ *European Civilization*, p. 221.

² That the religious life does not necessarily include the priesthood follows from: (1) its history (Cf. Montalembert, *Monks of the West*, Vol. I, pp. 166, 298, 398); (2) the fact that it is open to women; (3) the approbation which the Holy See has given to lay religious.

Religious orders and congregations agree in these respects: 1. They are associations of persons of the same sex who live under a common rule; 2. The members have bound themselves by the three vows of voluntary poverty, perfect chastity, and entire obedience, to strive for the attainment of Christian perfection as outlined in the Gospels; 3. Their association has been sanctioned by papal, or at least by episcopal, approbation. They differ, however, especially in this, that the members of a religious order are bound for life by solemn vows with their derivative obligations; whereas the members of a religious congregation are bound by simple vows, which at first may be temporary only, *i. e.*, for one year or for three years, but which eventually must become perpetual, *i. e.*, they must cover the remaining span of mortal life. Cf. Heimbucher, *Die Orden und Kongregationen der Katholischen Kirche*, Vol. I, pp. 1 ff., 23 ff.

For our present purpose it is not necessary to dwell upon the distinction between an order and a congregation. Accordingly we will use the two terms interchangeably.

Since those persons who followed the call to this higher life, took upon themselves the special obligation of tending to the perfection of Christianity (that is, of striving not merely to keep the commandments of God, but also to practise the Gospel counsels), they became 'bound' to the service of God in a special way, and hence they were known as 'religious.' So early even as A. D. 450, we find the term *religio* used by the Second Council of Arles to designate what would now be called a religious order. Later the term *ordo* (order) was substituted, suggesting more particularly the idea of social organization.¹ To it was sometimes added the qualifying adjective *religiosus* (religious) or *regularis* (according to rule). The fundamental idea embodied in the word 'congregation' is that of flock; viz., one fold with one shepherd, the superior.

From these considerations certain ideas stand out prominently: 1. The religious life as expressed in the religious orders and congregations of the Catholic Church is a state,² constituted such by the vows; it is therefore a permanent institution, and as such includes: (a) a system of fundamental principles guiding the judgments and correcting the conclusions of those who share its life; (b) an ethical code, determining their outward conduct and in this way influencing to some extent the feelings and emotions that give color to their daily life; (c) an educational agency illustrating in a notable way

¹ Id., p. 19.

² St. Thomas (tr. Proctor), *The Religious State*, Chaps. XV, XVI.

the principle that solidarity promotes individuality—*i. e.*, that the highest development of the individual is attained by sincere and active co-operation in the work special to the society.¹ 2. The religious state imposes the obligation of “tending to perfection” by the practice of the Evangelical counsels. It implies continual growth and development. “Not to advance is to recede” is a maxim of spiritual writers. 3. In other words, as a state tending toward Christian perfection, it imposes on its members the obligation of striving for the Christian ideal. “I have given you a new commandment,” said our Lord; “that you love one another as I have loved you.”² The religious life is, therefore, characterized by genuine social service.³

For comprehensive knowledge of these principles, for adequate control over their application, for habitual regulation of one’s conduct by the great end to which these principles should lead, careful, consistent, and persistent preparation is not only advisable but imperative. The religious life is more than a craft demanding a period of diligent apprenticeship; it is, even in the language of the Catholic Church, a profession⁴ as well as a vocation, and therefore, like the so-called “learned professions,” it calls for a period of earnest preparation.

¹ Baldwin, *The Individual and Society*, Chap. I.

² John xiii, 34.

³ Heimbucher, *op. cit.*, pp. 109-111.

⁴ *Id.*, p. 20.

A religious profession is obviously a public assumption of the duties of the religious life. According to the laws of the Church now in force, it "denotes the act of embracing the religious state by the three vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience according to the rule of an order canonically approved."¹ Such an act supposes in the one who makes it, (1) a trained will, otherwise he would be incapable of the self-mastery revealed in his act of "self-donation"; (2) a trained judgment, extending not only to the rights and privileges accruing to him as member of an order, but also and in a particular manner to the obligations which he freely takes upon himself for life; (3) a practical spirit of sincere co-operation with his fellow-religious in those channels of social service through which the order justifies before men both its claim to existence and its appeal for increased membership. Engagements of this kind are not lightly to be assumed. Hence from the very character of the religious profession, as well as from the nature of the religious life, it follows that a period of preparation is indispensable. If years of careful training at West Point are held to be a necessary equipment for military service, if a special and comprehensive education is considered requisite at Annapolis for candidates for the Navy, some preparation is evidently desirable in one who is to devote his life not only to acquiring the science of sanctity but also to becoming proficient in the art of holy living. For the religious life, although a state, is, in the mind of the Church, not a static con-

¹ Vermeersch, *Catholic Encyclopedia*, "Profession, Religious."

dition, but a dynamic factor in both individual development and social betterment.

According to Professor Ruediger,¹ "Education as a professional study and practice has, (1) a theory of aims, values, and content; (2) a theory of instruction and training; (3) a history; (4) a theory of management and control; and (5) a technic of practice." The religious orders hold a prominent place among the great educational agencies controlled by the Catholic Church. They too have: (1) a theory of aims and values that comes from the very Founder of Christianity; (2) a content or curriculum embodying the best traditions of this mode of life from the days of the first hermits down to our own age; (3) a method of instruction and training that has grown up out of the experience of the great founders of orders; (4) a history that is intimately connected not only with the history of the Catholic Church, but also with that of Christian civilization; (5) a theory of management and control embodied in the rules and constitutions as approved by ecclesiastical authority; (6) a technic of practice which is begun in the novitiate. The novitiate is therefore the "normal school" of the religious life. It is a school that prepares for the profession of religion. St. Benedict, the great lawgiver of the Monks of the West, speaks of it as "the school of the Lord's service."²

¹ *Principles of Education*, p. 10.

² *Prologue of the Rule*, tr. by a monk of St. Benedict's Abbey, Fort Augustus, p. 11, cited by T. W. Allies, in *The Monastic Life*, p. 175.

Article II.—The Nature and Aim of the Novitiate.

The period of preparation for that formal entrance into the religious life which is effected by the act of religious profession, is known as the novitiate. The term is also applied to the house in which this preparation is made. He who wishes to become a member of the order is known as a 'postulant' from the time when he has been received into the house of the novitiate to the date of his reception of the religious habit. After his request for admission has been duly accepted by the proper authorities in the order, he is clothed in the religious habit and is henceforth a 'novice.' The term itself reminds us of how the Catholic Church takes the mean and lowly things of this world and, appropriating them to the purposes of her mission, lifts them up to the plane of her spiritual life. In the ancient Roman days of the elder Cato, a 'novice' was a newly acquired slave, in contrast to a *veterator*, a slave worn out by years of labor and suffering in the service of a master. Now the "word *novice* . . . is the canonical Latin name of those, who, having been regularly admitted into a religious order and ordinarily confirmed in their high vocation by a certain period of probation as postulants, are prepared by a series of exercises and tests for the religious profession." ¹

¹ A. Vermeersch, *Catholic Encyclopedia*, "Novice." Cf. Heimbucher, *op. cit.* Vol. I, pp. 7 ff. Allies, *Formation of Christendom*, Vol. I, p. 71. When Newman was made Rector of the Catholic University of Ireland, he asked Mr. Allies to take the chair of history.

The novitiate is, therefore, (1) a period of preparation. As such it should interest: (a) the genetic psychologist who sees in the present the promise and potency of the future; (b) the teacher, whose life is spent in preparing the young for citizenship and social service. (2) It is a period of preparation for the religious 'life;' and therefore it has analogies to those features of adjustment that may be attractive to the biologist in his study of organic life. (3) It is a preparation for the 'religious' life. As such it is of interest: (a) to the theologian, who makes a careful study of the virtues that characterize the religious orders; (b) to the Christian who looks upon the religious orders as a special manifestation of the vitality of Christian principles; (c) to the philosopher, who sees in Christianity the realization of a new form of universality; viz., the brotherhood of all men, as a corollary of the fatherhood of God, the great truth taught by both the Old and the New Testament.

To the novice himself the order proposes a new ideal for his personal realization; viz., the example set by the Saviour of mankind in His every word and deed. This ideal is constructive: "Do not think that I am come to destroy the law or the prophets," said the Founder of Christianity; "I am not come to destroy but to fulfill."¹ It is prophylactic: "He that shall scandalize one of these little ones that believe in Me, it were better for him that a millstone should be hanged about his neck, and that he should be drowned in the depth of the

¹ Matt. v, 17.

sea.”¹ It is remedial. This is shown by the parables of the good Samaritan,² the lost sheep, and the prodigal son.³ It is inspiring: “Come to Me, all you that labor and are burdened, and I will refresh you.”⁴ It is supreme: “Be you therefore perfect, as also your heavenly Father is perfect.”⁵ “Seek ye therefore first the kingdom of God and His justice.”⁶

Looking at the novitiate in another way, we may say that it purposes to make a perfect novice of each candidate who is received; that is, it aims to develop in him both persistent longings and consistent efforts to reproduce in himself the life of Christ. With this end in view, it supplies him with special means to broaden, deepen, and strengthen his Christian faith, that he may the better appreciate, (1) his position as a creature and the duties that bind him in consequence; and (2) his privileges and responsibilities as a human being, as a Christian, as a religious. We shall briefly consider these topics.

1. Both reason and experience tell man that he is dependent. It is indeed in virtue of this state that his education is at once possible and necessary. But Christian faith assures him in no uncertain voice that his dependency has a mark of nobility:

¹ Matt. xviii, 6.

² Luke x, 30-37.

³ Luke xv.

⁴ Matt. xi, 28.

⁵ Matt. v, 48.

⁶ Matt. vi, 33.

“we come
From God, who is our home.”

Although man must rely upon his fellow-creatures of the mineral, the vegetable, and the animal kingdom, which minister in a thousand ways to his many wants; yet, as embodying in himself all their perfections, but in a more excellent way, and as possessing the attribute of reason, he becomes their representative and therefore, in their name as well as in his own, he owes their common Lord and Master the tribute of service. The novitiate, therefore, seeks first of all to revive in the mind of the novice a keen sense of his position as creature. It reminds him that he must have “the conduct and the virtues befitting a creature. . . . He must be made up of fear, of obedience, of submission, of humility, of prayer, of repentance, and, above all, of love.” It endeavors to impress upon him the great truth that “the only knowledge worth much of his time and trouble, the only science which will last with him and stand him in good stead, consists in his study of the character of God. He received everything from God. He belongs to him.” It labors to produce in him a living conviction that “God must be equally the object of his moral conduct. God must have his whole heart as well as his whole mind.” Day by day therefore the novice draws nearer to this conclusion:

“A creature means ‘All for God.’ Holiness is an unselfing [of] ourselves. To be a creature is to have an intensified sonship, whose life and breath and being are nothing but the fervors of his filial love taking fire on his Father’s bosom in the pressure of his Father’s arms. The Sacred Humanity of the Eternal Son, beaming in the very central heart of the Ever-blessed Trinity—

that is the type, the meaning, the accomplishment of the creature.”¹

The endeavor to live up to his obligations as creature makes the novice a better man.

2. (a) The novitiate recalls to him the lessons of his early days. It reminds him that he is possessed of intelligence and that he should direct his conduct according to right reason. Even the pagan philosopher Aristotle had taught as much.² If all men are bound to practice the moral virtues—prudence, justice, temperance and fortitude—the novice ought to cultivate them in an eminent degree. If Professor Thorndike’s principle of selection operates in favor of the normal school student, it operates also for the novice. The novitiate tells him that, by God’s merciful providence, he has been called not merely into existence as a creature, but also into rational being as a man. Both justice and gratitude therefore impose on him the duty of aiming to develop in his life what is characteristic of man at his best.

(b) The novice is not merely a human being; he is also a Christian guided by the light of divine faith and upheld by divine grace. He might indeed have been created in the state of pure nature, endowed with all the qualities belonging to his nature as man and with nothing more. He could then be subject to sickness

¹ Faber, *The Creator and the Creature*, pp. 67-69.

² *Nicomachean Ethics*, I, 6. Cicero, whom Allie (*Formation of Christendom*, Vol. I, pp. 144-155, especially pp. 152, 153) selects as the representative of what was best in paganism, repeats these principles in *De Officiis* and *De Finibus*.

and suffering, since he has a body; to darkness of intellect and weakness of will, for he has a soul; and also to death, since though he is a unitary being, he is yet compounded of spirit and matter. Nor in this state could he claim integrity of nature as a right. The body might still rebel against the soul, and passion rise up against reason.¹

But in the very beginning man was constituted in the supernatural order, in the state of innocence, or original justice. He was thereby raised to the dignity of adopted son of God Himself, dowered in consequence with the theological virtues of faith and hope and charity, enriched with the gifts of the Holy Ghost, and predestined not to the natural happiness of which Aristotle has written,² but to the supernatural felicity of seeing his God face to face and possessing Him forever. In this way was his dignity as man incomparably broadened and deepened. It is therefore a principal duty of the novitiate to instil into the future religious the spirit of faith, educating him to take God's viewpoint of the things of life, feeding his hope on motives of faith, and making the principles of faith the very soul of his charity. As creature, the novice is servant of the Most High; as Christian, he is adopted son.

(c) The principle of selection³ has worked to a much higher degree than this in the novice. He is chosen even from among Christians. He has hearkened to the

¹ Faber, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-46.

² *Nicomachean Ethics*, X, 7, 8.

³ See p. 5, above.

Master's call: "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come, follow Me."¹ To insure the development of the three theological virtues, faith, hope and charity, and the keeping of the ten commandments, he is preparing to surround them with the triple guard of the three Gospel counsels: poverty, chastity and obedience.

The religious novitiate, therefore, after laying before the novice his state and his duties as creature, inspires him so to act as to merit the triple crown of virtuous deeds befitting the man, the Christian, and the religious. In laboring to make him a better man, it proposes to him for imitation the great Christian ideal not merely as a great Teacher,—this even the normal school does²—but as a divine Model who gives special helps to those who strive to walk in His footsteps. Furthermore, to guarantee in him the attainment of the Christian ideal, the novitiate bids the novice walk in the more excellent way of religious perfection. Thus is the novice doubly guarded against the moral dangers to which even the normal school student may be exposed, for in the stress and strain of temptation he must withdraw from the practice not only of the Gospel counsels but also of the Christian law, before he runs counter to the dictates that emanate solely from right reason.

To sum up, we may say: the novitiate aims to make of the novice not only a creature imbued with loyalty

¹ Matt. xix, 21.

² See p. 10, above.

to his Creator, but also an honorable man, an exemplary Christian, an intelligent and zealous religious. By what means can this be effected? The answer entails a consideration of both the curriculum and the method of the novitiate.

Article III.—The Curriculum of the Novitiate.

What we here designate as the curriculum is better known under the title of "spiritual exercises." The latter term is happy in both its parts, and suggests kinship with the supposedly modern theory that all the information imparted in school should become functional in the pupil's life. From the earliest days in the history of the religious orders the novice has learned by doing.¹ The novitiate has consistently endeavored to make the "learning process" significant and valuable for him by having him incorporate its lessons into his conduct. In the language of modern psychology, the acquisition of the learning process determines his "behavior."²

The daily exercises of the novitiate may be divided into two great classes: work and prayer; the one employing chiefly the activities of the body; the other, those of the soul. Both are to be performed in common; both exert a socializing influence.

1. Although bodily labor was not unknown to the early hermits and the cenobites of the East, yet St. Benedict seems to have been the first great religious

¹ Montalembert, *Monks of the West*, Vol. I, pp. 331, 332.

² Cf. Colvin and Bagley, *Human Behavior*, Chaps. I, II.

legislator to make manual or literary labor of strict obligation. He even "regulated minutely every hour of the day according to the seasons, and ordained that, after having celebrated the praises of God seven times a day, seven hours a day should be given to manual labor, and two hours to reading."¹ The tradition of manual labor thus early formed in the history of the religious life has been handed down to our own day. It is the remote progenitor of modern sensori-motor training in school; and notably in the case of the Benedictine Order, it has been productive of results from which both the agricultural schools and the schools of vocational training of our own day may well take lesson.² The legislation of St. Benedict on external labor served a great economic as well as Christian purpose. Long before the decline of the Roman empire,³ not merely cultivation of the soil, but all the industries, in fact everything connected with manual labor, had been consigned to slaves. In consequence of this association, both manual labor and industrial efficiency were marked with the stigma of degradation.⁴ The rule of St. Benedict making labor by hand obligatory on all members of the order, whether they were of patrician birth or not, was the first organized movement to restore the Christian ideal after the barbarian invasion and to make

¹ Montalembert, loc. cit.

² Id., pp. 33-37.

³ Allies, *Formation of Christendom*, Vol. I, pp. 66-75; Döllinger, *Heidenthum und Judenthum*, pp. 704-710.

⁴ The expression, *servile works*, used to designate works forbidden on Sunday, is inherited from those days.

the material civilization of Europe possible. St. Augustine over a century earlier had reminded Christians that the law of labor rests on man as man, and therefore was binding on Adam even before the Fall. A penalty of the Fall was not labor, but the irksomeness of labor, "the sweat of the brow."¹ Manual labor remains an integral part of novitiate life.

2. There is another tradition which the novice inherits from St. Benedict, if not from St. Augustine. This is study. If the rule of manual labor brought material prosperity to Europe, that of study spread spiritual enlightenment.² Both labor and study the novice is taught to dignify and sanctify by the spirit of prayer in which he undertakes them. But while he is to study even truths of the natural order ultimately from the viewpoint of divine faith, it is especially to the mastery of the truths of Christian revelation that he is to devote his time and energy. To him and to his fellows does Scripture say: "By grace you are saved through faith."³ Although revealed truth cannot be confined within the limits of time and space, yet practically its tenets may be grouped under two heads: God and the human soul. For this we have the warrant of St. Augustine: "It is God and my soul that I long to know. Nothing more? Absolutely nothing."⁴ Hence it is that Rudolf Eucken writes of him:

¹ *De Genesi contra Manichaeos*, lib. ii, 15.

² Montalembert, op. cit., pp. 33, 34, 331, 344.

³ Eph. ii, 8.

⁴ "Deum et animam scire cupio. Nihilne plus? Nihil omnino."
—*Soliloquia*, I, 2.

"He is interested not so much in the world as in the action of God in the world, and particularly upon ourselves. God and the soul: these are the only objects of which knowledge is needful; all knowledge becomes ethico-religious knowledge, or rather ethico-religious conviction, an eager faith of the whole man."¹

Although "the whole Church, both teachers and taught, is permeated by his sentiments,"² yet it may be well to cite also an authority nearer our own day in the person of Cardinal Newman. Even at the early age of fifteen, he too was absorbed in the "thought of two and two only absolute and luminously self-evident beings, myself and my Creator."³ Therefore, with the example before him of two such great minds, differing so widely in race, heredity, environment, experience, and education, and yet agreeing on the studies that so intimately concern his own life, the novice need entertain no fear that his curriculum is narrow and narrowing.

Even the old Greek philosophers acknowledged the contrary to be the case; for although their knowledge of God was vague, halting, and blended with error, yet the study of man they held to be liberalizing. Wherefore they called man the microcosm—the world in miniature—an epitome of the macrocosm—the world writ large. If man would fully understand himself, he must study the world about him, since the mineral, vege-

¹ *The Problem of Human Life as Viewed by the Great Thinkers from Plato to the Present Time (Die Lebensanschauungen der grossen Denker)* tr. W. W. S. Hough and W. R. Boyce Gibson, p. 224.

² Eugène Portalié, *Catholic Encyclopedia*, "St. Augustine."

³ *Apologia pro Vita sua*, p. 4.

table, and animal kingdoms are all summarized in him. Then from a consideration of the created world both within him and outside him, he can ascend to a knowledge of the Creator of all.

3. Besides labor and study, and far more important than either, is the duty of prayer. Even when viewed in its merely human aspect, its cultural and socializing influence on the novice is undeniable. Rooted as it is in the principles of divine faith, it bears rich fruitage of courage, confidence, generosity, and perseverance. It transforms the life of the novice. Of its scope, the Saviour Himself has said: "Whatsoever you shall ask the Father in My name, that will I do; that the Father may be glorified in the Son."¹

Prayer may be of two kinds: public and private. Private prayer as exemplified in individual meditation, will be considered under the topic of method. Of public prayer two great acts are required daily in the novitiate. One is the conventual or community Mass, at which all the members are bound to assist. It is the supreme act of homage offered by the novitiate to the Lord of hosts. At this Mass the novices receive holy communion, for the decree of Pope Pius X concerning Daily Communion,² applies in a special way to religious houses. The other great act of divine praise is the public recital, in the name of the Church, of the Divine Office, or, as is the case in many congregations, of the Office of the Most Blessed Virgin. Both the Mass and

¹ John xiv, 13.

² 20 December, 1905.

the Office are acts of genuine social service. Montalembert writes pertinently:

"The first of all the services which the monks have conferred upon Christian society was that of praying—of praying much, of praying always for those whose prayers were evil or who prayed not at all."

And these prayers were highly esteemed by the faithful at large:

"Like its chiefs, the entire mass of Christian society, during the whole period of the middle age, showed a profound confidence in the superior and invincible power of monastic prayer; and for this reason endowed with its best gifts those who interceded the best for it."¹

If the flame of piety is to burn brightly, it must be fed assiduously. According to the mind of St. Thomas, "study especially of Holy Scripture, peculiarly befits men consecrated to a life of contemplation."² It reveals to them, particularly in the pages of the New Testament, the perfection for which they should strive. Hence they should bring to it an attitude of mind and a disposition of heart appropriate to their state of life.

"If thou didst know the whole Bible outwardly, and the sayings of all the philosophers, what could it all profit thee without charity and the grace of God?" . . .

"He that would fully and feelingly understand the words of Christ must study to conform his whole life to that of Christ."³

Two books are, therefore, specially commended to the devout and attentive perusal of the novice. The first

¹ Op. cit., pp. 24, 27.

² *The Religious State* (tr. Proctor), p. 160.

³ *Imitation*, Bk. I, Chap. I, 3, 2.

is Holy Scripture, particularly the New Testament, as containing his great rule of life. The second is the *Imitation of Christ* as helping him to acquire the spirit in which Scripture should be studied.

"The philosophy of 'The Imitation' may be summed up in two words. It is a philosophy of Light and a philosophy of Life: the Light of Truth and the Life of Grace. Both the one and the other à Kempis seeks in their source and fountain-head. He does not separate them. It is only in the union of both that man attains his philosophic ideal. . . . It is not only the Light of Truth; it is also the Life of Grace. This life consists in the practice of the Christian virtues; the practice of the Christian virtues leads up to union with Christ, and union with Christ is consummated in the Holy Eucharist."¹

And so we are led back to the greatest of all acts of worship, the holy sacrifice of the Mass, the novice's great model of immolation, the perennial source of his self-denial and devotedness.

Although the nature and the duties of the religious life in general and of his own order in particular must always constitute the chief study of the novice, yet, by a decree of 27 August, 1910, he was ordered by Pope Pius X to give several hours a week to such studies as the mother-tongue, Latin and Greek, the reading of the Fathers of the Church, and in general to such branches as conformed to the purpose for which the order continued to exist.² In this way he not only relieves the

¹ Brother Azarias, *Phases of Thought and Criticism*, pp. 107, 112.

² The decree prescribes private study for an hour a day except on feast days, and lessons of one hour each not more than three times a week.

mental strain incident to exclusively spiritual exercises, but he also enables his superiors to judge more accurately of his talents and fitness for the work of the order.¹

Article IV.—Method in the Novitiate.

As both curriculum and methods agree in being means for the attainment of the educational ideal, it is difficult to draw a hard and fast line between them. Nor is this necessary. In its relation to the novice the method employed in the novitiate bears two aspects: it is individual and it is social. In its individual character it is exemplified in two of the daily exercises: self-examination and meditation.

I.—1. Self-examination may be general or particular; when general, it may, in turn, look forward or backward. When it looks forward, it is called the examen of forethought, and is made at the beginning of the day. It forecasts, in the light of experience, the difficulties which the novice is likely to meet during the day and the opportunities which he may have of doing good. The exercise concludes with intelligent and practical resolutions as to the means to be used that very day both in order to guard against relapsing into habitual faults and to derive greater merit from the opportunities for practising virtue. When the examination looks backward, it is directed upon the actions of the day that is closing, and is followed by sincere

¹ By a decree of 19 March, 1603, provision was made for suitable recreation in all novitiates.

sorrow for what has been amiss in conduct and by a firm resolution of amendment. How profitable these examinations are when practised rightly and perseveringly, appears from these words of Thomas à Kempis:

"If only thy heart were right, then every created thing would be to thee a mirror of life and a book of holy teaching. There is no creature so little and so vile that it showeth not forth the goodness of God."¹

In other words, these searchings of the soul are well adapted to develop that spiritual sense in the exercise of which the religious should excel.

"Only when truth and goodness walk hand in hand, and the heart grows apace with the intellect, does the soul develop into strong, healthy action. . . . Now, the Spiritual Sense takes in all the truth, goodness, and beauty of both the natural and revealed orders and views them in the light of Faith."²

Different from these general examinations in its immediate purpose is the particular examen. By means of this exercise the novice seeks to acquire: (a) systematic knowledge of his ruling passion and of the means to combat it effectually; (b) the necessary grace to apply these means courageously and perseveringly. He keeps before him the admonition of Thomas à Kempis:

"As our purpose is, so will our progress be; and there is need of much diligence for him that wisheth to advance much. . . . The resolutions of the just depend rather on the grace of God than on their own wisdom; and they always, whatever they take in hand, put their trust in Him."³

¹ *Imitation*, Bk. II, Chap. IV, 1.

² Brother Azarias, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

Imitation, Bk. I, Chap. XIX, 2.

Even when the task is tedious and the progress slow, he does not despond. He recalls these other words:

"If every year we rooted out one fault, we should soon become perfect men."¹

But the function of the particular examen is not purely destructive; it is also constructive. Were the novice merely to refrain from evil, he would fulfil but a small portion of his duty. He must learn more completely the lesson conveyed by the parable of the talents. He must take to heart these words from the homily of St. John Chrysostom:²

"He that hath a gift of word and teaching to profit thereby, and useth it not, will lose the gift also; but he that giveth diligence will gain to himself the gift in more abundance, even as the other loseth what he hath received. But not to this is the penalty limited for him that is slothful, but even intolerable is the punishment, and with the punishment the sentence, which is full of a heavy accusation. For 'cast ye,' saith He, 'the unprofitable servant into outer darkness; there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth.' Seest thou how not only the spoiler and the covetous, nor only the doer of the evil things, but also he that doeth not good things, is punished with extreme punishment? . . . The talents here are each person's ability. . . . For this purpose God gave us speech, and hands and feet and strength of body, and mind, and understanding, that we might use all these things, both for our own salvation and our neighbor's advantage."³

Self-examination, therefore, whether general or particular, is prescribed for the novice as a condition of self-mastery. In virtue of our common human nature,

¹ Id., Chap. XI, 5.

² Matt. xxv, 24-30.

³ Homily 78, Vol. X, *Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, pp. 470-472.

however, it becomes, as an exercise of introspection, a key to the understanding of others and thereby to their direction in the way of virtue. In his own measure and degree, as he is faithful to the lessons of the *Imitation* will the novice verify in his own person¹ this estimate pronounced on its author:

"He probed the human heart to its lowest depths and its inmost folds; he searched intentions and motives and found self lurking in the purest; he explored the windings of human folly and human misery and discovered them to proceed from self-love and self-gratification. But this author does not simply lay bare the sores and wounds of poor bleeding human nature. He also prescribes the remedy. And none need go away unhelped. For the footsore who are weary with treading the sharp stones and piercing thorns on the highways and by-ways of life; for the heart aching with pain and disappointment and crushed with a weight of tribulations; for the intellect parched with thirsting after the fountain of true knowledge; for the soul living in aridity and dryness of spirit; for the sinner immersed in the mire of sin and iniquity, and the saint earnestly toiling up the hill of perfection—for all he prescribes a balm that heals, and to all does he show the road that leads to the Life and the Light."²

2. There is another daily exercise of the novice that emphasizes the individual aspect of the method used in the novitiate. This is meditation, or mental prayer—a sustained interior exercise in which the soul applies itself to God. Its subject-matter includes all the truths of divine faith; all the virtues becoming the man, the Christian, and the religious; all the maxims taught by our Lord in the Gospel. This is, so to say, the curriculum of meditation. Its aim is first the sincere amend-

¹ Cf. Baldwin, *The Individual and Society*, pp. 14-18; 23-26.

² Brother Azarias, *op. cit.*, pp. 123, 124.

ment of the life of the novice, and then the complete reformation of his character after the model set by Jesus Christ. Its spirit is therefore the spirit of the Saviour, the spirit of faith; for Scripture assures us that "the just man liveth by faith."¹ In its method it either directly or indirectly utilizes all the powers of the mind. We should then *à priori* be inclined to look upon it as a great means of mental and spiritual development. And such it really is when entered upon with due preparation and prosecuted with unwearying diligence. Preparation for it is both proximate and remote. The remote preparation consists in living the life of faith, in guiding one's conduct by the principles of the Gospel; the proximate preparation consists in acts of faith in God's presence. For this purpose "spiritual reading" is most effective. Besides the Bible and the *Imitation*, which we have already mentioned,² the lives of the saints both of the Church in general and his order in particular, and treatises on the virtues of the Christian and the religious life, are especially recommended to the novice. But he is to read these books in the spirit in which he reads the Office—reverently, attentively, piously ('digne, attente, devote'). Here is a practical exercise in apperception which he is called upon to perform daily. Lest his interest should wane or his affection grow slack, he is to place himself in a sympathetic attitude when he begins to read. Every teacher will appreciate the sound psychology of this advice.

¹ Rom. i, 17.

² See Art. III, "Curriculum of Novitiate."

"Before reading, place yourself in the presence of God; say some short prayer to obtain light to understand, and grace to practise what you will read. Never read through curiosity, and do not read hurriedly; stop occasionally to relish your reading; examine what prevents you from practising what you read. Read your spiritual book as you would a letter sent by our divine Lord to make known His holy will."

It is in these terms that St. John Baptist de la Salle ¹ gives counsel to each of his religious. Again he asks:

"What fruit do you derive therefrom? What difficulties do you experience? What obstacles do you put in the way? . . . Carefully distinguish between reading for purposes of study and spiritual reading, and see whether you observe the distinction."²

Why this insistence on the method of spiritual reading? Why this effort to awaken interest? Because it is through its strong appeal to the emotions that spiritual reading becomes an effective aid to mental prayer. The whole purpose of meditation is to promote the ampler development of the spiritual life. Mere knowledge of revealed truth is not sufficient to attain this end. It must be reinforced by strong motives. Professor Wundt writes:³

"Those combinations of ideas and feelings, which in our subjective apprehension of the volition are the immediate antecedents of the act, are called *motives* of volition. Every motive may be divided into an ideational and an affective component. The first we may call the *moving reason*, the second the *impelling force* of action. When a beast of prey seizes his victim, the moving reason is the sight of the same, the impelling force may be either

¹ *Collection of Short Treatises*, p. 136.

² *Id.*, pp. 202, 203.

³ *Grundriss der Psychologie (Outlines of Psychology)*, tr. C. H. Judd, pp. 185, 186.

the unpleasurable feeling of hunger or the race-hate aroused by the sight. The reason for a criminal murder may be theft, removal of an enemy, or some such idea; the impelling force the feeling of want, hate, revenge, or envy."

With him Cardinal Newman agrees in the following passage, which further suggests how meditation can be an "interior occupation":

"Assent, however strong, and accorded to images however vivid, is not therefore necessarily practical. Strictly speaking, it is not imagination that causes action, but hope and fear, likes and dislikes, appetite, passion, affection, the stirrings of selfishness and self-love. What imagination does for us is to find a means of stimulating those motive powers, and it does so by providing a supply of objects strong enough to stimulate them. The thought of honor, glory, duty, self-aggrandizement, gain, or on the other hand of Divine Goodness, future reward, eternal life, perseveringly dwelt upon, leads us along a course of action corresponding to itself, but only in case there be that in our minds which is congenial to it."¹

Spiritual reading helps to furnish thoughts that are "congenial" to the divine attributes. Imagination pictures their concrete setting in the life and conduct of our Lord while on earth. We thrill with gratitude for His loving mercy, with sympathy for His suffering, with horror for sin that hounded Him to death. Meditation is an exercise of living faith. Such faith is, according to Cardinal Newman, a twofold experience.²

"It is an imaginative experience, realizing religious truths and picturing them with precise details. It is an affective experience, vivifying these images and their interior perceptions with all the sap of religious sentiment. Such reasoning as there is, is almost

¹ *Grammar of Assent*, pp. 79, 80.

² *Id.*, Chap. IX.

wholly implicit . . . and belongs to the *illative sense*. . . . Note how this analysis is verified exactly in the spirit of faith and in the active piety which are the special source of our religious experiences. Here in particular we discover the profound psychology of the classic procedures of Christian mysticism as also of its exercises, whether individual or collective. We may regard the Manresan, the Sulpician and other methods of meditation and mental prayer as methods of detailed 'realization' of general dogmas.¹ This reveals to view the whole mechanism and finality of the 'preludes,' the 'application of the senses,' and of the 'affections and resolutions.' Nothing is easier than to sketch here appropriate illustrations from the 'Grammar of Assent.' Take the celebrated meditation on the 'Two Standards.' Express it in Newman's terms. First 'realize' the two camps with their respective captains, their activity, etc. This is an imaginative experience. After this, or even at the same time, try to 'realize' the anti-Christian sentiments of anger and hatred, the Christian sentiments of love, devotedness, etc. Apply these reflections to yourself; excite yourself to charity, self-denial, etc. This gives affective experience. Personal arguments drawn from your needs and tendencies, from your inmost desires of salvation and sanctification, strengthen and orientate these 'realizations.' The conclusion [resolution of the meditation] should spring from this interior activity: it cannot fail to be a deeper realization of the supernatural life, marked at present by acts of faith and love, and by protestations of fidelity, in which all your powers co-operate; and guaranteed for the future by strong resolutions. From beginning to end you are occupied with the dynamic force of 'real' assents."²

As the examens are daily exercises for the development of self-mastery, so meditation is (a) a learning process of an excellent kind: it unfolds the inner mean-

¹ See also St. John Baptist de la Salle's *Explanation of the Method of Mental Prayer*.

² E. Baudin, "La philosophie de la Foi chez Newman," *Revue de Philosophie* (Sept., 1906), pp. 262, 263. "Real" and "realization" are to be understood in the sense defined by Cardinal Newman in "Grammar of Assent."

ing of the truths of faith. It is (b) a lesson in motivation, since it prompts the novice to follow the example of the Great Teacher. It is (c) a habit-builder, since it trains to ways of righteousness and sanctity. It is (d) a valuable exercise in thinking. Professor Dewey¹ and others maintain that we really think only when we have a definite problem to solve, for which our ordinary habits of thinking and acting prove or seem inadequate. Now, the novice finds this problem set him in meditation: "Why is it that I have not acted, do not act, as my Saviour and the saints have done in like circumstances? What are the obstacles? How shall I remove them? What are my present resources?"

Viewed in its individual aspect, the method of the novitiate is a dynamic factor in forming the personality of the novice.

II.—But the method has likewise its social value.

This also bears a two-fold character. The novice comes into intimate personal relations with (1) his superiors, and (2) his fellow-novices.

1. The novice master gives him instruction, counsel, and commands. On his part the novice is bound to obey. By his entrance into the novitiate he has proclaimed his desire and his intention to renounce material goods by the vow of poverty, to perfect his control over his body by the vow of chastity. Throughout all the period of his probation he must be exercised in obedience; for obedience is the characteristic vow and virtue of the

¹ Cf. *How We Think*, p. 205; also Colvin and Bagley, *op. cit.* Chap. II; and "Thought" in Monroe's *Cyclopedia of Education*.

religious. Without obedience no solidarity is possible. Obedience is the perfection of self-mastery. It is the attribute of a strong man, a man of character. Holy Writ assures us that its practice brings victory.¹

2. The social life of the novice is also developed by the action of his fellow-religious. They warn him charitably of his defects; this is the exercise of "fraternal correction." They share together their meals, their recreations, and their studies. From day to day he finds his personal views and desires taking on the color of the group of which he has become a member. He becomes more closely identified with the order in spirit and aim and method. The very change of name which is customary in many orders and congregations when the novice is first clothed with the religious habit² is but one expression of this community of sentiment. Like the first Christians, the members of a religious institute should have but one heart and one soul.³

Article V.—The Spirit of the Novitiate.

Detachment from worldly goods, subjection of the flesh to the spirit, submission of the will to lawful authority, and all for God's sake—these must characterize the true novice. What is the principle that shall give life and sustenance to these virtues? It is the spirit of faith, as revealed in the New Testament. It includes an attitude and a habit. As an attitude it inspires the

¹ Prov. xxi, 28.

² Cf. Heimbucher, op. cit. p. 21.

³ Acts iv, 32.

novice to look at all things from God's point of view as clearly expressed in the Gospel maxims. As a habit it has an active and a passive reference. In its active aspect it prompts the novice to do all his actions to promote God's glory, to fulfill the divine will.¹ Taken in its passive sense it inclines him to accept all the blessings and the ills of his life and state as coming directly or indirectly from his Creator. Sustained by the word of Scripture: "To them that love God, all things work together unto good,"² he endeavors to advance in ways of inward peace and spiritual joy.³

The immediate effect of this spirit of faith operating in the novice is a quickening of his desire to prepare worthily for his profession as a religious. If, as Herbert Spencer maintained,⁴ education is "preparation for complete living," the novitiate must train the novice for complete living as a religious, for the proper fulfillment of the duties imposed by the "state of perfection."⁵ Self-examination and self-mastery must be completed by self-realization. This can be accomplished only through sacrifice; and the sacrifice must be complete; it must be a holocaust. To this end three means

¹ 1 Cor. x, 31.

² Rom. viii, 28.

³ St. John Baptist de la Salle gives his Brothers three reasons for acting from motives of faith: 1. Because actions otherwise of little worth are thus made Christian; 2. Because this is the chief means of sanctifying them; 3. Because we thus participate in the dispositions in which our divine Lord performed His actions.—*Collection of Short Treatises*, p. 117.

⁴ *Education*, p. 30.

⁵ Cf. St. Thomas (tr. Procter), *The Religious State*, p. 3.

are indispensable, according to St. Thomas, who but expresses in this matter the mind of the Church.

"The things to be first given up are those least closely united to ourselves. Therefore, the renunciation of material possessions, which are extrinsic to our nature, must be our first step on the road to perfection. The next objects to be sacrificed will be those which are united to our nature by a certain communion and necessary affinity. . . . Now, amongst all relationships the conjugal tie does, more than any other, engross men's hearts. . . . Hence, they who are aiming at perfection must, above all things, avoid the bond of marriage, which, in a pre-eminent degree, entangles men in earthly concerns. . . . Therefore, the second means whereby a man may be more free to devote himself to God, and to cleave more perfectly to Him, is by the observance of perpetual chastity. But continence possesses the further advantage of affording a peculiar facility to the acquirement of perfection. For the soul is hindered in its free access to God not only by the love of exterior things, but much more by force of interior passions."¹

"It is not only necessary for the perfection of charity that a man should sacrifice his exterior possessions; he must also, in a certain sense, relinquish himself. . . . This practice of salutary self-abnegation and charitable self-hatred is, in part, necessary for all men in order to salvation, and is partly a point of perfection. . . . It is in the nature of divine love that he who loves should belong, not to himself, but to the one beloved. It is necessary, therefore, that self-abnegation and self-hatred be proportionate to the degree of divine love existing in an individual soul. It is essential to salvation that a man should love God to such a degree as to make Him his end, and to do nothing which he believes to be opposed to the Divine love. Consequently, self-hatred and self-denial are necessary for salvation. . . . But in order to attain perfection, we must further, for the love of God, sacrifice what we might lawfully use, in order thus to be more free to devote ourselves to Him. It follows, therefore, that self-hatred and self-denial pertain to perfection. . . . Now, the more dearly a thing is loved according to nature, the more

¹ Op. cit., pp. 26-28.

perfect it is to despise it for the sake of Christ. Nothing is dearer to any man than the freedom of his will. . . . Just, therefore, as a person who relinquishes his wealth and leaves those to whom he is bound by natural ties, denies these things and persons; so, he who renounces his own will, which makes him master, does truly deny himself. . . . [Religious] make a complete sacrifice of their own will for the love of God, submitting themselves to another by the vow of obedience, of which virtue Christ has given as a sublime example.”¹

Since the religious life is, according to St. Thomas, “the state of perfection,” those who profess it are bound to take the most perfect means of reaching perfection. Hence he adds:

“The vow which, of all the three religious vows, belongs most peculiarly to the religious life, is that of obedience. . . . Now, since the body is worth more than material goods, the vow of chastity is superior in merit to that of poverty, but the vow of obedience is of more value than either of the other two. . . . Again, the vow of obedience is more universal than that of either poverty or chastity, and hence it includes them both.”²

Such, then, is the character of the holocaust which the novice is preparing to offer. And just as the work of educating the child joins two factors, viz., his native instincts, on the one hand, and proper intellectual and moral development on the other, so too the training of the novice is a work in which his native endowments are corrected and refined and fructified by the action of divine grace. In proportion as he freely and fully responds to his vocation does he advance in the “way of perfection.”

¹ Id., pp. 41-46.

² Id., pp. 51, 52.

"Just as in genius one part must be ascribed to the faculties of the man and another to a superior element which the pagans called destiny, but Christians would designate by the name of vocation; so sanctity also is made up of two elements which, although they compenetrates, may yet be distinguished; viz., the call of God and the effort of man."¹

To strengthen his spirit of faith together with its expression in the spirit of sacrifice, therefore, the novice makes use of both natural and supernatural means. He may take courage from the words of the great Faraday:

*"I will simply express my strong belief that that point of self-education which consists in teaching the mind to resist its desires and inclinations, until they are proved to be right, is the most important of all, not only in things of natural philosophy, but in every department of daily life."*²

A like thought is expressed in a recent work of pedagogy:

"No conception of modern [?] pedagogy is truer to fact or safer in principle than this, that the vital function of public schooling is to raise the level of society in conduct and ideals. This is done, primarily, by improving the individual and for his individual need; but for the common good also."³

The novice, therefore, holds fast to divine faith, the root of perfection. He gives real practical assent

¹ P. Chauvin, O. S. B., *Qu'est-ce qu'un Saint?* p. 23.

² Lecture delivered at the Royal Institution of Great Britain, "Observations on the Education of the Judgment," p. 205; in *The Culture Demanded by Modern Life* (ed. E. L. Youmans).

³ Boone, *Science of Education*, p. 342.

to the words of Cardinal Newman: "He who begins with faith will end in unspotted and entire holiness."¹ Because his faith is living, he is faithful to his spiritual exercises, especially to mental prayer. When he finds sacrifice difficult, he recalls the Saviour's promise: "Be thou faithful until death, and I will give thee the crown of life."² He becomes daily more adept in the great process of education; viz., the substitution of remote and spiritual ends, for those which are present and sensible. He thus attains to a fuller perception of the real values of life. He appreciates these words uttered by the President of Bowdoin College, and realizes their truth by service of others for God's sake:

"You can never be placed in circumstances so unfavorable, you can never be brought in contact with a person so mean and hateful, that this devotion to the loving will of God as applied to those circumstances and that person will not give you strength to do the right, true, noble, loving act, and so to overcome evil with good."³

We may sum up this article in the following conclusion: The spirit of the novitiate is the spirit of faith. Its effect is to produce a spirit of diligent preparation for the three religious vows, poverty, chastity, and obedience. Though all three demand sacrifice, obedience requires complete immolation of self. It is therefore the crowning act of devotion to God's service. It

¹ *Plain and Parochial Sermons*, Vol. V, p. 159.

² Apoc. ii, 10.

³ W. DeWitt Hyde, *The College Man and the College Woman*, p. 147.

is also, according to the teaching of the Saviour Himself, the indispensable condition of a fruitful life.

"Unless the grain of wheat falling into the ground die, itself remaineth alone; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit."¹

Moreover the novice is constantly profiting by the good example of his associates. The natural value of such a stimulus has been a subject of study for many psychologists and sociologists in recent years. Thus Camille Bos writes:

"A man's belief is not merely his work; it is also in part determined by social influence. In return, when once this belief has been established, it will not be limited in its effects to the individual who affirms it; it will also react upon others. . . . This reinforcement will be all the greater, the more uniformity of belief there is among the individuals."²

With increased certitude as well as with fresh delight does the novice turn from such passages to the panegyric of divine faith which he reads in the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews. As the one God is the author of both nature and grace, and "grace presupposes nature," so the novice entertains no doubt that loyalty to the principles of divine faith will multiply and enrich the efficacy of even human faith. With the Apostles he prays to the "Author and Finisher of faith":³ O Lord, "increase our faith."⁴

¹ John xii, 24, 25.

² "La Portée Sociale de la Croyancé," *Revue Philosophique*, Vol. XLVI, p. 293.

³ Heb. xii, 2.

⁴ Luke xvii, 5.

Article VI.—Limitations of the Novitiate.

These limitations may be grouped under two heads, although, by a kind of spiritual osmosis, they tend to compenetrates; viz., such as are predominantly individual and such as are predominantly social.

1. Such limitations as concern the individual novice may affect him (a) as Christian, (b) as candidate for a given order.

(a) Only Catholics may be novices. As we have already seen, this restriction is, according to the admission of Camille Bos,¹ a decided advantage, since uniformity of faith in the members of a group tends naturally to increase the efficiency of the group. Moreover, if a postulant were to be notably lacking in the Christian spirit or in an earnest will to acquire it, he would be manifestly unfit for the novitiate, since it is the function of the novitiate to train for the state of "religious perfection." The principle of development, which plays so vital a part in the educational psychology of our age, demands now as ever that the less perfect precede the more perfect. The postulant must therefore have given proof of his firm will to keep the commandments before he can be allowed to bind himself to the observance of the Gospel counsels. Our Lord Himself has sanctioned this course. It was only after the young man had assured Him that he had kept all the commandments from his early years, that the Saviour said to him: "If thou wilt be perfect, go, sell

¹ See p. 65, above.

what thou hast and give to the poor . . .; and come, follow Me.”¹

(b) Besides these general conditions, there may be others arising from the special mission of the order into which the candidate seeks admission. St. Benedict Joseph Labre possessed not only the ordinary virtues of a good Christian, but many of the traits which distinguish the saint when he sought entrance into the religious life. But though his holiness was beyond question, the superiors deemed him an unsuitable subject. The novice must be capable of adjusting himself to the life and the work of the order.

2. In its social aspect the novitiate calls for the “common life,” which, says Heimbucher, “is strictly prescribed in all congregations.”² If the candidate shows lack of adaptability to this requirement, he is assumed not to possess a religious vocation. By the *Normæ* (regulations) of 1901 the Holy See reserves to itself the right of dispensing from the disability of age, a candidate under fifteen years or over thirty, who seeks admission to the novitiate of a religious ‘congregation.’ This restriction has bearings that are both psychological and sociological. Candidates who have not attained their fifteenth year belong to the early adolescent period and often lack the maturity of judgment requisite in a novice; while those who are over

¹ Matt. xix, 21.

² “Streng ist in allen Kongregationen das gemeinsame Leben vorgeschrieben.” *Op. cit.*, p. 37. On the eremitical life, see Heimbucher, *op. cit.*, pp. 41 ff.

thirty are wanting in mental plasticity and have become "set" in their ways. They have passed the limit that Professor James¹ fixed for "old fogeyism." The average novice must break old habits and form new ones. He is counselled to make a general confession of the sins of his whole life soon after his entrance into the novitiate. Seeing his own many faults and failings as contrasted with God's generous favors to him, he is moved to profound sorrow for all that is evil in his past life, and to firm resolutions of amendment. This is the phenomenon known as "conversion,"² the beginning of the novice's "first fervor." Under the impulse of deep emotion like this, together with the remarkable change in his environment, old habits may be inhibited with relative ease by the substitution of the newer and nobler activities subserved by regular observance.

On its sociological side this restriction as to age is a natural precaution to secure peace, good-will, and hearty co-operation among the novices—all these dispositions being correlative in the order of nature to the operation of divine charity in the realm of grace.

But the social aspect of the novitiate is expressed also in the formal acceptance of the candidate by the order; for this act is a contract drawn between the

¹ *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 110. See also Halleck, *Education of the Central Nervous System*, Chaps. II, III.

² Cf. Starbuck, *Psychology of Religious Experience*, Chaps. II-XIII. Cf. H. Brémond (tr. H. C. Corrance), *The Mystery of Newman*, pp. 177-195. The "Confessions" of St. Augustine is classic.

novice and his religious superiors as representing the order. It entails on the novice the subordination of his ideals and purposes to those for which his society lives and labors. Hence it is that he is now limited, or his activity is defined, by the aim, the curriculum, the method, and the spirit of the order whose novitiate he has entered. According to a decree of the Council of Trent, the novitiate must last for a minimum period of one year, which may, however, be extended to two or three years. By fixing the minimum age of religious profession at sixteen, the same Council virtually placed the age requirement for the admission of a novice to an 'order' at fifteen or at fourteen years.

3. (a) The limitations of the novitiate may be considered also with reference to some of the great aims proposed for the educative process. Prominent among these is knowledge. The knowledge required for admission to the novitiate is first, all that is required by the profession of the Christian faith or is in consonance with that profession. In the next place, it is determined by the special works of charity for one's neighbor which constitute the peculiar function of the order. Aptness to acquire the necessary knowledge is a qualification which every candidate must possess.

(b) Moral development, or good character, we have seen to be a fundamental requirement in every teacher, in every normal school student. It is doubly requisite in the novice, since he is preparing to embrace a life of perfection. Were he to lack this qualification he could not be even a good Christian. Herbart went so

far as to maintain that the "term virtue expressed the whole function of education."¹

(c) To be equipped to labor with great effectiveness for souls, the novice needs that social grace which we call "culture." For entrance into the novitiate this is not indeed indispensable. By cherishing fidelity to the religious exercises and by developing that spirit of faith which reveals to him in every neighbor a member of Christ's mystical body, the novice will acquire a real vital culture. For true culture is not merely "acquaintance with the best that has been known and said," as Matthew Arnold thought, nor even "the disinterested endeavor after man's perfection," as he also surmised.² It includes also that special charm which comes from possessing the spirit of Him who drew all things to Himself.³

4. To certain minds the most serious limitations of the novitiate, arise from the vows of religion for which the novitiate prepares. Rosenkranz⁴ goes so far as to charge those who make such vows with going directly counter to the religion which they profess:

"Christian monachism . . . in merely renouncing the world by the three religious vows instead of conquering it and gaining

¹ Lange and De Garmo, *Herbart's Outlines of Educational Doctrine*, p. 17.

² *Culture and Anarchy*, Preface, p. xxxiv.

³ John xii, 32. See also Newman's "Idea of a Saint" in *Discourses Addressed to Mixed Congregations*, pp. 94, 95; Dr. Shields, *Psychology of Education*, Lesson XXIV.

⁴ *Philosophy of Education* (tr. A. C. Brackett), p. 254; International Science Series.

possession of it, . . . contradicts the very principle of Christianity."

Is this indictment true? Let us weigh the testimony of an acknowledged authority:

"The full and permanent resignation of that which for the majority of men makes life desirable, has a power of attraction only for the rarest natures, and for this very reason the ascetic type will never lose its honorable position among the people, but will be newly produced and newly honored in every age; and it is not the most enlightened but the darkest ages of history in which men so forget their own deeply hidden yearning for spiritual freedom that they fail to recognize those who overcome the world as social assets of the first rank. . . . The radicalism and individualism of our age has not the faintest idea how deeply all the victories of personal freedom over the omnipotence of the State, or the so-called rights of men, are linked up with this much scorned retirement from the world, which has brought personality to its highest concentration and raised spiritual life above all other aims. It was doubtless the fervor and intensity with which whole groups of individuals left domestic and social life in order to come entirely to themselves, which first made men conscious, in the most impressive manner, that man has a right to himself—that there is a holiness of inner life and effort, in which society and the State have no right to interfere. . . . Thus these ascetic institutions, on closer study, reveal themselves as a most powerful support for everything which one may call *character*, and a pillar of that great and true resistance to all that is merely tangible and useful, upon which, ultimately, everything depends which makes life worth living and lends men real power over material things."¹

There is the great law of charity formulated by our Saviour: "I give you a new commandment that you love one another as I have loved you,"² illustrated in

¹ Foerster, *Marriage and the Sex Problem*, pp. 142-145.

² John xiii, 34.

the parable of the Good Samaritan,¹ confirmed by divine example,² and sanctioned by the sentence which the great Judge is to pronounce on the last day.³

A more violent attack than that of Professor Rosenkranz comes from Sir Francis Galton.⁴ It is directed against a doctrine taught explicitly and emphatically by Christ Himself, a doctrine that is fundamental in the religious life:

"The long period of the dark ages under which Europe has lain is due, I believe in a very considerable degree,⁵ to the celibacy enjoined by religious orders on their votaries [sic]. Whenever a man or a woman was possessed of a gentle nature that fitted him or her to deeds of charity, to meditation, to literature, or to art, the social condition of the time was such that they had no refuge elsewhere than in the bosom of the Church. But the Church chose [sic] to preach and exact celibacy. The consequence was that these gentle natures had no continuance, and thus, by a policy so singularly unwise and suicidal that I am

¹ Luke x, 25-27.

² John xiii, 15.

³ Matt. xxv, 31-46.

⁴ *Hereditary Genius*, pp. 357, 358. Sir Francis Galton is the "father of modern eugenics." It is pertinent to recall the words of the late T. J. Gerrard, S. J. ("Eugenics," Vol. XVI, *Catholic Encyclopedia*): "The root difference between Catholic teaching and that of modern eugenics is that the one places the final end of man in eternal life, whilst the other places it in civic worth. The effectual difference is that the Church makes bodily and mental culture subservient to morality, whilst modern eugenics makes morality subservient to bodily and mental culture. . . . Moreover, since the most necessary and most difficult eugenic reforms consist in the control of the sex appetite, the practice of celibacy is an important factor in race culture. It is the standing example of a Divinely aided will holding the sensual passion in check."

⁵ One may be pardoned for dissenting from the author's punctuation here.

hardly able to speak of it without impatience, the Church brutalized the breed of our forefathers. She acted precisely as if she had aimed at selecting the rudest portion of the community to be, alone, the parents of future generations. She practised the arts which breeders would use, who aimed at creating ferocious, curish, and stupid natures. No wonder that club-law prevailed over Europe; the wonder rather is that enough good remained in the veins of Europeans to enable their race to rise¹ to its present very moderate level of natural [sic] morality."

Were these words to be taken at their face value, education as a real institution of society would be impossible. It would exist only as the idle dream of a philosopher, if indeed a philosopher could be found under such conditions. But there is another side to be considered.

"Now, the noblest works for the good of others in which man can be engaged fall under these three classes: that of maintaining and propagating religion; that of forming the human character by education; that of administering to human infirmities by acts of mercy. And the evidence of history, by induction from many times and countries, is this, that wherever the Virginal Life does not exist as an institution, these works, if pursued, are only pursued as a profession. They may be followed with much zeal and ability, and even with considerable success; but still it will be as a means of livelihood, not for the sake of others, but for the sake of self. Remuneration in some shape will be their motive power. And no less does it follow, from the evidence of history, that where the Virginal Life is cultivated, and exhibits itself in various institutions, it will throw itself especially upon these three classes of works. The dedication and sacrifice which lie at the root of it will communicate themselves to these works, as conducted by it, will give to them a high and superhuman character, a power of attraction over the hearts of men, which

¹ The student of logic may find it difficult to conceive how, in view of Galton's *premises*, they could *rise* at all. The author is covertly admitting the influence of another factor than heredity.

come from that divine Original of sacrifice, whose signet is the Virginal Life. And in this case no human remuneration will be the spring of these works; neither praise, nor power, nor wealth, nor pleasure will call them forth or reward them. Rather they will flourish amid poverty, self-denial, and humility, in those who exercise them, and be the fruit not of political economy, but of charity."¹

Even Sir Francis Galton seems to have had a glimpse of the natural aspect of this truth, for he confesses:

"A man who has no children is likely to do more for his profession and to devote himself more thoroughly to the good of the public than if he had them. A very gifted man will almost always rise, as I believe, to eminence; but if he is handicapped with the weight of a wife and children in the race of life, he cannot be expected to keep as much in the front as if he were single."²

Another quotation may be given in answer to the objection raised by Rosenkranz:

"A great Christian writer, who stood between the old pagan world and the new society which was taking its place, and who was equally familiar with both, made, near the end of the fourth century, the following observation:³ 'The Greeks have had some men, though it was but few, among them, who, by force of philosophy, came to despise riches; and some too who could control the irascible part of man; but the flower of Virginitate was nowhere to be found among them. Here they always gave precedence to us, confessing that to succeed in such a thing was to be superior to nature and more than man. Hence their profound admiration for the whole Christian people. The Christian host derived its chief luster from this portion of its ranks.'"⁴

¹ T. W. Allies, op. cit., pp. 380, 381.

² Op. cit., p. 330.

³ St. John Chrysostom, Vol. XLVIII, p. 533, "De Virginitate," *Patrologia Graeca*. The translation of *De Virginitate* is omitted from "Select Library of Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers." See comment in *American Ecclesiastical Review*, Vol. XXIV, p. 210 (Feb., 1901). Cf. T. S. Dolan, *The See of Peter and the Voice of Antiquity*.

⁴ T. W. Allies, op. cit., pp. 381, 382.

As to obedience, it will suffice to note that the realization of the highest ideal officially proposed to the public school, viz., social service, is impossible without respect for lawfully constituted authority. This is the natural value of obedience. Father Faber sketches its supernatural significance in the following words:

"Monks and nuns have given up their liberty by the heroism of the vows. . . . Theirs is a glorious captivity, in which supernatural charity has bound them hand and foot, and handed them over to the arms of their Creator. They have used the original liberty He gave them in the grandest of ways, by voluntarily surrendering it."¹

Article VII.—Summary.

The novitiate is a period (1) of preparation, (2) for the "religious life," which, in the words of St. Thomas, is (3) a "state of perfection." The novice, by appropriate spiritual exercises of prayer and self-denial, as also by acts of Christian charity, must develop the habits that become him as (1) creature, (2) man, (3) Christian, and (4) religious. To prepare for his "profession" as religious he practices self-examination and seeks by mental prayer to model his life after that of his divine Exemplar. In proportion as he becomes more thoroughly imbued with the principles of the religious life in general and with the aims of his own order in particular does he surrender private interests under the great socializing influence of Christian charity, the flower of Christian faith.

¹ *The Creator and the Creature*, p. 38.

CHAPTER III.

THE PERSONALITY OF THE TEACHER.

Article I.—What is Personality?

The thought and the culture of the modern world are deeply indebted to the Catholic Church for presenting to her members the idea of personality and for demanding of them conduct befitting their dignity. Of both these moral elements—the idea and its expression in behavior—had the pagan world lost its sense long before the coming of Christianity. The result was inevitably a depolarization of man's spiritual life.¹

“And so the ignorance which divested God of His creative power, by the same stroke divested man of his personality. In Greek and Roman philosophy man had not only ceased to be a creature, being conceived either as an emanation of the world-soul eternally transfused through material forms from generation to generation, or as a product of the earth's slime warmed into life by the sun's heat; but likewise, emanation or production as he was accounted like all other living things, he could hardly in his short transit through the world be held to have a personal subsistence: or if this be allowed him, it must be allowed to all other livings things, and at the same time was deprived of all moral value, being utterly extinguished at death by resumption into the world-soul.

“It is but a part of the same error as to the divine nature, that the notion of a divine providence observing and directing the course of the world, rewarding or punishing the actions of men, had likewise been lost.”²

¹ See also above, p. 44.

² T. W. Allies, *op. cit.*, pp. 87, 88.

With the concept of God's personality perished also the consciousness of man as a person; for man is made in the image and likeness of God.¹ When paganism, to use the words of Scripture, "had corrupted its way upon the earth,"² it proceeded to conceive its gods in the image and likeness of man. With such a lowering of ideals and perversion of fundamental relationships, true progress became impossible. Whenever and wherever, in the last twenty centuries, like conditions have been reproduced, like results have followed. When the mental vision of God's unity and personality becomes darkened, then man's worth depreciates in the estimate of the community. So it comes to pass that in the world of labor he is no longer a moral agent; he is merely an economic factor. Even in the school the child ceases to be a concrete intelligence dowered with the promise and potency of undying life; he is relegated to the ranks of the social group and, in so far, is only one of many. We might say, then, that the history, not of religion only, but of philosophy also, has "personality" for its central theme. Consequently no system of education can be right in its conception or genuinely beneficial in its application unless it includes a correct interpretation of personality.

As is suggested by its derivation, the term 'person'³

¹ Gen. i, 26.

² Ibid. vi, 12.

³ From the Latin *per* and *sono*, *sonare*, signifying to "sound" or "utter through," i. e., through the opening for the mouth. It was at first thought that these masks were intended simply to remind those attending the play that the actors were representing *other*

primarily designated the mask worn by the actors in the old Greek and Roman plays. Then it came to signify the player who wore the mask. Finally, since "all the world's a stage," it attained its present meaning. It is a matter of some cultural interest to note that in Chaucer's day the priest was the most important person in the community, whence he was called the "parson."¹ From the Christian viewpoint it is still true that only religion as the guiding principle of man's theory and practice, can develop in him the real dignity of personality. The nature of personality St. Thomas Aquinas has attempted to explain,² and to his definition we now turn.

Taking Boethius' description of person as "an individual substance of a rational," or intelligent, "nature," he expands it into this form: A "person" is "a complete substance having an intellectual nature, subsisting by itself and apart from other substances." He designates person as "substance" to distinguish it from "real accident"; that is, from a mere quality, modification, or process. It is "complete," and is therefore different from either man's body or his soul, since it is superior to both. In the case of man it is actually "constituted" by the "union of body and soul." Because it "subsists by itself," it is ultimate master of its

characters than their own, that they were *impersonating* the *dramatis personæ*. Subsequently it was found that the funnel-shaped opening for the mouth helped the actor's voice to carry to a greater distance.

¹ "Parson" is only a variant, in pronunciation as in spelling, of the original "person." See also *Canterbury Tales*.

² *Summa Theologica*, III, q. 16, a. 2.

acts, and therefore cannot become a mere component of something else. The phrase "apart from other things" is used especially to distinguish the real concrete person from the 'idea of person,' which applies not to a determinant individual, but to each and every person as such.

According to the mind of St. Thomas, therefore, personality includes at least relative completeness of existence, perfection of activity, and distinction from others even of the same kind. It is a significant truth for the teacher that this completeness and this distinction—this development and this individuality—can be and should be, to a great extent, the work of education. Fortunately, when used without qualifying epithets, the term still possesses an honorable connotation.

Article II.—What Society Expects.

We have already seen¹ that "an ethical aim, specialized knowledge, and technical skill," together with "culture," are qualifications which every teacher should possess. But the greatest of all these is character. It is only the teacher of "character" that can develop "character" in his pupils. Now, genuine social service is impossible without the basic equipment of good character.

"To live according to nature, to follow one's own inclinations and interests, . . . no great effort is needed. . . . To overcome nature and instead to prepare for a life of ideals, to inhibit the personal desires and instead to learn to serve the higher purposes, indeed demands most serious and most systematic efforts.

¹ See p. 8, above.

"It is the teacher's task to make these efforts with all his best knowledge of mind and body, of social and of cultural values. Psychology and physiology, sociology and the subjects taught have to furnish him with the equipment for his great calling, but they all represent only the means, which are of no use until ethics has shown us the aims. Those means the teacher must master by study and knowledge, but those aims he must hold in his heart."¹

Hence Prof. H. H. Schroeder says bluntly:

"What education must aim at, therefore, is the building up of moral character; for it is only when those with whom we come in contact are possessed of such character that our interests are assured, as far as concerns our social environment."²

What society particularly asks of both teacher and pupil, what it demands as a result of the educative process, is social efficiency. This has been defined as "the ability to enter into a progressive social process and do one's part toward advancing the interests of the whole, while at the same time attaining the highest degree of realization of the self."³

"Efficient participation requires knowledge and technique. To be a good citizen of the state, one must have a knowledge of the purpose of government, of the machinery of his own government, and the nature of the social problems confronting the state. If one is to stand in right relations to the school and do his part as patron, taxpayer, or official, he requires a comprehension of the nature and aim of education and a knowledge of the organization

¹ Muensterberg, *Psychology and the Teacher*, pp. 76, 77. Cf. Dr. Adolf Matthias, *Praktische Pädagogik für höhere Lehranstalten*, Bd. II, p. 11: "Die Persönlichkeit nur gewinnen kann, wenn sie tüchtig in der Technik und Methodik des Berufs sich schult."

² *The Psychology of Conduct Applied to the Problem of Moral Education in the Public Schools*, p. 21.

³ Betts, op. cit., p. 245.

and functions of the school as the instrument of education. To enter successfully into a vocation, whether industrial, professional, or any other, the individual must have a concept of the place of work in human progress, and a particular knowledge of and technique in the vocation selected. Or, if one is to make fruitful use of the avocations, he must see the relation of avocations to development and efficiency, and learn the technique of the avocations chosen."¹

Yet although efficiency demands both knowledge and technical skill, what it really accomplishes will depend chiefly on "character," for character shares its own force with the other factors.²

"The power of an intense purpose to heighten the intellectual insight not only operates on the teacher, but also on those taught. . . . The first requisite is a supervisor whose soul is inspired with the sacredness of life. . . . In the replies of fifty-five college presidents and representative men to the question: 'What is the Best Thing College Does for a Man?' influence of personality everywhere predominates."³

One who has done great service for mankind, Karl von Baer, can therefore say with authority:

"What a man accomplishes in the course of his life depends mainly upon his character—more upon what he is than what he does."⁴

The reason is given by Professor Swift:

¹ Ibid., p. 246.

² Cf. the Scholastic axiom, "Bonum est diffusivum sui," also the *Catechism of the Council of Trent* (Art. I, of the Creed): "God was impelled to create from no other motive than a desire to impart to creatures the riches of His bounty."

³ D. E. Phillips, "The Teaching Interest," in *Pedagogical Seminary*, Vol. VI, p. 242.

⁴ Quoted in Miall's *Thirty Years of Teaching*, p. 182.

"Character, which is only another name for the established will, is formed through ideals which have been consciously or unconsciously accepted as governing principles of action. And these ideals can become fixed only so far as they are acted upon."¹

Since society expects to find in its citizens good moral character, it therefore asks (1) that they be equipped with true and noble ideas; (2) that they make these ideas the principles of their conduct; (3) that they cultivate the emotions best adapted to transform these ideas into motives. For:

"Beyond heredity, and beyond environment, are those factors that determine motives: the things that prod us to capacity effort, that set us against the current of mere circumstances. These things are ideas, the stuff and substance of our knowledge, the results of our educational process. To realize the foolishness of evil, to understand the method of its avoidance, to know how to substitute for its indulgence a vigorous habit of healthful activity is, for all robust natures, already to will, and to *achieve*, good behavior."²

Article III.—What the Catholic Church Demands.

The connection between this article and the preceding one is clearly pointed out by Mgr. J. Guibert when he compares the demands made upon the teacher by God and by the State:³

¹ *Youth and the Race*, p. 126.

² Elliott Park Frost, "Habit Formation and Reformation," *Yale Review*, Oct., 1914, p. 147.

³ "La Société lui demande des hommes sains de corps et d'âme, des citoyens honnêtes et dévoués à la patrie: Dieu lui demande, en plus, des chrétiens fidèles à leur foi et des apôtres zélés pour la défense et l'extension de l'Eglise."—*Les Qualités de l'Éducateur*, p. 5. The author was Superior of the Seminary of the Catholic Institute (i. e., the Catholic University) of Paris.

"Society asks of him men sound of body and soul, citizens that are honest and patriotic. God asks, beside this, Christians that are true to their faith and apostles that are zealous for the defense and the expansion of the Church."

From this statement it would appear that the requisites sought by the Catholic Church, far from destroying or supplanting those insisted upon by the State, rather (1) complete them by adding other qualifications, and (2) transform them by animating them with a new spirit. We may therefore consider briefly the requirements that are special to the Catholic teacher. According to the authority just cited, they are two in number; for the teacher must "nourish his soul, and give his soul"; because, "in the measure in which he gives out his life, must he renew its vigor."¹

All teachers should be firmly convinced of three things:

(1) 'The scope of their apostolate will be determined by their own personal worth; (2) their personal worth will be quickly drained unless it is fed and strengthened by personal culture; (3) personal culture is of obligation for all, and it is possible for all who have sufficient good will to economize their time and possess their souls in peace.'

"What culture should the teacher acquire? All that may be for him a principle of life and a principle of action: his faith, his virtue, his knowledge."²

¹ "Tous ses devoirs se ramènent à deux: nourrir son âme, donner son âme, car, à mesure qu'il donne sa vie, il doit en renouveler la vigueur."—Id., p. 8.

² "Je voudrais que tous les maîtres fussent persuadés de trois choses: que la portée de leur apostolat sera en proportion de leur valeur; que cette valeur, fût-elle très grande aux débuts, sera vite épuisée si elle n'est entretenue et développée par la culture personnelle; que cette culture, obligatoire pour tous, est possible à

Faith is placed first. It directs the teacher in the choice of virtues to be cultivated; it determines his aim both in acquiring and in imparting knowledge, it vitalizes his method. It gives a broader outlook and a deeper inspiration.

"The Gospel did not create a new system of culture in opposition to that which it found in possession, but it introduced into the latter an essentially new circle of ideas, equally foreign to abstract indefiniteness and poetic exaggeration on the one hand, and to mere empty knowledge of the letter on the other. The former bore the baleful mark of antiquity; the latter, that of Jewish devotion to the letter of the law: while Christianity possesses a definite personal unity in Jesus Christ, the Alpha and Omega of the Gospel. Hence it is that Christianity exercised not a destructive but a constructive, influence on the culture with which, at its birth, it was brought face to face. By it the content of man's religious and moral conscience was corrected, broadened, completēd, and elevated."¹

This estimate is confirmed by Dr. Pace, who inter-

tous pourvu qu'on ait assez de volonté pour économiser du temps et pour posséder son âme. Mais que devra cultiver le maître? Tout ce qui est en lui principe de vie et principe d'action: sa foi, sa vertu, son savoir."—Id., pp. 13, 14.

¹"Das Evangelium schuf nicht ein neues Bildungssystem in Opposition zu dem welches es als ein historisch gegebenes antraf, sondern es trat an dasselbe mit einem wesentlich neuen Ideenkreise heran, der ebenso fern war vom abstrakter Unbestimmtheit and poetischer Gestaltenüberfülle wie leerer Buchstabenkrämerei; das eine die unheilvolle Signatur der Antike, das andere die der jüdischen Schriftgelehrsamkeit, vielmehr eine ganz bestimmt persönliche Einheit besass, die das Alpha und Omega seines Evangeliums ist, Jesus Christus. Damit hat das Christentum eine nicht umstürzende, sondern eine gestaltende Macht auf die Bildung, welche es bei seinem Eintritt in die Welt antraf, geübt, dass es den Inhalt des religiös-sittlichen Bewusstseins berichtigte, erweiterte, ergänzte und erhöhte."—J. N. Brunner, *Katholische Religionslehre*, II, pp. 5, 6.

prets in a Christian sense Spencer's definition of education as "preparation for complete living:"¹

"It is just this completeness—in teaching all men, in harmonizing all truth, in elevating all relationships, and in leading the individual soul back to the Creator—that forms the essential characteristic of Christianity as an educational influence."²

Just as the exercise of faith presupposes reason, which examines and approves the grounds of faith, so the development of virtue implies a co-operation between grace and nature. As the teacher must have human faith,³ so must he cultivate human, or natural, virtues. Of these, besides the four cardinal virtues, which every man should possess, Mgr. Guibert would have the teacher excel in four:⁴ (1) sincerity, winning the confidence of others; (2) probity, respecting their rights; (3) delicacy, displaying the courtesy of the true gentleman;⁵ (4) strength of character, for the teacher must "be a man."⁶

Now, the Catholic Church teaches that our existence does not terminate with death, but that this earthly life is only a period of probation and training for life everlasting, just as the school prepares for social service here on earth. Consequently the Catholic

¹ See p. 60, above.

² *Catholic Encyclopedia*, "Education."

³ See above, pp. 28, 29.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, pp. 31-34.

⁵ Cf. Cardinal Newman's "Idea of a Gentleman" in *Idea of a University*, p. 208, together with Rev. Charles L. O'Donnell's explanation in the *Ave Maria*, Jan. 16, 1915, p. 73 f.

⁶ This list is in great accord with the "characteristics of the best teachers," *Pedagogical Seminary*, Vol. III, p. 413.

teacher must supplement his natural virtues with virtues that are supernatural. He must even develop his natural virtues from supernatural motives; in other words, he is to raise them to the plane of the supernatural. This gives a deeper significance to the words of Professor Miall:¹

"Everything falls into its right place as soon as we focus our minds upon the thing which really signifies—that is, upon life."

It also guards against the attitude which Professor McKenny deprecates:²

"Nine-tenths of the failures of life are due to a lack of devotion to the work in hand, to a vacillating, indifferent, flippant attitude, toward life. Such an attitude saps manhood."

The three theological virtues raise the Christian into intimate relationship with God: (1) faith does homage to His intelligence by accepting the revelations made by infinite Truth; (2) hope honors the divine goodness by trusting to secure the personal everlasting possession of the reward promised to man; (3) charity seeks intimate union with Him who has given us the law of love. But in addition to these spiritual habits, the Christian teacher must possess the supernatural virtues of humility, self-denial, and detachment;³ for these inhibit the three great obstacles to his complete success, viz., pride, self-gratification, and the craving for wealth. These virtues bring us to the very door of

¹ Op. cit., p. 217.

² *The Personality of the Teacher*, p. 74.

³ Guibert, op. cit., pp. 35-41.

the novitiate. The spirit of the typical Christian teacher is at one with the spirit of the typical novice.

Article IV.—What the Novitiate Offers.

1. The novitiate offers its members a practical course in the philosophy of life. It unfolds to the novice the significance of his existence and action (a) as creature, (b) as human being, (c) as Christian, (d) as religious. Each of these planes represents a stage of ascent; whence we may argue a certain measure of propriety in St. Thomas' designation of the religious life as a "state of perfection."¹

2. The novitiate gives training in (a) self-examination, (b) self-mastery (self-denial), and (c) self-realization. The first is a condition of understanding other minds. How wide may be its scope and how far-reaching its influence, is to be inferred from its splendid expression in Cardinal Newman's "Grammar of Assent."² The second qualification is a condition of directing and controlling others. The third is a condition of developing an effective personality.

3. The novitiate socializes its members. Together the novices partake of bodily food; together do they feast on the Bread from heaven that daily awaits them

¹ See above, pp. 32, 60.

² The student will find the *Indexed Synopsis of the Grammar of Assent*, by J. Toohey, S.J., a great help. Rev. Joseph Rickaby's *Index to the Works of Cardinal Newman* (Longmans, 1914) is even more valuable, since it extends to all the Cardinal's writings.

in the tabernacle. Together they share their joys and their labors. Together they recite the office in the name of the Church. Together do they day by day seek by meditation to assimilate the great truths of that faith whose tenets they may later strive to translate into the living deeds of their pupils.

4. The novitiate opens an excellent laboratory for experiments in habit-formation. The silence of the house, its seclusion from worldly concerns, but most of all, the retreat and general confession prescribed for the novice or recommended to him at the beginning of his career, break or weaken the chains of the past. His soul is borne onward by the tide of noble but controlled emotions. Regular observance brings with it endless opportunity of practising the acts whose repetition helps to build habit. The spirit of faith guards the novice's fervor against that routine which would either render the formation of habit impossible or weaken its efficacy or mar its purpose.

5. Since, according to the principles of sound method, the study of the philosophy of education should precede that of the psychology of education,¹ the novitiate is justified in making its curriculum consist chiefly of the meaning and value of life. It thus sets a standard of values. That standard places religious and ethical aims above the theories and estimates offered by physiology, psychology, and sociology.² Does the history of religious orders ratify the

¹ Cf. Ruediger, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

² Cf. Muensterberg, *ibid.*

appraisal made by the novitiate? Let us ponder the words of Dr. Heimbucher:

"The monks carried the banner of *culture* and *civilization* to the distant regions of the earth. They were the apostles of *Christianity*, not only in the West, but also in Asia and in the newly discovered regions of the globe. Their foundations opened the way for the cultivation of the soil, for the laying out of colonies, villages, and towns. The monks cleared forests, drained swamps and planted them, controlled rivers, recovered fruitful land by the building of dams, gave an impetus to cattle-raising, to agriculture and industry, and trained in these pursuits the colonists whom they habituated to a fixed dwelling-place and to regulated labor. They introduced the cultivation of fruits and vegetables, they built mills and forges, made streets and bridges, promoted trade and commerce. They prepared the way for the class of *free handworkers*, and in so doing favored the development of city government. They united the handworkers [craftsmen] in fraternal societies and guilds and made a point of favoring their material advance through appropriate means. The cloisters practised *hospitality*, *care of the sick*, and works of charity, wherever the opportunity was offered, erected schools and colleges [Erziehungsanstalten], hospitals and inns, and took in travelers who had lost their way. Great have been their services to the *arts* and *sciences*. Without the cloisters many cities and countries would be without those buildings and art treasures which to-day call forth the admiration of all the cultured. The monks formed valuable *libraries*, and through their unceasing industry in the scriptoria (writing-rooms) in making copies, which they often illuminated with beautiful miniatures, they preserved the priceless literary monuments which to-day link us with the culture of the distant past. They were the *historians* of their time. They left many valuable sources of the Old High German *tongue*; they cultivated poetry and song, won for themselves a good name by their knowledge of lands, peoples, and languages, mathematics and astronomy, and the science of diplomacy (study of records, titles, etc.). They even attempted natural philosophy and medicine. But it was especially *theology* that, through the orders, experienced beneficial attention and progress. Brotherhoods copied and distributed a superior kind of *popular literature*, and, after the invention of

printing, applied themselves to the printing of books. The *care of souls* formed another branch of the comprehensive activity of the orders. Attention was also given to prisoners, and especially to *slaves*, for whose redemption from captivity special orders arose. From the orders also came many *martyrs*, and many of the members have been beatified or canonized.”¹

Let us not forget (1) that the one common, indispensable, fundamental preparation for all these varied forms of service was the novitiate; (2) that the motives which brought so many noble ideas and ideals into reality sprang from Christian faith; (3) that the works which would have been impossible for isolated individuals became facts through individuals who had learned in the novitiate to lead a “community life” and to animate it with the spirit of faith. And these remarks hold true even in the case of orders that do not specially devote themselves to formal education. “By their fruits ye shall know them” is a test that is accepted by both God and man.²

We may now better appreciate the worth of the testimony given by an historian whom no one will accuse of prejudice in favor of the Catholic Church:

“Its [Latin Christianity’s] most important peculiarity lay in this—that a slow but sure and unbroken progress of intellectual culture had been going on within its bosom for a series of ages. . . . Hence all the vital and productive elements of human culture were here united and mingled: the development of society had gone on naturally and gradually; the innate passion and genius for science and for art constantly received fresh food

¹ Op. cit., pp. 60, 61. On pp. 65, 66, the author cites non-Catholic testimony to the benefits accruing to the world from religious orders.

² Matt. vii, 16.

and fresh inspiration, and were in their fullest bloom and vigor; . . . in Europe were found united the most intelligent, the bravest, and the most civilized nations still in the freshness of youth.”¹

There is also the prestige of example:

“The greatest teachers and bishops of the fourth century, St. Athanasius, St. Basil, his friend St. Gregory, in the East; St. Ambrose, St. Martin, and St. Augustine, in the West, themselves introduced this life by their example as well as by their precepts. No sooner had St. Augustine, upon his conversion, renounced the intention of marriage, than he drew together a number of like-minded friends, who with him also gave up the possession of private goods, and the pursuit of every object of temporal ambition. St. Basil and his friend St. Gregory had a generation before done this, with an earlier and more perfect choice, inasmuch as they had not first tasted the pleasures of the world. St. Athanasius, driven by persecution to Treves and to Rome, publishes a life of St. Anthony, and spreads throughout the West an admiration of the marvelous virtues which he had witnessed in the Fathers of the desert. By and by the great legislator of the monastic life in the West, St. Benedict, arises, who systematizes for all succeeding ages the religious institute, as based upon the three vows of continence, poverty, and obedience.”²

Would it not then be passing strange, if, since “with

¹“Die wichtigste Eigenthümlichkeit derselben lag darin, dass hier eine Reihe von Jahrhunderten hindurch ein nicht unterbrochener, langsamer, aber sicherer Fortschritt der Cultur stattgefunden hatte. . . . Daher hatten sich hier alle lebensfähigen Elemente der menschlichen Cultur vereinigt, durchdrungen; die Dinge hatten sich naturgemäss Schritt für Schritt, entwickeln können; . . . das Vorkommene verfiel, die Keime des frischen Lebens wuchsen in jedem Moment empor; hier waren die geistreichsten, tapfersten, gebildetsten Völker, noch immer jugendlich, mit einander vereinigt.”—Von Ranke, *Deutsche Geschichte im Zeitalter der Reformation*, Band I, Buch I, cap. i, p. 155.—English tr. by Sarah Austin, *History of the Reformation in Germany*, Vol. I, Bk. I, Chap. I, pp. 251, 252.

² Allies, op. cit., pp. 359, 360.

one mouth all the ancient Christian writers proclaim the Virginal Life to be the *condition* of all perfect following of our Lord,"¹ and our Lord is the great Teacher of mankind, the religious novitiate should be lacking in fundamental pedagogical value?

Article V.—The Teacher's Ideals of Personality.

The teacher's personality is said to constitute nine-tenths of the capital that he needs to fulfill his mission worthily and successfully. Is personality a gift bestowed from on high, implying no preparatory dispositions or efforts on the part of the recipient? Or may one develop a personality and in so doing produce the finest of masterpieces—a model man? Among those who take the latter view is William De Witt Hyde, President of Bowdoin College.

From the history of philosophy Dr. Hyde selects five great ideals of education, and presents them to the teacher.² The first is the Epicurean ideal, viz., that pleasure is the great aim of life, and therefore that pain is the great bane of existence, to be avoided at any cost. Epicurus himself³ did not go the length of some

¹ Id., p. 345.

² The complete title of this book is *The Teacher's Philosophy in and out of School*. The same principles will be found also in his *From Epictetus to Christ*, his *Five Great Philosophies of Life*, and in Section XIII of his *The College Man and the College Woman*.

³ Cf. Alfred W. Benn, *The Greek Philosophers*, for these four Greek ideals; also Rev. W. Turner, *History of Philosophy*.

of his disciples in adopting the maxim: "Eat, drink, and be merry; for to-morrow we shall die." But such a principle is valuable as illustrating the inherent weakness of his system and its narrowing and debasing tendency. What, then, is the teacher to do with this ideal of pleasure if not reject it entirely? He should make rational use of it, says Dr. Hyde. Just as man contains in himself not only reason, but the qualities of the lower orders of creation, so in virtue of these humbler elements of his nature must he satisfy their tendencies and demands—all in accordance with the laws of morality. Now, there are times when recreation and relaxation become imperative. Ordinarily one's fidelity to duty and one's degree of efficiency will be conditioned on the possession of health and vigor. Although these are not the highest of perfections, since they belong to man merely because he is an organism, they are yet gifts of God, and as such should be treasured. Moreover, Scripture nowhere records that the Saviour endured sickness. Hunger, thirst, fatigue, lassitude even—all these indeed He suffered—but of illness there is no mention except when He is pictured as miraculously banishing it from the bodies of those so afflicted. The lesson to be drawn from this ideal is therefore one of reasonable care for one's health and strength. It includes provision for sufficient rest and recreation to be taken preferably in "God's own out-of-doors," in the society of congenial friends.

The second great ideal comes from the Stoics, and stands in sharp contrast to the Epicurean. According

to this school of philosophy, the great goal of human endeavor is apathy, a state of indifference to pleasure and pain, and indeed to feeling in general. It virtually asserts that man is not an animal, but a thinking machine. Its practice is therefore to ignore the joys and sorrows of life. The Stoic even tries to persuade himself that they do not exist. If it be true that most of the worries of life concern things that never happen at all, the Stoic's attitude may not be utterly unwise. The lesson for the teacher is obvious. His calling bristles with trials and disappointments, and the success of his mission depends on his ability to rise above these annoyances and, by his dignified conduct, justify the confidence which his pupils place in him. This disposition Dr. Hyde names "Stoic self-control by law."

The third great ideal is Plato's. For him, man's body and the material universe were but accidents, or at most incidents. Both his *Republic* and his *Laws* were consistent, though not successful, plans for the establishment of an ideal—or Utopian—State. Yet if one is to live his own life, to see above and beyond the petty details of his trade or profession, he must be idealistic in the sense of having true ideas of the value and the purpose of life; and from time to time he must climb the mountain of idealism to breathe a purer atmosphere and to draw new courage for the battle in and with the world. But if they are to be of real service, these short periods of withdrawal from his daily occupations should but fit him the better for the daily

demands made upon him. It is in this spirit that "hobbies" and avocations may have a genuine uplifting influence on character. The lesson is therefore that of being larger than one's calling, of refusing to be absorbed by it, since it is a means, not an end. In other words, the teacher must cultivate a "Platonic subordination of lower to higher."

The fourth great ideal is that of Aristotle. Unlike Plato, Aristotle lays a secure foundation on facts perceived by sense and examined by intellect. His attitude is not poetic, like that of his great teacher, but scientific. He seeks to ascertain the true relations of things and thereby to develop a sense of proportion. In this respect he has been a safe guide for subsequent ages. Every real educator, says Dr. Hyde, is called upon to do twenty times as much as he can do with any justice to himself and to the work in question. He must therefore cultivate a sense of proportion and discriminate between the things that are important and those that only seem so. In order to do well the one-twentieth that is possible, he must learn to say "No!" kindly yet firmly when occasion calls for refusal. Only in this way will he keep that peace of mind which is essential to him as man and as teacher. Only in this way will he practise the "Aristotelian sense of proportion."

Lastly, there is the ideal set before man by the Incarnate Wisdom of God when He came down upon earth to teach by word and example. Its characteristic is a spirit of love, proclaimed, like a clarion call, from the great pulpit of the cross. The teacher who

would walk in the footsteps of the Greatest of all Teachers must early learn the lesson of sacrifice. It is the means of redemption for himself and his pupils. The Christian ideal includes and exalts all that is good in the other four.¹

These ideals of personality, based as they are on fundamental views of life, deserve a prominent place in the philosophy of education. Of the benefit which the teacher may derive from their careful study, let Dr. Hyde himself speak:

"Show me any teacher of sufficient mental training and qualifications who is unpopular, ineffective, unhappy, and I will guarantee that this teacher has violated one or more of these principles of personality. . . . On the other hand, I will guarantee perfect personal success to any well-trained teacher who will faithfully incorporate these principles into his personal life. . . . This teacher can no more help being a personal success as a teacher than the sunlight and rain can help making the earth the fruitful and beautiful place that it is."²

The first four of these ideals have long been held in honor in the normal school. The difficulty arises in recognizing and following the fifth, which is the greatest of all. How serious may be the consequences of ignoring it, we have noted in Chapter I.³ After years of careful study given to the question, Dr. F. W. Foerster has arrived at this conclusion:⁴

¹ Dr. Hyde calls attention to this fact, pp. 78-81.

² Op. cit., pp. 81, 82, 83.

³ See Chap. I, Arts. VI, VII.

⁴ "Gegenüber der religiösen Ethik ist die blosse Moral immer nur ein Kreuz ohne Auferstehung—die Religion erst bezieht alle Ueberwindung auf ein höchstes Gut des persönlichen Lebens. Die Moral religiös begründen, das heisst eben diese ganz persön-

"In contrast with religious ethics, mere morality is at best only a cross without a resurrection—for it is religion that turns every conquest to the highest good of our personal life. To give morality a religious foundation is to perceive this personal significance of the moral, to concentrate our attention upon it, to draw inspiration from it. To-day it is regarded as a mark of developed personality to strip the moral of its religious basis; whereas in reality this religious basis is the true foundation of personality, since this alone can represent the *sacrificing* of life as

liche Bedeutung des Sittlichen herausempfinden, sich darauf konzentrieren, daraus die Inspiration entnehmen. Es gilt ja heute als Zeichen der entwickelten Persönlichkeit, dass man die religiöse Begründung des Sittlichen abstreift—in Wirklichkeit aber ist die religiöse Begründung die wahrhaft persönliche Begründung, weil sie allein die *Hingebung* des Lebens als den *Gewinn* des wahren Lebens darzustellen—and nicht bloss darzustellen, sondern in einem ergreifenden Leben und Sterben zu verkörpern vermag. Der blosse dumpfe Lebenstrieb rebellierte seinem Wesen nach gegen das Sittengesetz—die christliche Religion klärt den Menschen am tiefsten und überzeugendsten über das Wesen des wahren Lebens und der wahren Freiheit auf—in diesem aufgeklärten Zustande erfasst der Mensch dann alle Ueberwindung als höchste persönliche Lebenserfüllung. So versteht allein die christliche Religion die *äussere gesellschaftliche Forderung* mit dem *tiefsten persönlichen Freiheitsdrange*, die Beschränkung des Lebens mit dem Lebensdurst zu versöhnen; sie allein übersetzt wirklich und lebendig den Gehorsam in die Sprache der Freiheit, sie ist der Ort, in dem Individuum und Gesellschaft sich innerlich vermählen. Und eben diese Leistung des Christentums hat Paulus in Auge, wenn er sagt, das Christentum beendige die Knechtschaft des Gesetzes. Alle blosse Ethik bleibt in der Knechtschaft des Gesetzes; auch die wissenschaftliche Ethik ist ja nur eine wissenschaftliche Darstellung dieser Knechtschaft. Die Ethik erzählt dem Menschen von gesellschaftlichen Notwendigkeiten—die Religion erzählt ihm von sich selbst, seiner höheren Herkunft, von der tiefverborgenen Kräften seiner geistigen Natur, weckt seine Sehnsucht nach vollkommener Freiheit, stellt diese Freiheit in strahlender Vollendung: das ist religiöse Begründung der moral."—"Religion und Charakterbindung," *Mémoires sur l'Éducation Morale présentés au deuxième Congrès international d'Éducation Morale à la Haye, 1912*, p. 7.

the *gaining* of true life. And not only this, it may even incorporate it so thoroughly as to embrace both life and death. The mere animal impulse of self-preservation, by its very nature, rebels against the moral law. The Christian religion enlightens man in the most thorough and convincing way as to the nature of genuine life and real freedom; and so enlightened, man perceives that self-mastery is the realization of the highest personal life. Thus it comes to pass that only the Christian religion knows how to reconcile *external social demands* with *the most intimate craving for personal freedom*; the restraints of life, with the craving for life. Only the Christian religion really and vitally translates obedience into the language of freedom; only within her pale is the individual truly wedded to society. And it is just this function of Christianity that St. Paul has in mind when he says that Christianity puts an end to the bondage of the law. All pure ethics remains in bondage to the law; even ethics as a science is only a scientific presentation of just this bondage. Ethics speaks to man of social needs; but religion tells him of himself, his noble origin, of the hidden powers of his spiritual nature, stimulates his craving for entire freedom, represents this freedom in its dazzling perfection, and then points out morality to him as the way to this perfection. Such is the religious basis of morality."

What use does the novitiate make of these five ideals?

1. It teaches the lesson of necessary rest and recreation, (a) by making provision for them in the rules and constitutions of the order; (b) by obeying the decree of the Holy See dated 19 March, 1603.

2. It teaches the lesson of Stoic fortitude, but tempers it with reliance on Divine Providence. It bids the novices heed the words of St. Peter: "Cast all your care upon the Lord, for He hath care of you";¹ and take to heart the Saviour's message at the Last Supper:

¹ 1 Pet. v, 7.

"Let not your heart be troubled. You believe in God; believe also in Me."¹

3. The Platonic ideal in its best form is cherished day after day by spiritual reading and devout meditation. It is kept pure by silence in the community and by withdrawal from the world of affairs.

4. A typical illustration of the Aristotelian sense of proportion is implied in St. John Baptist de la Salle's advice to his Brothers:

"If we desire to perform our actions with the perfection that God requires of us, we must be particularly careful not to perform any thoughtlessly or with precipitation. Hence, before undertaking what is proposed, we should wait some time to consider and examine four things: (1) Whether the action we are about to perform be contrary to the law of God, or will offend Him in any way; (2) whether this action will not withdraw us from our duty and the obligations of our state, which we should perform perfectly and in preference to all other good that we might accomplish; (3) whether it be contrary to the rules of the community or to the resolutions we have taken to regulate our conduct; (4) whether it be opposed to some greater good, either for ourselves or for our neighbor."²

5. As to the realization of the Christian ideal, it is the very purpose for which the order exists. When the novice shows no disposition to labor for this end, he is summarily dismissed. We may, therefore, conclude that, although the religious novitiate directly prepares only for the religious life, yet, by its insistence on the spirit of faith and its frequent daily exercise of the virtue of faith, it tends to develop good strong

¹ John xiv, I.

² *Collection of Short Treatises*, pp. 121, 122.

character. It supplies as a by-product the most important factor in the personality of the teacher.

“Seek ye first the kingdom of God and His justice, and all these things shall be added unto you.”¹

General Summary.—The Necessity of Faith.

We have seen in Chapter I that the work of education is impossible without genuine human faith—(1) faith of the teacher in the pupil, (2) faith of the pupil in his teacher, (3) faith of the pupil in his fellow-pupils. Moreover, education as a process and a system is impossible without faith on the part of society—(1) faith in an educational ideal, (2) faith in the efficacy of education not merely for the select few, but also for the democratic many, (3) faith in the value of right methods when properly employed.

This human faith imposes (1) on the teacher the duty of developing a noble character, a fine personality—(a) in himself, (b) in his pupils; (2) on the pupils the duty of responding promptly and fully by due service, to these efforts to fit them for their social heritage.

Yet the public normal school has some limitations. It is not permitted to teach directly either as moral training or in connection with any other subject of the curriculum the highest form of religion revealed to man. It is not permitted to teach definite Christian doctrines as divine in origin and therefore binding on man. It is not permitted to trace their development in history

¹ Matt. vi, 33.

nor to show how the hearty and full acceptance of Christian principles leads to the development of that type of character which we speak of as personal holiness. It is therefore denied the use of the most efficacious means to form character.

In Chapter II we saw that the religious novitiate proposes to the novice as his chief studies God and the human soul; as his special method, "spiritual exercises." Self-examination was found to be a means to self-mastery, and self-mastery was to be won largely through assiduous "meditation." Meditation includes not only a learning process, but also practice in motivation and habit-building as well as in thinking and willing. Besides these forms of training which develop him in his individual capacity—so to say, "from the foundation up," viz., as creature, human being, Christian, and religious—the novice as a social being is trained to obedience and "fraternal charity." He is taught also to look beyond the immediate present and to forecast the effects of his actions on himself and on others not only in the near future, but even beyond the limits of time. To appreciate so great a responsibility and to prepare for its fulfillment, he must develop the "spirit of faith," which endeavors to appraise things at their eternal values. The limitations imposed by the novitiate help to secure the higher personal development of the novice and to guarantee for him a larger measure of social efficiency.

Of the five ideals of personality considered in Chapter III, the Christian ideal, with its essential note of sacri-

fice, is, from the nature of the case, only incidental in the normal school. In the novitiate, it is not only integral, but essential. Without it even the professional spirit suffers. The Religious Novitiate, therefore, since it develops a fine type of personality and directly fosters the professional spirit, renders a vital pedagogical service to society.

BOOK II.
FAITH.

CHAPTER IV.

FAITH AND ITS EXERCISE.

Article I.—The Nature and Kinds of Faith.

WE HAVE instituted a comparison between the normal school and the religious novitiate in aim, curriculum, method, spirit, and limitations. We have seen that in both normal school and novitiate it is the person, the individual, that counts. We have found that the teacher's greatest asset is character or "personality," in the best meaning of that term. The development of personality, precisely because it is a work of education,—it is, indeed, the great work of education,—is impossible without faith. This faith must be not theoretical only; it is essential that it be practical also. It must be regularly and intelligently exercised by both teacher and pupil: by the teacher that is, and the teacher that is to be. In the State normal school, as at present constituted, only human faith can receive official recognition; whereas the novitiate is unthinkable without the daily exercise of divine faith. It is, therefore, important to consider more closely the nature of divine faith, and the character of its influence on the conduct of the teacher. To this end we shall first examine the nature of faith in general.

The fundamental element in the concept of faith in

general, as suggested by its etymology, is "loyal fidelity."¹ It is, therefore, kindred in meaning, as well as in derivation, to "confidence." Closely allied to faith is *belief*, for to believe a thing is literally to "hold it dear." St. Thomas Aquinas² and Immanuel Kant³ agree in placing faith, or belief, between "opinion" and "science"; but faith, as such, always excludes doubt.

Viewed as an act, it is always a judgment, since it is

¹ Cf. Middle English *feith*; Old French *feid*; Latin *fides*, allied to *fidere*, to trust. The prefix *be-* in *believe* is a substitute for the older *ge-* (cf. Anglo-Saxon *geliefan*). According to Cardinal Newman, *belief* refers more to the material objects of faith; that is, the truths to be believed: whereas, "faith, in its theological sense, includes a belief not only in the thing believed, but also in the ground of believing; that is, not only in certain doctrines, but belief in them expressly because God has revealed them."—*Grammar of Assent*, p. 95.

When the two terms are distinguished, "faith" is often used when the object is personal; "belief," when it is impersonal. "A man has faith in his father, his physician, his fellow-student, his God; he believes the necessity of tariff reform, the doctrine that acquired characters are inherited, the dogma of the inspiration of the Bible" (M. W. Calkins, *A First Book in Psychology*, p. 245).

Dr. Dubray writes: "*Knowledge* is based on immediate or mediate evidence and is essentially rational. *Belief* refers to that which is not evident, or at least not clearly so: thus it is partly rational, partly emotional, and partly volitional in its causes. In the acceptance of a statement, the proportion of objective and subjective influences may vary; a truth is more or less impersonal and more or less personal." (*Introductory Philosophy*, p. 20.) He does not discuss faith.

It is not the province of this chapter to go into the theological aspects of faith; for these, see "*Faith*"—Hugh Pope, *Catholic Encyclopedia*; J. V. Bainvel, *La Foi et l'Acte de Foi*; F. Mallet, *Qu'est-ce que la Foi*?

² *Summa Theologica*, IIa-IIæ, q. 1. a. 4. Cf. IIa-IIæ, q. 2. a. 1.

³ "Vom Meinen, Wissen und Glauben," *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, Bd. III, 5, 531, *Sämmtliche Werke* (Berlin, 1904).

an assent. As a "habit," it becomes an "apperceptive state," or an "attitude." Viewed simply as a judgment, it does not differ intrinsically from "intelligence" or "science," from doubt or opinion; for all these mental states are either explicit or implicit acts of assent. But it differs from all of them in its motive. In the case of intelligence, or understanding, the motive is the proposition as known intuitively, *i. e.*, directly. "Science," on the other hand, is motivated by conclusions accepted as certain, because correctly deduced from first principles known to be true. Doubt, however, is a negative state; it excludes assent, properly so-called. Opinion, though not excluding assent altogether, yet implies the possibility of error, and is therefore incompatible with that certainty which is an element of genuine belief and faith. The true characteristic, then, of faith and belief is authority. In other words, we assent, not because the fact or proposition is intrinsically evident to us, but because it is extrinsically evident. But we have or can have intrinsic evidence of the competence of the authority whose word we accept.

Yet there is a pronounced tendency at the present day to use the term "belief" more loosely than this, especially when it signifies human belief and is applied to matters that do not directly concern religion. However, both ancient and modern philosophers are practically in agreement on these two points: (1) the object of faith; that is, the fact or principle believed, is less clearly perceived than is the object of science; (2) faith is therefore subject in some way to the influence

of the will and the emotions.¹ Although faith is thus influenced by the "heart" of man, nevertheless it begins and terminates in an act of the intellect,² and this is of its very essence. It is important to bear this fact in mind when one is forming an estimate of the *educational* value of faith.

Since to "believe a thing" is primarily to "hold it dear," we may attend, on the one hand, to the fact or principle itself, or, on the other, to our attitude toward its acceptance. The object of faith consists of the fact or facts, the principle or body of principles, held to be true. On the part of the believing subject, the essence of faith is deliberate and cordial acceptance of these facts or principles as true and therefore as standards of judgment and conduct. When used in the strict sense of the term, faith includes the concept of "testimony"; that is, we believe a thing because its truth is vouched for by a competent witness.

Faith, whether considered with reference to the truths believed, or to the person who believes them, is either human or divine, according as it rests on the

¹ Cf. S. Harent, "Croyance" *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique*.

² Thus Harent, loc. cit (coll. 2365, 2366): "Ainsi la croyance doit partir d'un acte initial de l'intelligence [*nil volitum quin præcognitum*], et à travers l'influence de la partie affectif elle aboutit à un nouvel acte de l'intelligence plus ferme que le premier. Si nous ne tenons pas compte de ce dernier terme qui la spécifie, si pour nous la croyance n'était qu'un objet, si elle ne s'achevait pas dans une certitude de l'esprit, ce ne serait plus en définitive qu'un acte purement affectif, contre le sens plus intellectuel que tout le monde attache au mot *croire*; et même le problème de la croyance serait arbitrairement supprimé, et trop aisément remplacé par le plus simple de phénomènes."

authority of man or of God. Viewed objectively, divine faith consists of the whole organic body of truth revealed by God to enable man to reach his everlasting destiny. Viewed subjectively, divine faith is primarily an act of divine faith, and as such is defined by St. Thomas to be "the act of the intellect assenting to a divine truth under the impulse of the will, which is itself moved by the grace of God."¹ Yet such acts of faith even when repeated at frequent and regular intervals and with that cordial assent which is characteristic of "loyal fidelity," cannot of themselves produce the "habit" of divine faith. This must be infused by God; it is not acquired. But once infused, it can be developed and intensified by repeated "acts" of divine faith. This habit in turn connotes an "attitude" of mind with respect to revealed truth and the "behavior" which its acceptance makes obligatory. This "attitude"² can

¹ *Summa Theologica*, IIa-IIæ, q. 4, a. 2.

² "By an attitude is meant an organization of various mental capacities in a definite way about certain situations, or problems of life. Attitudes are correlated with the situations, not in the sense that they are results, but simply in that a reaction to a situation necessitates such an organization of mental elements on the part of the individual."—Irving King, *Development of Religion*, p. 30. (We are far, however, from accepting the author's explanation of the origin of religion.)

Professor Baldwin (*Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, s. v.) writes of Attitude: "Mentally, it is a state of attention primarily, and secondarily an expression for habitual tendencies and interests. A physical A. is primarily a state of partial stimulation to action of a definite kind, and secondarily an expression of habit." . . . Attitudes toward action may be "revivals of earlier actions brought about by the perception or thought of the object to which they are appropriate." [It is this aspect of attitude that is important for religious faith.] "In genetic psychology the view has been worked out that the organizing and the conserving of

best be pictured as that of a dutiful son toward a worthy father. The term is, however, unsatisfactory to the consistent Catholic. It seems to him too "passive" in its implication. He, therefore, prefers the more vital expression of "spirit of faith"; for the spirit of faith connotes not merely willing submission to the action of Divine Providence, but also the active squaring of one's conduct with the truths revealed by God. The spirit of faith joins "behavior"¹ to "attitude." To develop it is to develop spiritual life. It socializes the individual, training him to take over God's viewpoint, to appreciate the eternal values of things, and, in all that is right and best, to give cordial support to his neighbor as an "heir apparent" of the Almighty Father of us all.²

In recent years not a little attention has been given to the genesis of faith in the individual. The topic is one of the most interesting in the whole field of genetic psychology. From the Catholic viewpoint it is also one of supreme importance, since it intimately affects man's life here and his destiny hereafter. A view that has obtained wide currency is a corollary from that form of evolutionism which holds that man is descended

the experience on which mental development proceeds, are due to two typical attitudes, under which all those of attention and action may be subsumed, the attitudes of Habit and Accommodation."—These two attitudes will be considered at some length in Chap. VII, *Psychological Aspects of Faith*. (See below, pp. 267 ff.)

¹ Cf. W. James, *Talks to Teachers*, Chap. I; Colvin and Bagley, *Human Behavior*, passim.

² See below, pp. 315 ff.

from brute ancestors and that consequently he differs from the rest of the animal kingdom in degree only, not in kind. Whoever accepts such a principle is compelled to trace faith back to some element or combination of elements which man, as we know him to-day, holds in common with the brute kind. Instinct, and more particularly instinctive feeling, has therefore been regarded by many psychologists as the necessary and adequate source of human belief. Starting from the fact, which any one can verify for himself,¹ that the content of consciousness at any given moment includes a "center" or "focus," to which we directly attend, and a "margin" or "fringe," of which we are only vaguely aware, Professor J. B. Pratt² ascribes this "fringe" to what he calls the "feeling background." The "definite, describable, communicable elements of consciousness," such as cognitions—"the material which may be made public property by means of scientific and exact description"—all this occupies the center of consciousness; but the "indefinite, the indescribable, the peculiarly private mass of subjective experiences, which, by their very nature, are not susceptible of communication," such as feelings and emotions—these are

¹ Professor James was probably the first to emphasize this distinction (cf. *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, pp. 240-264).

² *The Psychology of Religious Belief*, pp. 6-8. He thinks that this "dual classification" is in line with Aristotle's division of the mind into "thought" and "desire." His interpretation of the Stagyrte is, however, open to criticism. For Aristotle divides mental processes not into thoughts and desires, but into cognitions (including two species, viz., sensations and intellections) and appetitions (also of two species, viz., sensuous and rational).

distributed over the margin of consciousness. Furthermore, it is "through this non-rational, vital feeling mass that we are united to our own past, to our ancestors, and to the race—in fact, in a sense, to all living things."¹ This "feeling background" in us thus becomes a "compendium of history." Such views are, of course, evolutionistic in the extreme. It is but a natural consequence of their acceptance to identify "our nature as a whole" with "the organism" and to make the "feeling background" the "expression" of both. Man's priceless possessions of intellect and will fare rather badly at the professor's hands; for he affirms that "the organism—our nature as a whole— . . . is essentially right; it is fitted to the universe in which it finds itself."² Yet he would not absolutely exclude intellect. He therefore defines belief as "the mental assent to the reality of a given object. This assent may be either articulate or inarticulate,—it may be the mere immediate feeling [sic] of reality not as yet questioned, or it may be the more self-conscious acceptance of the object as real after doubt [sic] has made the possibility of its non-reality conceivable."³

These are, he thinks, the general features of belief. Professor Pratt, however, distinguished three types.

¹ Ibid., p. 22.

² P. 23.

³ P. 33. "Inarticulate belief" he identifies with Professor Baldwin's "reality-feeling" (*Feeling and Will*, pp. 149 ff.), accepting Bain's view that, in such cases, "we believe without knowing it." Professor Pratt acknowledges in the Preface his indebtedness to Professor James. In the pages from which we are quoting he follows also the lead of Hume, Bain, and Baldwin.

The first is that of "primitive credulity." It accepts as "real" whatever is presented to the mind. It is characteristic of the period of childhood, but is more or less pronounced throughout the whole life of most men.¹

Its determining motive is authority. This "authority" is not necessarily an attribute of persons. Like Professor Baldwin, he extends it to things. Hence what is directly presented to us through the senses we "believe;" we do not "know" it. We believe it because it is the only thing presented. It has no rival claimant. Hence no doubt of it can arise in the mind. In criticism we may say that such a view must consistently lead to skepticism. It would limit the sphere of certainty to conscious phenomena. As to the cause of these facts and processes, as to our own individuality, as to the reality of objects other than our own impressions, we could have only a "feeling." Professor Baldwin even applies the term "reality-feeling"² to this "inarticulate belief." Tenets such as these are utterly inconsistent with Catholic doctrine. St. Paul teaches that "faith cometh by hearing."³ We must be able, therefore, under fixed conditions, to attain certainty through our senses. Nor is this all. For the message of the preacher must be interpreted by us. This kind of "private interpretation" is indispensable. Hence our intellect must likewise be a source of certainty both

¹ Pp. 34 ff.

² Loc. cit.

³ Rom. x, 17.

in its direct perception of first principles and in the necessary inferences that it draws from them. Hence it is that Christian faith is a "reasonable service"¹ which we pay to God.

The solution of the difficulty is found, at least in part, by lessening the emphasis placed on the "feeling" aspect of consciousness and by including the cognitive phase which is present at the very same moment. How much we know is not here the question. What is really significant is the fact that from the very beginning of our conscious existence we know anything at all. Through the senses we become directly aware of external reality, whether that reality be person or thing.

Authority, in its usual and more restricted sense, connotes a person. When "some one's authority is consciously used as a definite reason for belief,"² then we have Professor Pratt's second type. "The reliability of any reasoned belief will depend," he thinks, "on the nature of the individual reasoner." Its strength will vary with the degree and extent to which it is "interconnected and entwined with our total 'real' world," *i. e.*, with the reality-feeling.³—Such an interpretation makes "reasoned belief" also individual and subjective. It differs from the first type only in being based on some form of argument. The argument is occasioned by doubt, by the possibility that the belief be not true. It is not easy to see how such a "religion of thought"⁴

¹ Rom. xii, 1.

² Op. cit., p. 37.

³ P. 40.

⁴ Pp. 43, 44.

can produce allegiance to a church or creed. Moreover, the importance attached to the stage of doubt seems like an echo of the Cartesian methodic doubt,¹ and would seem to be equally futile with Descartes' method, as a means of attaining certainty.

The third type considered is "emotional belief." It draws its strength from the "field of vital feeling."² It is an "instinctive conviction of the existence of a satisfaction for the various organic desires. . . . Nor is this use of the term 'belief' in any way an extension of its strict meaning. It is literally 'the mental attitude of assent to the reality of a given object.' The object in these cases is the thing which will satisfy the need or impulse."³ What the organism demands must be real, must exist somewhere, because the organism needs it. The appropriateness that marks the instinctive reactions of the organism has a parallel in the "wisdom" which belongs to instinctive beliefs,—those beliefs in which "the feeling background voices the demands of the organism." Such beliefs are "hardly to be eradicated by argument," for they go deep down into the "organic and biologic part of us."⁴—This third type is, therefore, also subjective and

¹ Cf. John Rickaby, S. J., *First Principles of Knowledge*; J. Balmes, *Fundamental Philosophy*, Vol. I, Chaps. XVII, XVIII, XIX.

² Op. cit., p. 40. Professor Pratt adds (p. 41): "Emotion often so increases the vividness of an idea and adds to it so much reality-feeling as to give it almost the overpowering force of an immediate sense-presentation."—This statement is quite Hume-an!

³ Pp. 41, 42.

⁴ Pp. 42, 43.

variable. As such it is lacking in a prime essential for genuine social co-operation; viz., an objective standard of truth, an ideal that is not dependent on instinctive cravings, a law that is binding on man as a "rational" animal—a law, therefore, that claims the submission of his whole being, not of his feelings and emotions only, but likewise of his intellect and will. Is it necessary to add that all three of Professor Pratt's types of belief refer explicitly to the order of nature only, making no clear distinction between human faith and divine faith? Practically also they assume that man, not God, is the author and finisher of religious belief.¹ Moreover, not all instinctive tendencies are to-day beneficial to the individual or the race. If, then, it is necessary to "inhibit" or to modify any of them in their functions, how are we to know that "religious belief" is not of that number?² Some there are to-day who look upon religion simply as a necessary restraint for the uncultured, the rude and ignorant. In their eyes it is a "negative" force. For the cultured it must give way to philosophy, as in Cicero's time;³ or, if you wish to pay deference to the time-spirit, it must yield to

¹ Contrast with St. Paul's text (Heb. xii, 2): "Looking on Jesus, the author and finisher of faith."

² "The time is coming and is, I believe, not far distant, when this inner experience, this spiritual [?] insight, will be recognized as the only sure basis [sic] of religious belief." Pratt, op. cit., p. 303.

³ On the difference between the Catholic Church and a School of Philosophy, see Brother Azarias, "Aristotle and the Christian Church," pp. 15-20, in *Essays Philosophical*. On the inadequacy of Philosophy as a substitute for Religion, see T. W. Allies, *Formation of Christendom*, Vol. I, passim, who also gives a good sketch of Cicero's mental attitude, *ibid.*, pp. 175-180.

science. In either case, the result is a reversion to pagan ideals and a pagan attitude of mind. Hence as Christians, nay, even as men, it is our duty to reject the principles on which such religious belief is based. Belief must be something more than "a lively idea related to or associated with a present impression."¹ It must be objective as well as subjective. To be divine, it must refer explicitly to the God from whom it comes.²

The view of religious belief which we have been examining, is implicitly accepted by many educators today. It is for this reason that we have devoted so much space to its consideration. Moreover, it has social consequences which are matter for grave concern to the individual. They affect the tone of the school which he attends as child or youth; they leave their impress on the society of which as man he is a citizen. Sooner or later they influence the time-spirit, whose atmosphere he is compelled to breathe. Were our concern chiefly philosophical, it would be necessary to take account of Pascal, Maine de Biran, and the Traditionalists, who, in their zeal for religious faith, restricted the lawful exercise of reason within its own domain; of Sir William Hamilton, who asserted that we could not "know" the Infinite, although it was a necessity and a duty to "believe" in it; of Immanuel Kant, who, divorcing "pure reason" from "practical reason," affirmed that we could not attain to "knowledge" of God by the

¹ Hume, *Treatise on Human Nature*, p. 96.

² Ollé-Laprune (*De la Certitude Morale*, p. 182) describes Fichte as "fired with the passion of Pascal and inspired with the poesy of Plato" in his *Bestimmung des Menschen* (Destination of Man).

former, yet had the duty of faith in Him imposed on us by the latter, operating through the voice of conscience; of Fichte, who accentuated and exaggerated the same subjective attitude; of Herbert Spencer, who limited the object of faith to the Unknowable, and thus, by a stroke of the pen, lopped off all religious duties; of John Stuart Mill, who, rejecting religious dogma as an illusion, would substitute an ideal social service; of Alexander Bain, who, deriving faith from the "fountains of human feeling" alone, looked upon it merely as "a mode of consoling, cheering and elating emotion"; or finally, of William James, who has warned us that it is "only when they forget that they are hypotheses [sic] and put on rationalistic and authoritative pretensions, that our faiths do harm."¹

¹The following may be given as references: 1. Blaise Pascal, *Pensées*; C. Kegan Paul, *The Thoughts of Blaise Pascal*. 2. F. Maine de Biran, *Journal intime*; N. E. Truman, *Maine de Biran's Philosophy of Will*. 3. "Traditionalism," G. M. Sauvage, C. S. C. *Catholic Encyclopedia*; John Rickaby, *First Principles of Knowledge*. 4. W. Hamilton, *Lectures on Metaphysic and Logic; Discussions on Philosophy*. 5. Immanuel Kant, *Kritik der Reinen Vernunft; Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft*; J. M. Meiklejohn (tr.), *Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*; T. K. Abbott (tr.), *Kant's Critique of Practical Reason, and Other Works on the Theory of Ethics*. Edw. Caird, *Critical Philosophy of Kant*. 6. J. G. Fichte, *Die Bestimmung des Menschen*; Mrs. Percy Sinnett (tr.), *The Destination of Man*. 7. Herbert Spencer, *First Principles*. 8. J. S. Mill, *System of Logic; Three Essays on Religion*. 9. A. Bain, *Emotions and Will; Logic, Deductive and Inductive*. 10. W. James, *The Will to Believe; Varieties of Religious Experience*.

On Belief in general, see Francis Aveling, "Belief," *Catholic Encyclopedia*, and bibliography; M. Maher, S. J., *Psychology*, Chap. XV, "Judgment and Reasoning," under which caption he treats Belief.—On Faith, see Hugh Pope, O. P., *Catholic Encyclopedia*, s. v., and bibliography; E. T. Shanahan, "Agnosticism,"

Article II.—The Exercise of Faith.

A psychological analysis of the attitude of faith, or spirit of faith, will help us to form an appreciation of its pedagogical value. It is a state of mind in the production of which many factors must have concurred. As it is in part social in origin, so it is also social in effect. Like other mental states it originates in sensation; for here as elsewhere Aristotle's dictum is valid: There is nothing in the intellect which did not in some way first exist in the senses (*Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu*). As in art, so in faith, it is the senses of sight and hearing, the so-called "intellectual senses," that contribute most freely to the matter of faith. When the words of the witness have been heard or his written statement has been read, the intellect proceeds to interpret the message in the light of its previous experience.¹ This aspect of faith reaches out into the domain of criticism, both higher and lower. The process of interpretation is necessarily affected by the present disposition of the individual believer, his "personal equation."² This, in turn, is a product of many subtle influences streaming in from

Catholic Encyclopedia and bibliography; L. Ollé-Laprune, *De la Certitude Morale*. Though mentioned by neither Father Aveling, nor Father Maher, Ollé-Laprune gives a thorough and philosophic study of the nature and conditions of "belief" as well as of "faith." His book deserves to be better known. He refers to Cardinal Newman's *Grammar of Assent*, which he values highly. For a systematic and sympathetic treatment of Newman's attitude, see Henri Brémond, S. J., *Newman: Psychologie de la Foi*.

¹ See below, pp. 294 ff.

² See below, pp. 215 ff.

the past, registered not only in plastic brain cells, but also in definitely formed association tracts,—in a word, in all those cerebral states, conditions, and connections by which the influence of environment on organism and mind, and the conscious adaptation of both body and mind to environment, have been gradually made over into the physiological basis of what we call “habit.”

Prominent among these activities are the multiple associations of imagination and memory and instinct. The very complexity of the act of faith, therefore, regarded even as a mere exercise of interpretation, should, on purely psychological grounds, be a warning against all hasty conclusions as to the pedagogical value of faith, be these conclusions favorable or unfavorable. Here, too, we first catch a glimpse of the amazing tangle of psychological difficulties which the process of “religious conversion,” considered merely as a natural phenomenon, must, in some way, involve. So many habits of mind and lines of conduct must be done away with; so many threads of association, the warp and woof of years, must be separated ere conversion is affected, that it is not surprising if hesitation, regret, reluctance, timidity, even dismay, should long precede that last step which has been called the “final plunge.” Cardinal Newman’s experience as recorded in his *Apologia* is an apt illustration.

Coincident with the act of interpretation is the act of confidence or trust in another which, as we have already seen,¹ is contained in the root-meaning of faith.

¹ P. 106.

An act of faith is an act of trust in the witness on whose authority we rely. As such it is an act of respect and courtesy, and by its very essence tends to strengthen the natural bonds by which men are held together in society. From the viewpoint of psychology and pedagogy it is also of great significance; for it is a fact of daily experience as well as of psychological experiment that sympathy with another is an indispensable condition for penetrating and understanding his mind. All this, it is true, is contained in the very meaning of sympathy. Yet the principle in question is in accordance with sound psychology, and, like all such principles, reacts on sociology, particularly in its educational phase. Thus Bainvel notes: "Faith, which has already done me so many services, is ready to serve still more. By it I am enabled to unite my mind to the minds of those who know, and thereby appropriate what they know."¹ Here we reach a truth that not only touches the rudiments of education, but likewise includes the mental attitude of every specialist, when, for instance, at a meeting of scientists, he listens with critical attention to the report presented by the greatest "authority" among his confrères. Here, too, we enter the field of "interest," which occupies so large a place in recent pedagogical literature, whether from the viewpoint of mental development or of motivation and discipline. Its scope is extensive—reaching from

¹ "La foi, qui m'a rendu déjà tant de services, est prête à m'en rendre davantage encore. Par elle, je puis unir mon esprit à l'esprit de ceux qui savent, et ainsi m'approprier ce qu'ils savent." *La Foi et l'acte de Foi*, p. 24.

the content and arrangement of the curriculum, the value of method, and the principles of vocational guidance, to the most efficient social service for which the school can train a child. In other words, the scope of the interest aroused by faith is, at least potentially, universal; for it springs from man's social nature, and that is essential to man as man.

The acceptance of a thing as true also stirs our feelings, affections, and emotions. These psychical states may arise from two sources: viz., from our attitude toward the fact or principle accepted as true, and from our attitude toward the person on whose word we accept the fact or principle. Sometimes these two streams converge, and then, especially when they favor the fact or principle and person, the tide of emotion may break down all the barriers of restraint or inhibition and issue in epoch-making action. Such an instance was Christ's triumphal entry into the city of Jerusalem on the first Palm Sunday; such also, to take a purely human example, the enthusiasm aroused by St. Bernard when preaching the Second Crusade. On the other hand, the fire of passion may be fanned into flame by the wild breath of emotion, and then death and devastation mark the course of the conflagration. Such scenes were witnessed during the French Revolution. Both cordial acceptance and indignant rejection of a principle lie within the compass of genuine faith. The excesses that mark the overthrow of reason in either man or group are phenomena that belong to the realm of social psychology.

The deeper the emotion entering into any specific act of faith, the greater the effect wrought on the mind and heart of the believer. This consideration introduces a new aspect of association, for by subsequent like acts, or by subsequent repetitions of the same act, the intellect gains a deeper insight into the truth accepted, while the emotions, although not proportionately intensified, are nevertheless appreciably reinforced. These factors are of great significance in the building up of habit; for deep and appropriate emotion must be joined to frequent and regular repetition of acts if habit is to yield its best results.¹ Furthermore, habit is a natural bridge between the theoretical and the practical. However much ideas may tend to express themselves in action,² it is still true that a purely speculative attitude of mind results eventually in what we may designate "atrophy" of the power of expression.³ Hence it is that educators accept the maxim: "We learn to do by doing." But they do not give sufficient conscious recognition to the parallel principle: "We learn to *know* by doing." Yet the principle is at least as old as Christianity,⁴ and has its psychological basis in the unitary character of the human mind. On the one hand, it is implied in every consistent theory of

¹ See below, pp. 248-275.

² The Ideo-motor Theory emphasizes this tendency.

³ An excellent illustration of this truth is found in Henry James' "The Madonna of the Future," *Reverberator and Other Tales*; also included in the *Passionate Pilgrim and Other Tales*.

⁴ Matt. vii, 24.

emotions;¹ for our mental states are produced, or at least accompanied, by appropriate organic states. On the other hand, it is a fact that the expression of a thought not only develops the mind, it also perfects our comprehension of the thought. Hence it follows that a life spent in "the living" of noble thoughts must yield an abundant harvest of whatever is best in man. The Apostle might well say: "Be ye doers of the word, and not hearers only, deceiving your own selves."²

This cumulative attribute of thought, when expressed in deeds, is not confined to the individual; it affects his associates also.³ In this respect it becomes in the natural order a kind of adumbration of that mysterious and inspiring source of spiritual helps which Catholics speak of as the communion of saints. The believer's behavior affects others, even if they be not of the household of faith; while the influence of others who make profession of his own creed, whether brought home to him by direct physical contact in frequent intercourse, or indirectly through the pages of history and literature, through works of Christian art or even through the instrumentality of scientific monographs,

¹The James-Lange theory of emotion holds that "the bodily changes follow directly the *perception* of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur *is* the emotion" (James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 449). Professor Titchener argues that evidence is against the theory, and concludes that "we cannot regard this organic commotion either as *constitutive*, as the one thing necessary to emotion, or as *differential*, the one thing that marks off any particular emotion from all the rest" (*Beginner's Psychology*, pp. 221, 222).

²James i, 22.

³See below, p. 274.

reacts on his own conduct and strengthens the ties that bind him to his faith. This phase of the question brings us into the very thick of imitation,—a fascinating study of the psychologist and sociologist, it is true; but long known to those outside the pale of science under the more prosaic name of “example.” These “expressive” values of faith would be impossible without the co-operation of the will. As we have already seen,¹ faith affords a less complete and less direct knowledge of its object than does science. This very defect, however, gives the opportunity for the will and the emotions, when directed by enlightened reason, to offer their homage to the truth attested and to the authority of the witness. It is this aspect that is so important an element in divine faith, and gives to the act of assent its quality of merit, making it pre-eminently a human act (*actus humanus*). Man’s need of faith is proof that he is a social being, just as his social nature makes imperative the preservation of his faith. This is a phase of the question not to be lost sight of in discussing social efficiency as the great aim of education.

So far we have considered the elements that enter into an act of faith, whether human or divine; viz., sensation, imagination and memory, judgment and reasoning, apperception and habit, feeling, sentiment and emotion, volition and its outward expression affecting both the individual and the group of which he is a member. While this is true of both human faith and divine, it applies in a more eminent way to the exer-

¹ P. 107.

cise of divine faith. Therefore we shall henceforth limit ourselves to the consideration of divine faith. This far surpasses human faith in its origin, God himself; in its motive, God's veracity; in its object, truths pertaining to the salvation of man; in its end and aim, the everlasting happiness of man; and, we may add, in its faculty, viz., the intellect perfected by infused virtue.¹ It therefore follows that in a much fuller sense than that expressed by Paul Janet, divine faith is really and indeed an act of "the whole man."

From the very comprehensiveness of the "act" of faith, it follows that the "habit" of faith, abiding, vitalizing faith, must permeate man's whole existence,—not his mental and moral life only, but his organic life as well. It is the whole man that believes; it is the whole man that aims to make his conduct consistent with his belief. This marks a high stage in the process of character-building. But since faith involves the exercise of

¹ Cf. Cardinal Newman (*Grammar of Assent*, pp. 186, 187), who after noting the "intrinsic integrity and indivisibility" of the assent included in the act of faith, goes on to say that these attributes do not "interfere with the teaching of Catholic theology as to the pre-eminence of strength in divine faith, which has a supernatural origin, when compared with all belief which is merely human and natural. For first, that pre-eminence consists, not in its differing from human faith, merely in degree of assent, but in its being superior in nature and kind, so that the one does not admit of a comparison with the other; and next, its intrinsic superiority is not a matter of experience, but above experience. Assent is ever assent; but in the assent which follows on a divine announcement, and is vivified by a divine grace, there is, from the nature of the case, a transcendent adhesion of mind, intellectual and moral, and a special self-protection, beyond this operation of those ordinary laws of thought, which alone have a place in my discussion."

the will, it includes also the exercise of choice and therefore the rejection of alternatives after the choice has been made. This rejection necessarily entails also the exclusion of the natural corollaries or consequences of the alternatives ruled out; and so the "practice" of faith comes to include also a prevision of future conditions, an attitude of expectancy, a state of readiness. More obviously, however, the action of the will in rejecting alternative measures and forbidding their execution brings us face to face with "inhibition."¹ Some form of inhibition is indispensable in all connected thinking and particularly in all close reasoning.² In the realm of divine faith, it means the rejection of facts or principles contrary to the revealed truth contained in the dogmas of the Catholic Church. When it is dynamic, and therefore expressed in deeds, it inhibits or seeks to inhibit all conduct opposed to the principles of faith. It is true that this aspect of faith is sometimes made the ground of bitter attack. It is looked upon as incompatible with openness of mind, with the spirit of research, with zeal for enlightenment and progress. The objection, however, rests on a false assumption. Just as the mathematician accepts the axioms and would reject with scorn all doubt of their truth and validity, if such a doubt were to occur to him; as the psychologist by his hours of patient experiment in the laboratory increases and confirms his knowledge of

¹ See below, pp. 229, 247, 254, 262 f., 287.

² Cf. Brother Azarias, "Aristotle and the Christian Church" (pp. 83-85), in *Essays Philosophical*.

mental phenomena; so the typical Catholic being certain of the truths taught him by his Church, feels no more hampered by them in his mental development than does the mathematician admit being cramped by the axioms; or the psychologist by the laws of conscious processes. As Donat has well said, faith being a certainty for the believer, cannot produce conflict in his mind.¹ The objection is a proof of bad psychology. The one who raises it virtually imputes to the believer his own unbelieving attitude of mind together with and in union with the believer's attitude toward science. As a matter of fact, the two states do not coexist in the same mind. The believing attitude is found in the Catholic together with the acceptance of the established data and principles of the science which he is pursuing. The unbelieving attitude exists in another mind, and, it must be confessed, sometimes perverts or distorts issues and principles that should be kept rigidly within the proper domain of science.

The function of inhibition as contained in the habit of faith is to perfect the spiritual life of the individual and, through the individual, of the group. Under circumstances of stress and grievous trial, its value in this direction may be manifested in the heroism of martyrs, who become for all subsequent ages models of fidelity to principle, of loyalty to duty.² Apostasy, even in

¹ "Faith does not restrain the mental freedom of one who is convinced of the truth of his faith." *The Freedom of Science*, p. 112.

² This suggests an important social aspect of inhibition. Cf. Matt. v, 21-48.

such times, is not an exercise of inhibition; it is rather proof of its absence, an indication of extreme moral weakness. In the milder times of peace, the inhibitive function of faith may be daily exercised in preventing the habit of faith from degenerating to the level of mere routine performance of spiritual duties. In this way it happens that faith, even on its inhibitive side reaches out to the co-ordination of activities, to asceticism and discipline. For faith is growth, and there is no vigorous growth without pruning.

It is necessary to bear in mind this comprehensiveness of the activities involved in the exercise of divine faith, because this seems to be just the attribute of faith which is commonly overlooked by those persons who object to making faith a dynamic factor in school life. In view of their pedagogical significance, we may classify the aspects or activities of faith under the two general heads of scientific and æsthetic, or cultural, values. The scientific aspect of faith appears not only in the demonstration of principles by which the Catholic Church as witness to divine faith establishes her claim to a divine mission to teach men the way of salvation, but also in the setting up of standards on the plane of the supernatural by which we may measure the accuracy and confirm the truth of the cognate fundamental principles that belong to the natural order. For the Catholic Church consistently teaches that "grace supposes nature" and is its complement. It is a mistake to say that such standards embarrass the intellect and impede the progress of learning. As well

might we say that standard units in physics, or uniform standards in like psychological experiments, bar the advance of physical or mental science. In science it is conceded that uniformity of standard is an aid to progress, if not indeed its condition. In this respect at least, the present generation profits by the hard-won victories of preceding ages. Figuratively speaking, it stands on the shoulders of the past and peers into the future. Must the very spirit of the method in which science takes so much pride be imputed to faith for a sin when it helps to confirm the claims of faith?

Since faith as a habit ¹ must be expressed in action, for otherwise the habit would perish; faith as a body of dogmatic truth has its complement in faith as a moral code. In this relation, too, faith sets a standard of values, for each of "the faithful" is exhorted to approximate the model set by his divine Redeemer. Being a wise teacher, deeply versed in human nature, the Church sets before her children the various copies of the perfect Model made by men of all ages and nations, whom she calls "saints," and who, because weighted with human weakness, may more quickly elicit from mortal man the indispensable condition of all human development and therefore of all education,—interest.

But interest may wane. The acts that were performed with such deliberation and enthusiasm in building up the habit of faith may fall to the level of mere routine phenomena. What resources has faith for

¹ On Habit, see below, pp. 248-275.

averting such disaster? It is a principle accepted by scholastic philosophers, that things are conserved by the causes that produced them. This principle is implied in all the genetic psychology of our day; for it is the philosopher's way of expressing a law of growth and development. As far as the individual alone is concerned, the chief means at his disposal is meditation,¹ as we have already seen. When, however, he is considered as a member of the Church, he has not merely the help afforded by authorized teachers, but also the immense benefits to mind and heart resulting from the rites and ceremonies that attend the administration of the sacraments. The fundamental Christian truths whose commemoration is noted in the yearly calendar, constitute a system whose perfection science might well envy and can only remotely copy; while in the variety of aspect which they present, these truths afford an excellent model to the teacher. It is in this latter respect that they become a means whereby the earnest Christian may keep his faith strong and active. "The old *in* the new," the discovery of the old principle in the new manifestation, is, according to Professor James,² the secret of vital teaching. For this reason, too, it is a sure means of quickening one's faith.

On its culture side, faith is also stimulated by the influence of good example, and by the natural expression of faith revealed in Christian architecture, painting, sculpture, music, and literature. To all men, in-

¹ See above, pp. 53, 57, 58. Cf. below, pp. 281-309.

² *Talks to Teachers*, p. 108.

deed, such works of art make their appeal, but it is only to the eye of faith that they disclose the richness and the perfection of their symbolism. Psychology gives a reason for this in its doctrine of apperception.

We may now summarize this article. Faith as an act, but most of all as a conscious habit, exercises all our psychical activities upon noble truths and lofty ideals. It therefore exerts a comprehensive pedagogical influence of a high order. This influence possesses both scientific and cultural values. Objections against faith, when sifted, are generally found to arise from overlooking or ignoring this comprehensive character of faith. As a corollary to these principles it would seem to follow that any institution fitted by its very nature to develop such faith, deserves well of society.

CHAPTER V.

THE PEDAGOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FAITH.

Article I.—The Pedagogical Value of Faith Viewed Objectively.

TO FORM a working estimate of the pedagogical value of faith viewed objectively it is well for us to examine the question from the various, though related, viewpoints taken in Chapters I and II of Book I; viz., aim, curriculum and method. We have already indicated what is meant by the "spirit of faith." The topic of curriculum has already been discussed sufficiently for our purpose.¹

From the standpoint of aim, the significance to the teacher of the doctrines of divine faith is this: he knows with certainty, on the authority of God's own word, that all men, and therefore both he and his pupils, are destined, on condition of their free and full co-operation, to attain everlasting happiness. It is therefore his duty and his privilege as an educator to select such subjects, to employ such methods, and to follow such gradations as will best secure the attainment of this ultimate end of man. By this standard also he is enabled to judge the worth of systems of education,

¹ See above, pp. 11-16, 43-50.

whether ancient or modern. In the light of this principle, moreover, he can appraise so-called educational "fads" and "reforms." In this age of ours when we profess to obey a Pure-Foods Commission and to respect a Standard-Weight Commission, can we reasonably object to any teacher or body of teachers for consistently striving to follow a standard of absolute values for the life of man as man? To the Catholic, our whole earthly existence is but a training school for heaven.

In the inevitable reaction against the excesses of purely elective courses of study in school and college, there has arisen a more insistent demand for the consideration and correlation of the studies pursued by the individual pupil. Educators realize that, from the pedagogical viewpoint, he is only a potential unit. It is their high privilege to help weld the processes of thought, the purposes of the will, and the pulses of the emotions into an actual unit stamped with the deepest traits of an honorable personality. In his endeavor to accomplish this result, the Christian teacher, and more particularly the religious teacher, seeks to bring home to himself and to his pupils the conviction that the unremitting performance of daily duties is the matter out of which man's eternal weal is fashioned.¹ He rejects, therefore, as false the conclusion sometimes drawn, that attention to one's higher spiritual interests is incompatible with complete loyalty to one's temporal duties as member of the family and citizen of the state. He

¹ Cf. "Accommodation," p. 267, below.

maintains, on the contrary, that the highest and most enduring motives for the practice of the domestic and the civic virtues are to be found precisely in the sanctions of religion.

Moreover, he insists that, even from a scientific viewpoint, this conscious striving for a supernatural destiny exerts a most valuable educational influence on his secular studies and pursuits. It is admitted by all teachers, whether religious or laymen, that in the early years of childhood the senses and the play of the muscles are the chief feeders of the growing mind. But with each succeeding year the child is, largely, nay chiefly, through the processes of human, if not divine faith, trained to interpret these various sense impressions. In this way is he initiated into the scientific value of phenomena, which in maturer life he may refer to basic principles of philosophy. But the religious teacher does not stop here. Holding fast to the doctrine of a supreme Creator, he looks upon the phenomena and the laws of nature as expressions of the Creator's mind. The things of sense, their interrelations as perceived by the trained intellect, the deductions of thorough-going science, the *Weltanschauung* or cosmic philosophy which harmonizes all these—each and all are welcome to the religious teacher, who finds in them successively a fuller revelation of the mind of God as expressed in the Book of Nature. He is certain that there can be no real "warfare" between genuine science and the truths of revealed religion. The seeming conflict he knows will end when due allowance is

made for the "personal equation," for hasty generalizations, and unverified hypotheses.¹

His attitude may be explained by a comparison. Just as the physical and chemical forces which the scientist has studied in the inorganic world, acquire a deeper significance for him when he investigates their action in organic life; as the processes of metabolism "mean" more for him when he has considered their influence on the sensations and the behavior of the animal; as even the bodily functions which are the concern of the physiologist, affect deeply the mental and moral life of man; so the Christian and religious teacher is justified in combining all these into one vast synthesis with the order of grace. As divine grace completes nature, so the natural order is for him but the symbol, the vesture, the body, as it were, of the supernatural. He seeks to develop the apperceptions befitting his position as a Catholic educator. Has he warrant for this? Most assuredly; the incarnate Wisdom of God taught him this lesson in the sermon on the Mount.² On that occasion the lilies of the field and the sparrows of the air were made object-lessons of this great principle. This very association of the highest of spiritual truths with the commonest of natural objects is a most efficacious means of making divine truth fecund.³

¹ See A. J. Balfour, *The Foundations of Belief*, pp. 313 ff.

² Matt. vi, 26-31.

³ Cf. E. A. Pace, "How Christ Taught Religion," *Catholic University Bulletin*, Vol. XIV, 1908, p. 8.

Article II.—The Pedagogical Value of Faith Viewed Subjectively.

Since methods when used effectively by the teacher, become permeated as it were with his personality, we may best inquire into the pedagogical value of faith viewed subjectively by examining what, for want of a better name, we may call the "method" of faith. If we look for an illustration of our meaning, we may find one to serve our purpose in "Evolution." Evolution as a system, that is, as an organic body of scientific truths, is not to-day accepted by all men without challenge or reservation. Evolution as a *method of investigation* is employed extensively and profitably. In a somewhat analogous manner we may speak of a "method" determined by the attitude or spirit of divine faith. To make our meaning clearer it is necessary to remove a current misunderstanding and to correct the error which this misunderstanding implies. It was pointedly expressed by the late William Torrey Harris, then Commissioner of Education, at the meeting of the National Education Association held in Boston in 1903:

"The principle of religious instruction is authority; that of secular instruction is demonstration and verification. It is obvious that the two principles should not be brought into the same school, but separated as widely as possible."¹

Dr. Harris' zeal here carried him too far. The principle of all instruction, whether secular or religious, implies, in the beginning, authority on the part of the

¹ *Proceedings*, 1903, p. 353.

teacher and faith on the part of the pupil. Even the divine Teacher of mankind, engaged in imparting to them truths of the gravest import for both time and eternity, and making use of methods that even His infinite wisdom saw to be best suited to the mental and moral capacity of His auditors, did not hesitate to make use of the principle of authority. The evangelist assures us that "He taught as one having authority, and not as their Scribes and Pharisees."¹ Furthermore, the principle of authority, with its correlate of faith, continues to exercise some sway over the whole period of man's mental and moral development, whether the man be unlettered or learned, whether he be dullard or genius. Even the greatest geniuses in the most exact of sciences must take much on faith in the very department in which their originality is most strikingly manifested. As for the experimental scientist, every time he performs a satisfactory experiment, he makes an act of faith in the reliability of the apparatus which he uses, the external conditions under which he operates, and the constancy of the laws which control the functions of his body and mind while he is experimenting. It is impossible for man to do without faith. If he be deprived of the true faith, he will adopt or invent a false one.²

But authority is not the only principle of instruction, much less of education, in either religion or secular

¹ Matt. vii, 29.

² This thought has been well developed by F. Brunetière in "Le Besoin de Croire," *Discours de Combat*, I, pp. 302, 308, 310.

branches. Religion calls for demonstration also. When divine faith seeks entrance into the human soul, she comes with all due credentials. It is by these credentials that she establishes her claim to our hospitality. Once admitted as guest within our interior, she speedily becomes a member of the family, if we are loyal to our duty, and rewards us by imparting greater penetration to the intellect, greater strength to the will, and greater purity to the emotions of the heart. We have already seen that the initial act of the intellect involved in faith becomes under the impulse of the heart and will a higher and more penetrating act of the intellect. Paul Janet even speaks of faith as "a complex result into which enter instinct, education, environment, reflection, sensibility, imagination,—in a word, the entire man."¹ The validity of the credentials of faith is a matter of investigation and verification.

In the address from which we have quoted, Dr. Harris emphasizes the part played by sense and imagination in developing the child's religion. He includes even the symbolic aspect of religion. He does not, however, seem to realize that the understanding of religious symbols, rites, and ceremonies, as such, entails comparison, abstraction, judgment, and reasoning—all acts of intellect. But the most serious misapprehension, the special occasion of the antithesis between religion and the secular branches—and this is almost

¹ "Elle est un resultat complexe, dans lequel entrent l'instinct, l'éducation, le milieu, la réflexion, la sensibilité, l'imagination, en un mot l'homme tout entier." *Principes de métaphysique et de psychologie*, t. I, p. 72, cited by S. Harent, S. J., loc. cit.

equivalent to saying between religion and science—is the implied restriction of religion in school to mere instruction; that is, to a body of doctrine to be taught. As we have already seen, faith itself is an act of the whole man. What we have called the “method” of faith is not merely training in a doctrinal system to be learned; it is also discipline in a code of morals to be kept, initiation into a life to be lived. The “method” of faith, the method of Catholic education which the religious novitiate applies, is fundamental in the development of the Christian life. The words of Thomas à Kempis leave no room for doubt or equivocation on this point:

“He that would fully and feelingly understand the words of Christ must study to conform his whole life to the life of Christ.”¹

Within the last ten years a pronounced reaction has set in against the dominance of a purely intellectualistic concept of education. This reaction is manifest in the increasing demand for supervised playgrounds, for motor and manual training, for greater laboratory facilities, and for vocational preparation. The Catholic Church maintains that our life here on earth is a great training school for life everlasting; that each of us has delicate and daily experiments to perform in the laboratory of his own nature; that each experiment brought to successful issue equips us to meet the greater problems of the morrow; and that in this laboratory of the Christian life our great teachers are the saints of God. This is admitted by Dr. F. W. Foerster:

¹ *Imitation*, Bk. I, Chap. I, 2.

"From this point of view the saints are of imperishable importance in the world of education. They illuminate and demonstrate the teaching of *Christ* in many and varied directions, at the same time linking it up with human life."¹

In this broader and truer concept of the Catholic faith, self-denial, mortification and asceticism are seen to exercise an important function and to be undeserving of the obloquy that has often attached to them. To quote again from Dr. Foerster:

*"Asceticism should be regarded, not as a negation of nature nor as an attempt to extirpate natural forces, but as practice in the art of self-discipline. Its object should be to show humanity what the human will is capable of performing, to serve as an encouraging example of the conquest of the spirit over the animal self. The contempt which has been poured upon the idea of asceticism in recent times has contributed more than anything else toward effeminacy. Nothing could be more effective in bringing humanity back to the best traditions of manhood than a respect for the spiritual strength and conquest which is symbolized in ascetic lives."*²

The "method" of faith, therefore, consists in (1) the hearty acceptance of revealed truth, (2) the shaping of our daily conduct so as to agree with these principles, (3) the assimilating of our feelings and emotions,—those great motive forces of our deeds,—to the inner spirit of divine truth.³ This is the method by which the novice is trained. The Catholic Church holds that, in due measure, this method is to be applied in all Catholic schools and to all subjects. The author

¹ *Marriage and the Sex Problem* (tr. Meyrick Booth), p. 133.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 128.

³ See below, pp. 260-271.

whom we have just quoted expresses the idea in these terms:

"As is well known, it was the Franciscan movement which gave rise to the so-called Third Order: the members of this order were permitted to live in the world, to carry on business and to marry; but they were required at the same time, through specific vows, to honour the saints to whom their order was dedicated, and they were enjoined throughout their economic and family life never to lose sight of the spiritual destiny of man. This Third Order symbolises the influence of the ascetic ideal upon real life; it shows the manner in which this ideal provides our earthly existence with an access of power—not the least of its services being the strengthening of the individual spirit against the confused world of human instincts and feelings."¹

There is another aspect of this "method" of faith which should appeal to such educators as endeavor to secure equal opportunities for all. Abraham Lincoln is credited with saying: "The Lord must have loved the common people very much: He made so many of them." Any method in education that tends of its own nature and by its own merits to ennoble the life of the common people, is deserving of consideration. There is matter for pertinent thought in these lines from Dr. Foerster, although he is directly applying them to the "nursing profession":

"There are, of course, numbers of self-sacrificing characters outside the Orders. But the Orders understand how to inspire *mediocre* characters, and to educate them in a magnificent fashion to an almost superhuman degree of self-sacrifice. And the main reason for this superiority on the part of the Catholic sisters is the vow of voluntary celibacy: in the first place, it puts the nurses in quite a different position with regard to the patients and doc-

¹ Id., op. cit., p. 133.

tors; they cease, indeed, to be women, and become sisters; and, moreover, they have put away the idea of leading lives of their own outside the hospital. This gives them a wholeness, dignity, and sacredness which they would not otherwise be able to acquire. Here, again, we perceive the deep relationship between social service and the ascetic ideal—the close connection between the capacity for the greatest sacrifice, and a form of retirement from the world; we see that only those who have left the ‘natural man’ entirely behind are able to do the best work in many spheres of life.”¹

It has been said that to-day science claims the right to enter every domain of thought and action and there impose its laws and methods.² May we not make a like claim, and with at least equal justice, for religion and its method, the “method of faith”? But this is not all; for science owes faith a tardy act of acknowledgment and gratitude. Were it not for the manly discipline imposed on self by the Christian religion, progress in science would have been impossible, and the scientific attitude unattainable.³ The scientific spirit, as we understand the term to-day, was unknown to the nations of pagan antiquity. It was by his diligent consideration and due acknowledgment of the rights of others that the Christian student was held in restraint; it was his sense of duty to God that helped to curb his bursts of passion; it was his conviction that mineral, plant, and animal are all creatures of God that developed in him an unselfish interest in their nature and functions;

¹ Op. cit., footnote, pp. 142, 143.

² Yet see Balfour, op. cit., pp. 92, 93.

³ Du Bois Reymond, *Die Kulturgeschichte und Naturwissenschaft* (Leipzig, 1878), quoted by Foerster, *Schule und Charakter*, p. 12.

it was his apperception of them as "souvenirs" of the Creator and traces of His presence, that sustained his patience and fed his perseverance. In a word, it was Christianity that made possible that loyalty to truth, that patient elimination of all disturbing factors which is essential to the success of either investigation or experiment. Let us amend Dr. Harris' statement. Let us proclaim a treaty of peace between religion and secular studies, between faith and science. The Christian faith has made modern science *possible*.

In virtue of its "method" the Christian faith is also the basis of modern culture. The movement takes its origin in the example and the authority of the Saviour Himself:

"I give you a new commandment: That you love one another as I have loved you: . . . By this shall all men know that you are My disciples, if you have love one for another."¹

Commenting on the text, "Liberty, Equality, Fraternity," Brunetière shows² that wherever the realities flourish they are the flower of Christian teaching and practice. Sociologists call attention to the fact that culture seems more effective than religion in forming "groups" at the present day. The tendency is in harmony with the disposition, which is rather widely manifested, to take the ethical fruits of Christian teaching, but to reject the dogmatic tree on which they grew.³

¹ John xiii, 34, 35.

² "Raisons actuelles de croire," *Discours de combat*, nouvelle série.

³ Cf. F. Brunetière, *Discours de combat*, I, p. 300, note 1.

So, too, men delight in the fruits of Catholic culture, but refuse to appreciate the Catholic lives, the Catholic atmosphere, of which that culture is so fitting an expression.

Article III.—Summary.

We have briefly considered the nature of human and of divine faith, the psychological aspect of faith, and the difference between the objective and the subjective aspects of faith. The pedagogical value of the objective aspect of divine faith is found in the comprehensive and fundamental character of the truths which it contains. These afford standards of value, rules of conduct, and principles of motivation that avail for the leading of an honorable life here on earth and for the attainment of undying happiness beyond the grave. They are great principles of correlation and co-ordination.

The pedagogical value of the subjective aspect of divine faith is seen in the attitude of mind which it develops, the spirit which it fosters. This spirit is marked by a detachment from the material things of life, by a refusal to be subservient to instinct and passion. This self-control is a valuable asset in the prosecution of scientific research, which is also furthered by the habit of regarding creatures as images or traces of the Creator. It is inconsistent to demand the fruits of thoroughly Catholic training, viz., the scientific "temper" and the quality of "culture," and withhold recognition from the very principles of Christian faith and conduct by which they are produced and conserved.

The most valuable asset of the efficient teacher is character or "personality." Character connotes self-mastery, and a spirit of sacrifice which is more than mere altruism. The most fruitful source of both these qualities is a life that is the outgrowth, the unfolding, of Christian principles. Such a life the Religious Novitiate aims to foster, and in so far as it succeeds, it imparts to the novice a training of great pedagogical significance.

A clear view of the nature of faith and more particularly of the "spirit of faith" which the Catholic Church seeks to diffuse in all her schools, helps to destroy the illusion that religious training is effected by the principle of authority only and therefore promotes an attitude that is hostile to the scientific temper. Rather is the reverse true, that religion fosters an attitude that favors impartial scientific investigation. Whoever appreciates the value of the scientific temper and of genuine culture ought therefore in justice to concede the pedagogical value of that virtue of faith from which they both have sprung. Since it deliberately and efficiently fosters the virtue of Faith, the Religious Novitiate exercises a genuine pedagogical mission.

BOOK III.
PEDAGOGICAL VALUES OF FAITH.

CHAPTER VI.

BIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF FAITH.

Article I.—Fundamental Concepts.

FOR a score of years biological concepts have dominated educational theory. So pronounced has been their sway that within this period not a few educators would seem to have forgotten that man is something more than a mere organism. As a natural consequence, a reaction has set in, and to-day there is manifest a marked tendency to emphasize man's social relations.¹ Since, however, every society is composed of individuals, social values and social efficiency must depend at least remotely, on individual worth, and proximately

¹ Cf. J. M. Baldwin, *The Individual and Society*, pp. 115-117 and passim. A fuller exposition of his fundamental principles is to be found in his *Mental Development of the Child and the Race* and *Social and Ethical Interpretations*. This tendency, in turn, may also become extreme, as when Bagley (*The Educative Process*, p. 65) writes that the social aim of education includes the "moral," because, "generally speaking, the moral standard is the social standard." The acceptance of such a principle would give one a standard of morality changing with time and place, a standard as variable indeed as fashions in dress. Morality must be based on man's essential nature and therefore on the unchanging source of that nature, viz., the divine Creator. See also J. M. Baldwin (*Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 83), "Morality is in its origin and practical bearing a social thing." This is very true, provided that the society include essentially not only men but their Maker.

on the co-operation of individuals. In order, then, to form a right estimate of social efficiency as an end of the educative process,¹ it is necessary to begin with a study of the capacity of the individual.² But to form an adequate idea of the individual, it is essential to consider him from the successive viewpoints afforded by the various planes of his existence and activity. These, in the purely natural order, are chiefly the biological, the psychological, and the sociological. Since the principles of biology are presupposed by both psychology and sociology, it is in accordance with sound method to begin with the biological aspects of education.

Biology is the science which studies living organisms,

¹ See above, pp. 79, 82.

² A further justification of this procedure is found in the acceptance of the so-called "Recapitulation Theory" not only by biologists at large, but also by many educators. According to this principle, the individual in the course of his development from the simplest and earliest stages of his existence up to complete manhood passes through the chief epochs which, according to the theory of evolution, have marked the progress of the human race. As the development of the individual is the concern of the science of ontogeny, while the development of the race is the subject-matter of phylogeny, the principle is conveniently expressed in the formula of Hæckel: "Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny." It is to be noted that the individual is conceived of as merely "recapitulating"; that is, as repeating *only the chief* phases in the supposed development of the race. Moreover the recapitulation is structural only, not functional. St. Thomas Aquinas admits ontogenetic development (*Summa Theologica*, I, q. 76, a. 4, *Potentia*, q. 3, a. 9). Yet cf. J. L. Perrier, *Revival of Scholastic Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 98, 99; T. Harper, *Metaphysics of the School*, Vol. II, pp. 553, 561; H. Muckermann, *Catholic Encyclopedia*, "Biology," II, 572; J. M. Baldwin, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, Chaps. I, VII. In the field of education, the recapitulation theory has culminated in the *Culture Epoch theory*, which is now discredited by the best educators.

whether plant or animal. It investigates their origin, their structure, their functional activity, and their development. The study of their origin, which Professor E. G. Conklin considers the "greatest biological subject" of the present century,¹ leads directly to the topic of heredity, with its recent offshoot, the so-called science of eugenics. In its study of organic structures, biology builds up the science of morphology; in its study of the functions of living bodies, it develops the science of physiology. Since it is the structure that functions, morphology and physiology are intimately related. In fact, "function and structure are merely different aspects of one and the same thing, namely, organization."² Function³ is determined by two great

¹ *Heredity and Environment in the Development of Men*, Preface.

² Conklin, *op. cit.*, p. 37.

³ A *process* is "a complex series of changes tending toward a single effective result." A *function*, on the other hand, is a species of process. It is a "process sufficiently complex to involve an arrangement or co-ordination of minor processes, which fulfills a specific end in such a way as to conserve itself." (J. Dewey, *Monroe's Cyclopedia of Education*, s. v.) Thus we speak of the digestive function, the function of the nervous system, of the senses in general, of sight in particular; or again, the function of intellect or will. (Cf. Brother Azarias, *Philosophy of Literature*, Chap. II, "The Function of Literature.") J. M. Baldwin (*Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*) is too vague. He states that a "function" in biology is "any normal activity, process, or performance accomplished by an organism or an organ." A "mental" function, he adds, is "any conscious process considered as taking part in a larger system of processes." E. B. Titchener (*Primer of Psychology*, pp. 6, 7, 9) contrasts "processes" with "things"; the latter are relatively fixed and permanent, the former are transient and changing. So, too, in his *Beginners' Psychology*, just published (1915), replacing his *Primer*, he writes: "Nothing could well be more misleading as a

influences: one intrinsic, viz., heredity; the other extrinsic, viz., environment, the collective name for all those influences and stimulations from without which modify the organism in structure or function. Both the qualities inherited by the organism and the func-

name for mental phenomena, than the familiar phrase 'states of consciousness'; for a mental state is something relatively stable and permanent. Mental experiences are moving, proceeding, on-going experiences" (p. 21). According to Professor Dewey ("Function," Monroe's *Cyclopedia of Education*) "the transfer of the conception of functions from biology to philosophy is a mark of a general tendency (1) to substitute a dynamic theory for a static one; (2) to place ends and purposes within the process of life-experience instead of outside and beyond; and (3) to emphasize the continuity of the process of development through biological, psychological, and social activities." As to the first phase of the tendency noted by Professor Dewey there can be no doubt. The second phase is more insidious, for it may include the disposition to look upon the creature as self-sufficient and therefore upon God Himself as unnecessary and inconvenient. As of old in Bethlehem, so to-day but too many men find no room for Him in the inn of this planet of ours. Since man is a creature, it must always and everywhere be true that the full meaning of his nature can never be found in himself alone. (Cf. Bishop Ullathorne, *The Endowments of Man*, Chap. I.) That can be grasped only when man is studied in his relation to God. His dependence on his Maker is his greatest glory. The third aspect emphasized by Professor Dewey lends itself too easily to the error of extreme evolutionism. We may agree with Mark Twain that cauliflower is "cabbage with a college education," but we cannot assent to John Locke's doctrine that a sense representation (he calls it an "idea," while W. Wundt uses the term "Vorstellung" to cover both sensile and intellectual representations) may be developed into a true intellectual (and, therefore, spiritual) concept. The essential, ineradicable distinction between the two is well brought out in Father Clarke's *Logic* (Stonyhurst Series), pp. 97-139. At the same time he indicates clearly how the sense representation is associated with the concept in the formation of the latter. By way of summary it may be said that the acceptance of Professor Dewey's *third* aspect as given above leads logically to the rejection of the spirituality of the human soul and therefore to the denial of an essential part of Christian revelation.

tions which give it its distinctive character are revealed and expressed in its growth and development. When the latter terms are used with precision, "growth" signifies increase in the number and size of the living cells, each organism coming originally from a single cell. "Development," on the other hand, connotes essentially a higher degree of perfection in the cells themselves and an increase in the number and strength of the connections between the cells. Growth, then, is primarily quantitative increase, whereas development implies greater excellence in quality and more perfect organization. Growth adds to the bulk of the organism; development augments its power. For the biologist development is invested with special importance, since from it alone can he learn both the inherited traits of the organism and the results wrought in it by environment.¹ Inherited traits remain mere aptitudes until they are acted upon by suitable environment. Hence it is that functional activity has been described as "response to stimuli," whether these stimuli be external or internal. From this viewpoint, "the entire process of development may be regarded as a series of such responses on the part of the organism," the kind of response in each case being determined by "the nature and state of the organism at the time and by the character of the stimulus."²

¹ "Just as the character of any function is determined by the organism, though it may be modified by environment, so the character of development is determined by heredity, . . . though the course and results of development may be modified by environmental conditions." Conklin, *op. cit.*, p. 86.

² *Id.*, p. 327.

Heredity, growth, and development characterize the organism and distinguish it from inorganic substances; they mark the dividing line between bodies that are living and those that are destitute of life. Furthermore, these characteristics of the entire organism are found also in its structural unit, the cell.¹ That nucleated mass of protoplasm which we call a cell must, therefore, hold the secret of organic life.

Man's knowledge of the intrinsic nature of life has advanced but little since Aristotle defined the life principle as "the first act (or prime perfection) of a physical organic body suitably disposed for life."² From this definition three attributes have been deduced as proper to life, whether in the organism as a whole or in each of its cells, viz., spontaneity, immanence, and plasticity.³

Biologists of our day prefer and use the terms irritability, conductivity, and adaptation. Irritability is the power of receiving impressions from without, such as those of light and heat. It is, of course, a biological

¹ It is worthy of note that Rev. John Baptist Carnoy, founder of the School of Cytology at the University of Louvain, contributed so largely to the study of cell life that he may almost be regarded as one of the founders of cytology. The very term "cell" has monastic associations, since the term was first used by Thomas Hooke, an Englishman, in 1665. He had been greatly impressed by the regular arrangement of "cells" in a piece of cork, which reminded him of the cells used by monks in their monastery.

² *De Anima*, II, i. §6. Cf. William Hammond, *Aristotle's Psychology*, pp. 44, 45: Soul is "the first entelechy of a natural body endowed with the capacity of life;" Brother Azarias, "Aristotle and the Christian Church" in *Essays Philosophical*, pp. 106 ff.

³ Cf. A. Farges, S. S., *La Vie et l'Evolution des Espèces*, pp. 30-35.

basis of the educative process, an essential requisite in pupil or disciple, if he is to learn anything from nature or from his fellows. In animal life the cell, or group of cells, possessing this requisite is called a "receptor." The impression so received is not confined to the point at which it initiated—its influence is felt throughout the cell, which, therefore, must have the power of conducting or transmitting the original impulse and thus producing a change that is really internal. From this viewpoint the cell is a "conductor." The educator finds in this process another biological element of the learning process, and therefore a factor in any genuine study on the part of the pupil.¹ Lastly, the cell, or organism, has the power of so reacting to the external stimulus as to adjust itself to its environment. This process is essential in order to secure to the organism fitness for survival in its struggle for existence. In virtue of this exercise of activity the cell is termed an "adjuster." Here is found the biological basis of behavior and conduct—a phase of activity emphasized by the school of psychologists known to-day as behaviorists.²

¹ Cf. J. M. Baldwin, *Handbook of Psychology*, Vol. II, pp. 7-17; Ladd and Woodworth, *Elements of Physiological Psychology*, pp. 16 ff. Conklin's statement stands in essential agreement with what is written above: "All the general functions of living things are present in the germ cells, viz., (1) constructive and destructive metabolism, (2) reproduction as shown in the division of cells and cell constituents, (3) irritability, or the capacity of receiving and responding to stimuli." *Op. cit.*, p. 37.

² For a temperate statement of the aims of Behaviorism and its significance to the teacher, see Colvin and Bagley, *Human Behavior*. For more sweeping claims, see Prof. J. B. Watson, *Behavior*, Introduction and Chap. I.

The higher forms of animal life are all characterized by a marvelously developed nervous system. It is the special business of biology to investigate this system, yet because the nervous system is an instrument of even the noblest acts of intellect and will of which man is capable, it comes also within the domain of psychology. The three characteristics of the cell in general are thus verified and raised to a higher plane in the three general functions of the nervous system in "receiving, registering, and reacting upon stimuli." These functions minister directly to the educative process. For it is the "sensory" system that receives impressions; it is the "motor" system that reacts upon them,—both being largely "peripheral"; that is, having organs that terminate upon the outer surface of the animal body. Registration, on the other hand, is effected in and by the "central" system; that is, the cerebro-spinal division of the nervous system. Since the whole organism is developed from the cell, it is to the cell that biologists look not only for an explanation of "development," a topic of surpassing interest in education, but also for the solution of the vexed and intricate question of "heredity."¹

The fundamental topics in biology that concern the educator may therefore be reduced to two: heredity and development. But the second of these always presupposes the first and the limitations placed by the first.

¹ So Conklin, *op. cit.*, p. 104: "In the last analysis, the causes of heredity and development are problems of cell structures and functions."

What we are to understand by these terms may now be stated in the words of a biologist whom we have already quoted: Heredity is "the appearance in the offspring of characters whose differential causes are found in the germ cells. Heritage is the sum of all those qualities which are determined or caused by this germinal organization. Development is progressive and co-ordinated differentiation of this germinal organization, by which it is transformed into the adult organization." Although the possibilities of man's development in the natural order are determined by heredity, "they rarely come to full epiphany."¹ Moreover, the developmental series is irreversible. Whether it be determined by environment or by personal choice, or both, the state or act that now prevails excludes forever the other alternative and therefore its essential consequences. In biology, as in faith and morals, "What things a man shall sow, those also shall he reap."²

According to certain biologists, the greatest social need of our day is to improve the physical human stock and purify the hereditary strain.³ Hence the vogue of the eugenic movement. It is well, however, to pause here and ask whether the Christian, and, with greater reason, the religious, life have anything at all in

¹ Id., p. 475.

² Gal. vi, 8.

³ "No other scheme of social betterment and race improvement can compare for thoroughness, permanence of effect, and certainty of results, with that which attempts to change the natures of men and to establish in the blood the qualities which are desired." Conklin, *op. cit.*, pp. 5, 6.

common with the principles of heredity and development.

Article II.—Heredity.

At first glance it would seem that the teachings of the Catholic Church have little connection with the science of biology. Yet we should be far from justified were we to draw such an inference. Did not the Saviour Himself tell Nicodemus: "Unless a man be born again of water and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God"?¹ He announced the purpose of His mission to men on earth in the words: "I am come that they may have life, and may have it more abundantly."² In like manner, He said of the Father: "God so loved the world as to give His only begotten Son; that whosoever believeth in Him, may not perish, but may have life everlasting."³ And at the most solemn period of His mortal life He estab-

¹ John iii, 6.—Since the societies formed by men are modeled more or less perfectly on the pattern of the great society of mankind to which we belong by nature, admission to these societies came in the figurative language of the Orient to be expressed in terms of birth. Whoever was duly admitted was said to be "born again." So Cardinal Wiseman, who adds: "But when we discover that this was the ordinary figure by which the Pharisees themselves expressed, in their mystic language, the act of becoming a proselyte, and that the phrase belongs to that philosophy and is used by the Brahmins of such as joined their religion; we at once perceive how such an obscure phrase should have been well understood by the person to whom it was addressed." *Lectures on Science and Revealed Religion*, Vol. II, Lecture II, p. 227.

² John x, 10.

³ John iii, 16.

lished the sacrament of the Holy Eucharist that these words of His might be verified by means of this living and life-giving Bread.¹ The Christian and the religious may well agree with Professor Conklin that "life processes are everywhere the same in principle, though varying greatly in detail";² and yet read into the statement a deeper meaning than is suspected by the author of "Heredity and Environment." For the Christian knows that when a child is to be received into the Church by baptism, the priest puts to him or to his sponsors the question: "What dost thou ask of the Church of God?" "Faith," replies the child. "What doth faith bring thee to?" continues the priest. To which the child makes answer, "Life everlasting."³

The religious can recall likewise the words of St. John Baptist de la Salle, addressed to the Brothers of the Christian Schools, in the meditation which he wrote for December 15th, the octave of the feast of the Immaculate Conception and celebrated in the Brothers' Institute as the patronal feast of their novitiates: "The holy vocation to which God has been pleased to call us, is our mother. The novitiate is the salutary and mystic womb of the religious life, in which her novices, who are her children, are spiritually conceived.

¹ "Panis vivus et vitalis" is the expression used by St. Thomas in his "Lauda Sion," the "Prose" for the Mass of Corpus Christi. Cf. John vi, 27-59; *Imitation*, Bk. IV, Chap. XI.

² P. 4.

³ Cf. Abbé Gaume, *Catechism of Perseverance*, Vol. II, p. 401.

She then begets them to Jesus Christ, as St. Paul expresses it, by forming them to a truly Christian and religious life.”¹

We must, however, beware of assuming that the Christian life, the life of grace, the life, therefore, of which the religious makes special profession, is essentially one with physical life, the life of the human body.² Man is so constituted that all his knowledge takes its beginning in the senses, and even his most sublime thoughts bear traces of this humble origin. His reflections on the “supernatural,” as the word itself betrays, must be expressed in terms of the natural. Yet, by means of certain reservations, restrictions, and modifications, he both respects his own limitations and safeguards the interests of truth. When, therefore, he

¹ *Meditations for Sundays and Festivals*, Vol. II, p. 736. In the French one-volume edition, reprint of 1882, the passage is found on p. 240.—This is but an application of the idea common to all Catholics when they speak of the Church as their Mother, “our holy Mother Church.” The concept is further emphasized by the words of St. Augustine: “He cannot have God for his Father, who will not have the Church for his Mother.”

² The following warning is not out of place:

“The avenue by which the problems of life, education, and religion are now approached is the biological. The ‘germ-theory’ is made to cover everything under the sun. . . . The result is that we find ourselves more frequently investigating the origin and growth of things, than inquiring into their nature and value. What things grew out of, rather than what they have grown into, if grow they ever did to the extent imagined, preoccupies and monopolizes attention. . . . When extended to society, religion, and the world at large in a literal *biological* sense, the concept of organism is employed beyond its legitimate sphere, and fills the mind with much ambiguity and false suggestiveness.”—Rev. E. T. Shanahan, “The Unconsidered Remainder,” *Catholic World*, February, 1914, pp. 586-588.

forms an idea of the life of grace which is received in baptism, he denies to it the imperfections that arise from essential dependence on matter. This mode of reasoning is the *via negationis et remotiois* of the Schoolmen. It "removes" from the concept of the higher order of life the defects that belong by essence to the lower. But this method of attaining knowledge does not stop here. It superadds to these two elements a third (*via eminentiæ*), which ascribes to the higher order of life the excellence which is its peculiar property, because of its more perfect nature. There are, therefore, three stages in forming a concept of the spiritual life, *i. e.*, the life of grace. To these must be added a fourth, in order to frame the idea of "life everlasting;" for the concept of life everlasting includes that of all the happiness of which the individual, according to his state, is capable, and that of its enduring and imperishable character. In other words, the idea expressed by the term "life" as applied to physical life, the life of grace, and life everlasting, is an "analogous" idea. If it be asked, Of what use is such an idea? we reply, in the words of Dr. Sauvage,¹ that, *after* a revelation of divine truth has been made to man, "analogy is useful to give us certain knowledge of the mysteries, either by comparison with natural things and truths, or by consideration of the mysteries in relation with one another and with the destiny of man." Analogy

¹ G. M. Sauvage, C. S. C., "Analogy," *Catholic Encyclopedia*. Cf. Ollé-Laprune, *op. cit.*, pp. 101-106.—It is only by "analogy" that unaided reason can rise from the creature to certain, albeit inadequate, knowledge of the Creator.

is our way of going from the lower to the higher order of truth and reality.

Not only is the notion of life, as so understood, fundamental in the doctrines of the Catholic Church, and therefore included in the articles of the Apostles' Creed; but the idea of heredity is equally emphasized. The perfervid statements of the most ardent eugenists do not equal in gravity and significance what the Catholic religion teaches concerning the nature and extent of heredity when the topic is viewed from the Christian standpoint. Heredity lies back of the doctrine of original sin and the fall of man, and therefore also back of the mysteries of the Incarnation and the Redemption.

According to the teaching of the Catholic Church, our first parents were, at the moment of their creation, constituted in the supernatural order and the state of "original justice." They were thereby raised to the dignity of adopted children of God Himself and made heirs of the everlasting kingdom of heaven. They were at the same time endowed with certain extraordinary gifts not at all demanded by their nature as human beings; such as great penetration of intellect and strength of will,—gifts perfecting the soul; exemption from sickness and suffering, which perfected the body; and control of the passions by reason, as also exemption from death—privileges which directly affected the intimate union between soul and body. By his sin of unbelief, pride and disobedience, Adam forfeited not only the great supernatural gift of sanctifying grace, but also those extraordinary privileges which, though

not requisite for the integrity of his nature as man, yet added immeasurably to its perfection, and so made it a fitter receptacle for divine grace. Henceforth, as every Catholic child is taught, man's intellect was darkened, his will weakened, his body liable to sickness and suffering; the "flesh," the passions, might rise against the "spirit," the reason;¹ and the warfare of life would terminate only with death.² And the sad plight of Adam passed also to his children, for they were born to him after his sin.³ And yet the infliction of this grievous penalty left no taint upon the perfect justice of God, who but took away the gifts of supererogation which He had freely but conditionally bestowed, nor upon His infinite mercy, for the sentence of condemnation and punishment was followed immediately by the promise of a Redeemer to come. Here then is the original question of heredity; here is the primal taint, from which, by a special divine intervention, only one human being has ever been exempt. And what remedy does the wisdom of God offer to fallen man, what means does He

¹ Cf. Rom. vii.

² Job vii, 1.

³ According to the Council of Orange (529), Adam transmitted to the whole human race both death of the soul, *i. e.*, sin, and death of the body, the punishment of sin (Cf. S. Harent, S. J., "Original Sin," *Catholic Encyclopedia*). Since original sin is essentially negative, consisting, as it does, in the privation of sanctifying grace and consequently of the extraordinary perfections granted on the condition of corresponding to this grace, the question of the "transmission, by generation, of acquired characters" does not enter into our discussion. For the views of Weismann, see Thomson's *Heredity*; for those of the Augustinian abbot, Gregor Mendel, see W. Bateson's *Mendel's Principles of Heredity*.

design to "improve the human stock," now so disastrously affected by the fruit

"Of that forbidden tree whose mortal taste
Brought death into the world and all our woe?"¹

The first is *faith* in the promised Redeemer, who is to restore to man the supernatural spiritual heritage which he had forfeited by sin. For the Lord, in cursing the serpent, said: "I will put enmities between thee and the woman, between thy seed and her seed."² Accordingly, "when the fulness of time was come, God sent his Son, made of a woman, made under the law: that He might redeem them who were under the law; that we might receive the adoption of sons."³ Thus it came to pass that through Mary's full co-operation with the designs of God in the redemption of mankind, the hereditary graces and privileges essential for salvation, which had been forfeited through the original sin of Adam and Eve, were now in some measure restored to the human race.⁴

From these teachings of the Catholic Church we must

¹ *Paradise Lost*. On the Semi-Arian tenets of Milton, revealed in the "Ode to the Nativity," as well as in his epics, see Faber's *Life and Letters*, pp. 206, 207.

² Gen. iii, 15.

³ Gal. iv, 4, 5.

⁴ St. Paul's statements are explicit (Rom. v): "Being justified therefore by faith, let us have peace with God through our Lord Jesus Christ: . . . by one man sin entered into this world, and by sin death: and so death passed upon all men in whom all have sinned. . . . But not as the offence, so also the gift. For if by the offence of one many died: much more the grace of God and the gift, by the grace of one man Jesus Christ, hath abounded unto many."

conclude: 1. That once the nature of man has been impaired by sin, there is no earthly power, there is no created agency, to restore his original dignity. 2. That the mystery of the Incarnation with its complement, the mystery of the Redemption, was wrought to effect in man a complete regeneration—not so much to purify and enrich his blood, although it does this indirectly, as to enlighten his mind with revealed truth, to strengthen his will with sacramental helps, to give him mastery over his passions, and to make suffering and death meritorious for life everlasting. 3. That man is more than a mere organism. Hence it is that the repairing of inherited defects can never be effected solely by means adequate for the improvement of the stock in either plant or animal. Man is intelligent; the means employed must therefore be spiritual and not solely corporal. He is endowed with free will; he must therefore make use of adequate means and use them with full deliberation.¹ But all men are called to be

¹ The words of F. W. Foerster are pertinent (*Marriage and the Sex Problem*): "It is true that these artificial methods [of eugenis] may momentarily relieve much suffering. In the long run, however, according to their own inner nature, they must increase the sum total of human suffering in every sphere of life—for their effect is immeasurably to increase the subjection of man to passion and artificial sensuousness" (p. 95). And again: "The almost miraculous regenerative power with which Christianity can repair the errors of human weakness, is illustrated with peculiar clearness by the effect of Christian faith upon sexual regeneration: leaving outward symptoms on one side, it touches primary control causes; it arrives not at counteracting the symptoms of degeneration, but at building up a new center of the whole personality. It is just this depth and simplicity which is absent from the reforming efforts of those who do not base their suggestions on genuine Christianity. . . . Religion overcomes the danger of a one-

followers of Christ and members of the Church which He founded. Therefore lasting race improvement, while coming from a source extrinsic to man,—that is, from God Himself,—with which man freely co-operates, will be realized only by the actual acceptance, on the part of the individual, of the truths taught by the Saviour, and the daily endeavor, with the help of divine grace, to make them the rule of his conduct. Now, divine grace is obtained by prayer, and prayer presupposes some degree of faith in God.

In sum, therefore, the Catholic Church includes and has always included what is best in the movement to improve heredity; but this she applies on the plane and in the sphere of the supernatural both in content of doctrine and method of application, securing thereby results of far greater extent and permanence than would be possible in the purely natural order. In proof thereof she can point to the first Christians, many of whom in spite not only of unfavorable environment but of degenerate ancestry, climbed to lofty heights of holiness. "The Son of God came to seek and to save that which was lost,"¹ and in every age since His coming, the Church, in repeating the marvelous conversion of

sided domination of the individual by intellect; thus making it possible for the unconscious element in personality again to assume its proper place; it makes it psychologically possible for men to free themselves from egotism; and it serves the general purpose of distracting the soul from a too close consciousness of the animal functions, which is a much better way of preserving these functions from any kind of degeneration than the most elaborate hygienic information." Pp. 164, 165.

¹ Luke xix, 10.

the Good Thief and the Magdalen, has borne witness to the efficacy of His mission.

Professor Horne admits,¹ as do most educators, that "biological problems underlie educational problems. They deal with life in its adjustment to its environment." He selects three facts as "significant for education": "(1) the increasing size of the cerebrum, or hemispheres of the brain, both absolutely and relatively to the size of the body, in the ascending scale of mammals; (2) the prolonged period of human infancy in comparison with lower animals; and (3) the brain as the organ of mind."² In place of his first fact we have taken one of deeper significance, viz., heredity, interpreting the term in its broad sense of transmission from generation to generation. The importance of his first fact, he maintains, lies in this, that it signifies "educability." We have asserted that the Catholic Church in presenting to men the only effectual remedy for original sin, educates them not only for their duties in this life, but also for their functions in the life to come.³ This very circumstance renders our interpretation of his second fact, the "prolonged period of human infancy," more fundamental and far reaching. From the Catholic viewpoint, man's whole life on earth is a preparation for heaven, and, in so far, it is therefore a kind of prolonged infancy. Moreover, the sacraments which he receives render him not only more sensi-

¹ *Philosophy of Education*, p. 18.

² P. 19.

³ See above, pp. 41, 42.

tive to truths of the supernatural order, but also more adept in interpreting in a supernatural way the phenomena, the occurrences, of his earthly environment. In other words, to use the language of the pedagogues who to-day "sit in the chair of Moses," they conserve and utilize what is best in his "plasticity." As to Professor Horne's third fact, no Catholic will admit that the "brain" is the "organ" of "mind," unless the term "mind" be so interpreted as to leave the spirituality of the soul intact. The brain is the central "organ" of the mind's sense-operations only. Its intellectual and volitional functions are intrinsically independent of the brain.¹

Article III.—Environment.

We have considered, from the Christian standpoint, some aspects of heredity as a factor of education. But heredity is valuable only as it makes for development, or, as some biologists prefer to express it, for "organization." Of the two factors that cause development, one, heredity, is intrinsic to the organism. The other, viz., environment, operates as an external stimulus. In the educative process there are two important phases of environment. The one takes cognizance of the passive or receptive state of the individual. In this stage the aim of the educator is to place the pupil in such an environment as will strengthen his weak tendencies toward the good, and avert the conditions that would thwart the strengthening of these tendencies. The other phase

¹ On this point, see Rev. J. T. Driscoll, *Christian Philosophy, The Soul*, Chap. IX, "Brain and Thought."

appeals to the individual's activity and seeks to train him to master his environment and make it contribute to the great purpose of his life. The first, or relatively passive, phase of the individual's attitude toward his environment is primarily the concern of biology. The second, or, by contrast, the active, phase belongs rather to psychology. Although it is the first aspect of environment that should principally engage our attention, yet it is futile to attempt an absolute separation of the two aspects. This is well presented by William Arthur Clark in the following passage:

"Man has two environments, or rather his environment is double in its character. From the physical universe about him he appropriates the materials of his bodily structure; and this same physical universe impinging upon his nervous mechanism stimulates him into conscious life activities—'rubs him into conscious life.' But his experiencing of the environment, his interpretation of its irritating contact, is mediated by his social environment. He sees the 'greenness' of the grass through the eyes of his race fellows. His life is saturated with the content of common consciousness, the accumulated race experiences, so that he cannot reach the physical world except [?] through the medium of the social atmosphere in which he lives. In addition to mediating the physical environment for man, this social atmosphere is itself a true environment. Man acknowledges his fellows as subjects with whom he agrees or disagrees, to whom he takes attitudes. His relations to them nourish and condition his individual life. Environment is only so much of circumstances as is related actively to the life of the individual; it is circumstances as they are grasped by the individual and made a part of his own structure."¹

In the first place, it may be well to note that only God has no environment, since He alone is absolutely independent; He alone, to use the language of scholas-

¹ *Suggestion in Education*, p. 14.

tic philosophy, is "pure act."¹ Dependence on environment signifies, therefore, in scholastic terminology, a "potency," an imperfection, which is characteristic of all created nature, from which not even the angels are exempt. Consequently it is of wider extent than heredity, which, in its proper meaning, is limited to living organisms, to plants and animals. Environment may be designated as the sum total of the influences from without that act upon a thing. With each ascending level in the perfection of the substance itself, there is an advance not only in the extent and the character of the environmental influences, but likewise in the degree to which the substance controls the environment and utilizes it to the furtherance of its own perfection. If, then, we were to keep strictly within the domain of biology, we should have to consider environment as a factor in the development of the organism when viewed simply as an organism. This is "physical" environment. Its value as a factor in education is twofold: (1) "it leads to the development of inherited qualities through use;" (2) it "represses certain functions through giving them no opportunity to act."² Yet because each higher stage of development in the living substance includes and refines the perfections of the next lower stage, it follows that the biological aspect

¹ Cf. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, I. qq. 2, 3, 4; A. Farges, *Acte et Puissance*, p. 75; T. Harper, *Metaphysics of the School*, Vol. II, pp. 390 ff.; J. L. Perrier, *The Revival of Scholastic Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*, p. 132; Ollé-Laprune, op. cit., pp. 223 f.

² H. H. Horne, *Idealism in Education*, p. 68.

of environment, which is so prominently in the foreground during human infancy and childhood, is also coextensive with the whole life of the man.¹ As he passes through the years of childhood, however, the youth normally becomes less and less a mere creature of environment and gradually attains fuller control over his surroundings. It is, indeed, the business of education to direct and to foster this power. Hence it is that, from the viewpoint of biology, "education reduced to its lowest terms is adaptation to environment."² How the individual acquires any control of his environment is the concern of psychology, and more particularly, of genetic psychology.³ Since, however, in acquiring this control, he needs the help of others not only as instructors but also as furnishing him models for imitation, it follows that the social aspect of even physical environment extends into the domain of sociology. In practice, however, it is impossible to separate by hard and fast lines these various aspects of physical environment, just as it is impossible to draw a sharp line of distinction between physical and social environment, or between the different grades of organization or levels of perfection that mark the various functions of the individual himself. The extent and the variety of the influences that come from environ-

¹ See above, pp. 38-43, 46, 47.

² E. J. Swift, *Learning and Doing*, p. 202.

³ This is the problem which J. M. Baldwin has set himself in the volumes, *Mental Development in the Child and in the Race* and *Social and Ethical Interpretations in Mental Development*. The principles are set forth more briefly in his *Story of the Mind*.

ment will depend both upon the complexity and upon the development of the organism. Hence it is that any satisfactory treatment of environment must entail not only biological, but also psychological and sociological considerations.

As we have already seen, a novice is a unity comprising a hierarchy of lesser unities.¹ On each of these levels he is subject to environment, and from each should he derive nutriment for the perfect life which he is called to live. Although environment acts simultaneously on these different planes, it is necessary for purposes of analysis to consider each separately. Viewed merely as an organism, the novice possesses physical life. Whatever food he uses to sustain this life, the very air that he breathes, he takes from his environment. This is a condition of his physical growth and development. He is bound by the law of God and by the rules of his order to take reasonable care of his health. Yet the contrary view is so widely current that it is opportune to cite the objection of a non-Catholic educator to "a continually recurring modern allegation against Christianity, namely, that it aims at suppressing and extirpating nature in the interests of spiritual culture. . . . Now in reality it was not Christianity at all, but the decadent period of heathen civilization which preached an exaggerated antagonism between spirit and body (the Neo-Platonists, Plotinus and the Manicheans, for example). The great classical protagonists of Christianity, such as Augus-

¹ Pp. 46, 47.

tine, were the very people who made a stand against this excessive dualism and never despised the natural works of God. *Their endeavor was merely to secure strict control over nature.*"¹ Since, however, the novice is more than plant, his perfection lies in higher activities than the preservation of health and the attainment of due physical growth and development. These are but means to an end.

It is as an animal that he first comes into "conscious" contact with his environment. It is on this plane that he begins to make adjustment to his surroundings a factor in his existence and, at least in many cases, to bring it under his conscious control.² But the multi-colored beauties of creation, the harmony of sweet sounds, the lusciousness of fruit, the fragrance of flowers, the resistance of the ground on which he treads, the soft summer breeze—all these "mean" nothing to him without the help of reason. And so the rational stage follows, wherein he studies the meaning of the various aspects of his environment, being guided more or less consciously in the process, by the character of his total

¹ F. W. Foerster, *Marriage and the Sex Problem*, pp. 214, 215. For a strange perversion of the truth, see W. D. Howell's "Saints and their Bodies," *Atlantic Monthly*, I, p. 582. A recent presentation of the Catholic attitude is given by W. J. Lockington, S. J., in *Bodily Health and Spiritual Vigor*. Cf. Francis Thompson, *Health and Holiness*.

² "Biological struggle is the means of selection for purposes of life in a physical and vital environment. . . . Social rivalry, on the other hand, is the means of selection for mental and moral purposes in the environment of a social order." Baldwin, *The Individual and Society*, p. 115. See also his *Story of the Mind*, pp. 40-43.

experience.¹ How exceedingly valuable this exercise may prove in furthering mental development is excellently presented by Reuben Post Halleck in his study of "How Shakespeare's Senses Were Trained."² According to modern science, all the subtle apparently unnoticed influences that stream in through the senses in all man's waking hours inevitably leave upon his mind the impress of his environment. Moreover, recent studies in psychology serve to show that our ideas tend to act themselves out, to express themselves in deeds.³ And so it comes to pass that to-day science unwittingly endorses the Church's teaching on proximate occasions of sin, viz., that one cannot freely remain in them without contracting some moral taint. This, therefore, may be regarded as a negative, or inhibitive, aspect of environment. But the positive phase is of even greater moment. The loving care of priest and people expended in the rearing of majestic Gothic cathedrals to the honor of God, the hallowed devotion of sculptor and painter in adorning the sacred fane, the inspiration of the musician consecrated to the production of harmonies befitting religious services—all these are but agencies for the framing of an environment suitable for the place of divine worship.

¹ For a simple presentation of the aspect, see *Teachers' College Record*, Vol. II, No. 4 (Sept., 1901), pp. 26-29. See also M. F. Washburn, *The Animal Mind*, Chaps. X, XI, "The Modification of Conscious Processes by Individual Experience."

² *Education of the Central Nervous System*, Chap. X.

³ J. B. Watson, *Behavior, an Introduction to Comparative Psychology* (pp. 16 ff.) presents the opposite view of the Behaviorists.

In the history of religious orders also environment has played a prominent part. The very principle emphasized by Halleck was not unknown to them; for, as Montalembert reminds us,¹ even the most austere monks of old did not deny themselves the beauties of nature. Moreover, the preference shown by many of the orders, especially by the Benedictines, for vast tracts of land remote from cities and possessed of diversified natural features is eminently justified on psychological and pedagogical grounds. It is a noteworthy fact that those who are considered by the world at large the greatest authorities of our day in matters of education, have, though unintentionally, done tardy justice to the much maligned Fathers of the Desert. What is the meaning of the vigorous insistence on the superiority of the country over the city as an educative factor during the plastic years of childhood and youth, but that the hermits of the early ages of the Church chose both wisely and well? The vast sweep of their environment was congenial to the nurture of great and noble thoughts far more enduring than the sentiments of Henry D. Thoreau, and of greater constructive value, from the viewpoint of faith, than the dramas of Shakespeare.² Many of the greatest Fathers of the Church

¹ Cf. Mabillon, *Ann. Benedict*, t. v., lib. 68 *ad finem*, cited by Montalembert in *Monks of the West*, Vol. I, pp. 71, 72.

² Chap. V, "Environment and Training," in R. P. Halleck's *Education of the Central Nervous System*, is good reading. The following passage is suggestive not only to a tenement house commission, but also to every whole-souled teacher: "The city has many drawbacks for bringing up children. In the first place, it is cramped. Only those rooms into which the sunlight can pour,

were trained in such solitudes. Steeped, as they were, in the traditions of sanctity handed down from patriarch to patriarch, these master minds of Christendom verified in both theory and practice what psychologists call the principle of association. In their own minds forever after, the laws of holy living were closely knit to these scenes of silence and solitude, so that even similarity in environment tended to recall the impressive lessons which they had received amid such fitting surroundings. The practical result was of even greater moment; for unnumbered multitudes in every age since then, hearkening to their words, have withdrawn, if not into physical retreat, at least into spiritual solitude, to ponder the great eternal truths. Men were thus taught

ought ever to be used for sitting or sleeping rooms. The sun, however, has small chance at the majority of city apartments. Space is also so precious that the most of the rooms are small. Some suggestive experiments have been made [unfortunately no references are given] which emphasize the baneful effect of cramped quarters on growing animal life. A row of vessels, regularly increasing in size, has been set on the same shelf in a room. These have been filled with water, and a growing tadpole or a pond snail placed in each vessel. Although all were treated alike, so far as the capacity of the vessel would allow, at the end of a certain period it was found that each tadpole or snail had developed proportionately to the size of the vessel; that is, the smallest tadpoles or snails were found in the smallest vessels; the next larger, in the next larger vessel. In connection with this, one can scarcely help thinking of the thousands of children, whose playground is the little back yard, frequently not so large as a good-sized room. It would be unfair to expect their development to be more than commensurate with their surroundings." P. 78. (These experiments were made by Professor Yung, and are reported by H. H. Donaldson, *The Growth of the Brain*, pp. 38, 39.)

And we ask, What are we to think of the value for development of both soul and body, of noble ideas that are fondly cherished and high resolves that influence conduct?

to look upon the world of sense experience as a reflection of God's power and goodness. This point of view reveals a higher plane of environment than that of mere sense and reason; for it reveals a plane of the supernatural order. From this level the Christian regards the things of time as feeders of the activities of eternity, for the God after whose image he is made is not an idle God.¹

Furthermore, man's senses give access to no more than fragments of the material universe. It is the business of the intellect to piece these fragments together and fashion them into a mosaic having a definite meaning, as being a genuine transcript of the world round about us. In accomplishing this task, the intellect must be guided by knowledge of the end of man and by consideration of the various ideals and means that are held to be values with reference to that end. It is in this way that it makes a selective use of environment, emphasizing certain aspects, minimizing others, and, as far as may be, ignoring still others. Hence it is that the work of education consists largely in training the young to make the best possible "selective" use of their environment. Such a concept of education supposes, on the part of the teacher, a clear vision of the great aim of the educative process, a definite curriculum of studies to impart, and a scientific, yet plastic, method of imparting these subjects. Hence it is that, in the opinion of Professor H. H. Horne,² "the environ-

¹ "The Father worketh until now, and I work." John v, 17.

² *Philosophy of Education*, pp. 97, 98.

ment of the pupil is the achievement of the race, to which he potentially belongs, in the conquest of nature, in the movement of affairs, and in the knowledge of itself. It is a spiritual environment. The adjustment to this environment, which is the race's life, discovers to the pupil his own social capacities; he finds his own life in his race's life."

It is incumbent on all men, in virtue of their power of reason, to make such selective use of their environment,¹ individual and social, as will enable them to attain the purpose of their existence. But since the Christian possesses a special revelation of his divinely purchased destiny, of the means to attain it, and the obstacles to overcome in striving for it, he is doubly bound, namely, as man and as Christian, to use his environment in accordance with the teaching of our Lord as contained in the Gospel. And what of the novice? He is to go one step higher and study his environment in the light, not merely of the Gospel precepts, but also of the Gospel counsels. The great question for him is: How can my environment help me to attain that more perfect life to which I believe myself called? To discover the answer to this question he studies the Scriptures and meditates in detail on the life of our Lord. He ponders the limitations and the successes of the chosen twelve, who were commissioned to "preach the Gospel to every creature."² He becomes familiar with

¹ "A man's real environment is the things of which he is conscious, over which he has some power through his selective attention and interests."—H. H. Horne, *Idealism in Education*, p. 122.

² Mark xvi, 15.

the great religious leaders honored yearly in the Church's calendar. And especially does he devote himself to a mastery of the principles that shaped the conduct of the founder of his own order; for it is in their light that he must interpret the rules and constitutions by which he is to be guided.

For the novice, then, there are two great orders of environment: the natural and the supernatural. The former comprises the mineral, the vegetable, and the animal kingdom, besides the great body of men with whom he comes in contact directly or indirectly, and who form his social environment. But within the sphere of the natural is also included a spiritual environment which appeals to the intellect and will, stimulating the former to fuller knowledge of the achievements of the race, and the latter to a noble emulation of the worthy deeds recorded in history. Above the natural environment and yet, for the Christian, compenetrating it also, is the order of supernatural values, which rates everything after its relation to man's everlasting destiny. As far as the novice is concerned, this order is twofold, consisting first of a basic plane of Christian doctrine; and secondly, resting in turn on this, the whole scheme of his religious life. Hence his training in the novitiate is specially fitted to enable him to "apperceive" nature in the light of divine faith. Even this supernatural environment is but preparatory to the undying splendors of heaven which the Beloved Disciple attempted to sketch in the Apocalypse.¹ Prescinding

¹ Apoc. iv, xxi.

from the question of mere material environment in heaven, the novice yet believes that there he shall enjoy the most perfect of social environments. There, too, in the Sacred Humanity of Christ, in the glorified body of His Virgin Mother assumed into heaven, and in the persons of all the blessed, especially after the last day, shall the kingdoms—mineral, vegetable, and animal—that here below formed the natural environment of the novice, contribute forever to the praise of the Creator of all.¹

The pedagogical value of environment, as its ever widening vista stands revealed to faith, is this, that it

¹ Apoc. xiv.—In the *Dublin Review*, 3d Series, Vol. XXIV (1890), pp. 21 ff., under the title of the "Final Destiny of the Earth," Rt. Rev. J. S. Vaughan suggested a possible final use for man's earthly environment. Interpreting the passage of Scripture where the Prince of the Apostles speaks of this world as being purified by fire on the last great day ("And the earth and the works which are in it shall be burnt up"—2 Pet. iii, 10), he borrows from chemistry the principle of combustion. Taking as a guide the text of St. Paul (Eph. iv. 13): "Until we all meet into the unity of faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the age of the fullness of Christ" (which is generally taken to mean that all human beings shall on the last day arise with fully developed bodies), he proceeds to calculate the demands that would then be made upon this planet from whose "dust" the body of man has been fashioned. After a careful consideration of facts and probabilities, he concludes that, on such a theory, the whole earth would be utilized in supplying a fully developed body for every human being that ever lived. In the case, then, of such human beings as attain to the bliss of heaven, man's physical environment here on earth, would, in and through the blessed, contribute to the glory of God and in a certain sense share in his reward for its passive concurrence in effecting his salvation. The article has since been republished in the author's volume of essays entitled *Faith and Folly*, London, 1901.

is a genuine principle of mental and moral development for the individual not merely as individual, but also as member of society. The mere sensible environment becomes the ground for selective use on the part of trained reason, and then faith revises, refines, readjusts and ennobles these interpretations in the light of revealed truth. Hence it is that the action of faith supplies a unifying principle of the highest value, possessing, in the best sense of that term, all the allurements which for so many minds invests the theory of evolution, and yet resting on a more secure foundation than scientific hypothesis, utility, or consistency; for its basis is the revealed word of God. For every Christian divine revelation is the secure foundation-stone of all theory and practice of life that has any permanent value.

Furthermore, environment extends its influence also into the domain of prayer. In proof thereof let this practice of Father Peter Faber (*Le Fevre*), one of the first companions of St. Ignatius Loyola, be cited:

“When he came near any city or town he used to pour out prayers for the inhabitants, and beg of God’s mercy that the angel of the place, and the guardian angels of the inhabitants, might guard it with a special protection. He invoked also the patron saints of the place, and implored them to return thanks, or to beg pardon, or to impetrate grace for the inhabitants, and to supply for all their negligence and omission in these respects, that God might not be defrauded of any of His glory. In hiring a house or changing his lodgings, it was his custom, when he first entered the house, to go and kneel in all the rooms, corners and cupboards that he could, and pray God to drive away the evil spirits, and all dangers and sorrows from the place; and in his prayer he remem-

bered all those who had ever lived or ever should live there, and entreated that no injury might happen there to their souls."¹

Such use of environment tends to perfect the highest attitude of social service and to strengthen that reflective habit of mind which is directly opposed to a blind yielding to the impulse of the crowd.² It puts in concrete form something of the ideal which the Catholic Church proposes to all her children and which the members of religious orders seek to incorporate into their lives. Furthermore, such Christian apperception of environment, when habitually expressing itself in congruous acts, helps to neutralize one of the effects of original sin foretold in the words addressed by God Himself to Adam: "Cursed is the earth in thy work, . . . Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee."³

A detailed consideration of social environment belongs under the caption of the sociological function of faith. Yet it is pertinent to refer here to the views by which Professor Horne is led to conclude that "the environment of man is God."⁴ To understand them it

¹ Faber, *All for Jesus*, pp. 211, 212.

² E. A. Ross, *Social Psychology*, Chap. III.

³ Gen. iii, 17, 18. No one can read the interesting stories in the late Monsignor Benson's *Mirror of Shalott* without getting a keener realization of the effects of that curse. Whether they be true or not, the stories are in harmony with what is known concerning the effect of the rites of exorcism. See especially "Father Meuron's Tale," "Father Rector's Tale," and "Father Girdlestone's Tale."—Of far greater significance, however, is *v. g.*, the ritual for baptism, and the blessing which the Church imparts before using any material object in the divine service.

⁴ *Philosophy of Education*, p. 271.

is necessary to go back to his concept of religion. He writes:

"Religion and art spring from the same fount of the personal being, viz., the feelings. Art is the expression of the feelings in the presence of the beautiful or sublime; religion is the expression of the feelings in the presence of the divine. . . . Religion is not primarily what a man thinks; this is dogma, creed, or philosophy. Nor is religion primarily what a man does, for the deeds of man may be done under necessity or from motives of prudence or convention. But religion is primarily what the man is, what he feels in the presence of the Supreme Person, and then, *and then*, what he thinks and does in consequence of such feeling."¹

Such a theory postulates for religion a purely human standard, and assigns to it a purely human origin. This the author subsequently admits:

"This conception of God is not that of the transcendent Jehovah of the ancient Hebrews. . . . Our conception is neither a transcendent dualism,² nor an immanent pantheism, but an idealistic theism. God is the self-conscious unity of all reality. . . . Matter is . . . a process of thought in the consciousness of God. This is the doctrine of idealistic theism to which education brings us as the only adequate [sic] interpretation of its own implications concerning the origin of man. A great new light is thus thrown upon the final nature of the environment of man, hitherto [in his *Philosophy of Education*] described as intellectual, emotional, and volitional, in adjustment to which consists the education of man. The environment of man is God."³

Although the author has already expressly rejected pantheism, yet he emphatically affirms it when he

¹ Ibid., p. 123.

² The Catholic Church teaches such dualism in affirming that man, though dependent on God, is yet distinct from Him. Cf. E. Thamiy, "Immanence," *Catholic Encyclopedia*.

³ Op. cit., pp. 269-291.

writes:¹ "The Word [of God] became the world and dwelt about us, before it became the flesh and dwelt among us." Moreover that part of his own "contribution to the definition of the conception of education" which he describes as the "induction of the Kantian ideas of God, Freedom, and Immortality from educational, rather than ethical, facts,"² accounts for the modernism³ which is so conspicuous in the following passage:⁴

"God is the self-conscious unity of all reality. . . . In this complete unity of self-consciousness, one can make abstractions of thought that do not exist in reality. There is the infinite subject, the thinker, the I, the Father, who does not exist apart from the infinite object, the thought, the Me, the Son, a portion of which [sic] is the temporal order, rising into clear consciousness of itself in Jesus, and there is the concrete unity of both aspects in one Being, the Spirit. God is Spirit. And the whole is one Person, as any self-conscious individual [sic], himself a subject-object, is one."

This is not the God of the Christian, and therefore is not, and cannot be the environment [?] of the novice. For the Christian in general and the novice in particular the mystery of the Incarnation is a special revelation of the mystery of the Blessed Trinity. It is the crowning glory of man's spiritual environment. This is manifest from the words of St. Thomas Aquinas:

"It would seem most fitting that by visible things the invisible things of God should be made known; for to this end was the

¹ P. 269.

² Preface, pp. xi, xii.

³ On "Modernism," cf. A. Vermeersch, *Catholic Encyclopedia*.

⁴ Horne, *op. cit.*, p. 272.

whole world made. But, as the Damascene says, by the mystery of the Incarnation are made known at once the goodness, the wisdom, the justice, the power, or the might of God. But the very nature of God is goodness, and it belongs to the essence of goodness to communicate itself to others. Hence it belongs to the essence of the highest good to communicate itself in the highest manner to the creature; and this is brought about chiefly by his so joining created nature to Himself that One Person is made up of these three—the Word, a soul, and flesh, as Augustine says. Hence it is manifest that it was fitting that God should become incarnate.”¹

The Son of God made man is the perfect model for the novice in two respects: (1) in His individual use of environment to develop His human life; (2) in His use of environment to symbolize to others the great truths of the religion which He came on earth to teach.² From the Christian viewpoint, man's environment is not God Himself, for God never changes; it is but a means of lifting the soul up to God and the things of God. It is by devout meditation on the life of our Lord, practised assiduously throughout the whole period of his novitiate, that the novice gradually learns the meaning and the use of environment. He comes to realize that his divine Model is master of both heredity and environment. Although the “Son of man” did not disdain to include even great sinners in His human ancestry³ and to be called the “Son of David,” yet He exempted His

¹ *Summa Theologica*, III, q. 1, a. 1.

² See above, pp. 43-65.

³ The genealogy of Christ on the male side is given by St. Matthew (i, 1-16); on the female side by St. Luke (iii, 23-38). St. Joseph conformed to the Mosaic law, and consequently we infer that he was a relative of the Most Blessed Virgin.

Blessed Mother from even the stain of original sin in her conception, and He removed its taint from St. John Baptist even before the Precursor was born. One of the many marvels associated with Bethlehem is the utter destitution in which the Lord of heaven and earth came among men.¹ With all the authority of the Godhead as well as with the charms of infancy, does He there teach men the great truth proclaimed on Sinai: "I am the Lord thy God. . . . Thou shalt not have strange gods before me."² Not by the adventitious aid of environment, but by His own inner worth would He draw all men to Himself.³ Later, in His public life, He was to proclaim the doctrine: "If thou wilt be perfect, go sell what thou hast, . . . and come follow Me."⁴ His example had gone before His words, for He could testify of Himself: "The foxes have holes, and the birds of the air nests: but the Son of man hath not where to lay His head."⁵ The poverty and renunciation of His mortal life He accentuated by the utter destitution of His death. By word and by deed, therefore, does the divine Teacher impress upon the novice the great truth that environment is to be used only as a help to go to God, and even then it is to be used in a spirit of detachment. When it hinders union with God it must be renounced. For environment is only a creature.

¹ Cf. F. W. Faber, *Bethlehem*, pp. 116-128.

² Exod. xx, 2, 3.

³ John xii, 32.

⁴ Matt. xix, 21.

⁵ Matt. viii, 20.

Whence also it appears how erroneous is the statement of Professor Horne: "The environment of man is God."

Article IV.—Plasticity and Adjustment.

Environment is primarily objective in character. Its efficacy is dependent on a correlative quality in man, viz., on his susceptibility to environmental influences. This quality is known as plasticity. It has been defined as "that property of living substance or of an organism whereby it alters its form under changed conditions of life."¹ The Greek etymology of the word insinuates that environment molds the organism, and, if considered as a factor in education, shapes the life of the pupil. A hint of its meaning in Christian pedagogy is found in a passage from Job, which the Church chants in the Office of the Dead, and which is addressed by him to his Maker: "Thy hands have made me, and fashioned me wholly round about."² Since plasticity is correlative with environment, it must include in man as many degrees of susceptibility as there are planes upon which environment operates. In the lower forms of organic life plasticity is a factor in the functions of irritability, conductivity and adaptation.³ Irritability makes it possible for the organism to receive environmental influence; conductivity diffuses this influence through the organism; and, through both constructive and destruc-

¹ Baldwin's *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*.

² Job x, 8, included in Lesson III of Office for the Dead.

³ See above, pp. 154, 155.

tive metabolism, adaptation applies this influence to the benefit of the organism. When we pass beyond the plant world into the sphere of sentient life, we generally find the animal capable not only of appropriating what is helpful from its environment and fleeing from what is hurtful, but also of seeking a new environment, and of changing its habitat for a longer or shorter time. This marks a distinct advance in the development of plasticity, and brings out prominently its active phase as a determinant of behavior. For we must not forget that plasticity is a characteristic of such bodies as are endowed with life. Hence it must include the activity proper to life.¹

The plasticity manifested by animals is based on automatic and reflex activities; sometimes also on instinctive activities.² All these are inherited by generation after generation of animal life, and tend to be-

¹ We have already seen (p. 154 above) that A. Farges makes it one of the true attributes of living bodies. Dr. Shields, in notes on the *Psychology of Education*, calls attention to the fact that to the popular mind "plasticity" has a passive connotation; whereas in biology it signifies an active power.

² Cf. J. B. Watson, op. cit., Chaps. VIII, IX; M. F. Washburn, op. cit., Chap. X, pp. 210 ff. Automatic activities are inherited internal adjustments of the organism and are evoked by internal stimuli. Reflex activities are adjustments to environment. As contrasted with automatic and reflex acts, instincts are less rigid and more complex. They have three attributes: (1) they are inherited, not learned; (2) they are complex, made up of a series of acts; (3) they are purposeful, they help to attain an end, even if that end be unknown to the possessor of the instinct. Cf. J. B. Watson, op. cit., Chap. IV; Dr. Shields, *Psychology of Education*, Lessons X, XIII-XV, and *Catholic Encyclopedia*, "Instinct"; Colvin and Bagley, *Human Behavior*, Part II.

come rigid if the environment remains unchanged.¹ In order, then, that plasticity may really contribute to the development of the organism, it must be stimulated by a slowly changing environment.² To such uniform surroundings the individual animal soon adapts itself, and this adaptation it manifests in the increasing facility, rapidity and perfection with which it responds to these regularly recurring stimuli. Plasticity is, therefore, the biological basis of the "learning process"—a phrase which it is well to interpret in its broadest sense.³ So interpreted, "learning signifies the modification of the behavior of an organism in the light of experience."⁴ This modification is commonly effected in one of three ways: (1) through "trial and error" (the "perseverance method" of Professor Watson);⁵ (2) through "imitation"; (3) through forming "free ideas."⁶ Of these methods the first two are common to man and the brute creation; the last, however, is proper to man. If the efficacy of the methods be considered, the first method is found to be wasteful of both time and energy unless it be controlled by human intelligence. This control may be exercised on the one hand through various forms of experiment performed upon animals with

¹ H. S. Jennings, *Behavior of the Lower Organisms*, passim.

² Cf. Dr. Shields, op. cit., Lesson X.

³ Cf. S. S. Colvin, *The Learning Process*. J. B. Watson, op. cit., pp. 45 ff.

⁴ Colvin and Bagley, *Human Behavior*, p. 25.

⁵ Op. cit., p. 46.

⁶ Cf. Colvin and Bagley, op. cit., pp. 26-36; also E. A. Kirkpatrick, *Genetic Psychology*, pp. 126-139.

a view to ascertain how they "learn" to do things.¹ On the other hand, it may take the form of one or more of the various agencies through which human society fulfills toward children its responsible office of "teaching." The method of imitation is twofold: it may reproduce the movements of other beings or, through the aid of memory, it may seek to repeat such movements of its own as have been successful in the past.² The method of "free ideas" is possible only when the individual has some idea both of the end and aim to be realized and of the means for attaining that end. This supposes a grasp of the causal relationship existing between means and end. As a necessary consequence this method demands the presence of abstract or "general" concepts, in the strictest meaning of that term, and therefore the possession of intelligence; that is, of an immaterial and spiritual power of "mind."

The application of these methods is dependent on certain qualities of the nervous system, and more particularly of the nerve-centers, that are directly conditioned by the "plasticity" of the nerve elements. The first of these qualities has been called the "integrating function," and consists in "the building up of a center

¹ Such experiments are described and analyzed by R. M. Yerkes, *The Dancing Mouse*. J. B. Watson's *Behavior* has references at the end of each chapter. M. F. Washburn's *Animal Mind* has a good bibliography.

² This theme is well developed by J. M. Baldwin (*Mental Development in the Child and the Race* and *Social and Ethical Interpretations*). A briefer presentation is given in his *Story of the Mind*. But see also J. B. Watson, op. cit., Chap. VIII.

to greater complexity of structure through new stimulations." These stimulations, or incoming influences, often conflict. The outlet through which they actually "discharge" in any given case becomes thereafter a favorable pathway, a channel of "least resistance." Eventually this mode of procedure nets two gains for the nerve-center: "first, its habitual reactions become a rockbed . . . of fixed function issuing in established paths of least resistance; and second, the center grows, gaining new and more mobile elements, and responding to more complex and difficult motor intuitions [impressions]. . . . Not only has the center become fixed and automatic for movements at first painfully learned, but it has become educated [!] by learning, so that it acquires new combinations more easily."¹ In other words, integration affects plasticity in two ways: first, it narrows its scope, since it leaves the nerve-center no longer indifferent to all stimulations, but rather favoring such as are like those to which it has already responded. In this respect, it is evident that integration is an essential factor in the formation of "habit." In the second place, integration produces greater plasticity for the forming of new combinations that are at all like in kind to the combinations already effected. This is a biological basis for the psychological phenomena of "apperception." Furthermore, according as the likeness of successive stimulations to past experiences is more or less pronounced, will there be a less or a greater need of "adaptation" or "accom-

¹ J. M. Baldwin, *Handbook of Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 23.

modation" to what is new in the present experience.¹

The integrating function calls for another quality in the nerve-centers, and that is "retention." Unless some change, however minute, be wrought in the nerve structure by each response that is given to a stimulus, it is difficult to conceive how "resistance" should gradually be lessened and a "habit" of response should be developed. "Retention as a physiological principle may, therefore, be called growth in functional complexity; while the term integration refers rather to growth in structural complexity." A third quality, which, like retention, is involved in the process of integration, has been called "selection."² Its effect is to produce a result analogous to what would have followed from preference or conscious choice in man; but in lower organisms it is probably to be accounted for as a corollary of retention or an expression of organic memory. Both retention and selection modify the plasticity of the nerve-centers and thus enter as elements into the learning process; in other words, they are factors in the series of processes by which the organism—animal or man—becomes "adjusted" to its environment.³

From the viewpoint of Catholic faith, the element of "plasticity" is intimately bound up with the very concept of man's nature. Man is a creature of God.⁴

¹ W. James, *Talks to Teachers*, pp. 108 ff.

² Baldwin, *ibid.*, pp. 25-27.

³ Cf. Dr. Shields, *Psychology of Education*, Lesson X.

⁴ Scholastic philosophy conveys the idea of man's essential imperfection and dependence by designating him an *actus impurus*; that is to say, a nature good in itself yet possessed of essential inalienable limitations.

From God he has received his whole being: his body, indirectly; his soul, directly. The very power to which he owes his existence continually renews that gift by the act of preservation, or, more properly, of conservation,¹ of which man is the recipient during the term of his mortal life and which is extended to his soul even beyond the grave. Furthermore, since activity is both the condition and the evidence of life, God concurs in every act that man performs, and He concurs according to the specific degree of perfection requisite in the act when regarded as a real physical act.² Without the sustaining hand of God, man would fall back into his original nothingness. Man, therefore, regarded merely as a created nature and without reference to his specific perfection as a human being, is by the very necessity of his created nature inherently "plastic" in the hand of God. In other words, he is plastic in the primary, or passive, sense of that term. When, however, we consider him not merely as a creature, not even merely as an organism, but rather as endowed with in-

¹—"Since the word *creation* in its passive sense expresses the term or object of the creative act, or, more strictly, the object in its entitative dependence on the Creator, it follows that, as this dependence is essential, and hence inamissible, the creative act once placed is co-extensive in duration with the creature's existence. However, as thus continuous, it is called conservation, an act, therefore, which is nothing else than the unceasing influx of the creative cause upon the existence of the creature. Inasmuch as that influx is felt immediately on the creature's activity, it is called concurrence. Creation, conservation, and concurrence are, therefore, really identical and only notionally distinguished." Rev. F. P. Siegfried, "Creation," *Catholic Encyclopedia*. Cf. B. Boedder, S. J., *Natural Theology*, pp. 348 ff.

² We are not here concerned with the moral aspect of the act.

telligence, and therefore capable of appreciating his state of essential dependence, then we perceive that he is bound by the dictates of right reason to endeavor to make his conduct square with this relation of intrinsic dependence. In his efforts to "adjust" himself to the requirements of this higher law, he shows "plasticity" in the second, or active, sense.

Now, the Catholic Church teaches that God "will have all men to be saved";¹ that, although without Him they can do nothing,² yet with Him they can, like St. Paul, do all things³ in virtue of the "plentiful redemption"⁴ wrought for them by the Saviour, the merits of which they may secure for themselves through prayer and the reception of the sacraments. There can be no question, therefore, that the revelation made by Christ confirms the conclusion already drawn by natural reason, viz., that with reference to the action of their Creator all men have a sufficient store of potential plasticity for concurring in the divine plan of their everlasting salvation. How else are we to explain the Saviour's words: "I lay down My life for My sheep. And other sheep I have that are not of this fold: them also I must bring, and they shall hear My voice, and there shall be one fold and one shepherd"?⁵ Furthermore, that all men are, with the divine assistance, cap-

¹ 1 Tim. ii, 4.

² John xv, 5. This truth is further emphasized by other words in the same verse: "I am the vine, you are the branches."

³ Phil. iv, 13.

⁴ Ps. cxxix, 7.

⁵ John x, 15, 16.

able of assimilating what is necessary for the sustenance of their spiritual life is implied, on the one hand, in the Saviour's injunction to His apostles to "teach all nations"¹ and, on the other, in the warning to their hearers not to harden their hearts.² Hardness of heart is, in the spiritual order, the analogue of that "rigidity" in organic life which, the biologist asserts, precludes all possibility of adjustment to even an improved environment and which, therefore, spells degeneration and destruction for the organism. For all men this day of mortal life is an "acceptable time," a time for the working out of salvation,³ if so be that men be "humbled" (plastic) under the mighty hand of God, that He may exalt them in the time of His final visitation.⁴

The whole plan of the sacramental system sets forth in the clearest light the fundamental truth that the Church looks upon the "plasticity" of her children as axiomatic. That quality is indeed an indispensable condition in her mission as guardian of souls. For the proper reception of the sacraments certain dispositions are requisite on the part of the subject who receives the sacraments, some of these dispositions being remote and in so far a preparation for the proximate dispositions. When the subject is thus duly disposed, he is better "adapted" or "adjusted," to receive the special benefit—the sacramental grace—which the sacrament

¹ Matt. xxviii, 19.

² Ps. xciv, 8.

³ 2 Cor. vi, 2.

⁴ 1 Pet. v, 6.

is fitted to confer. This is strikingly illustrated in the case of baptism and penance, the "sacraments of the dead." While for the reception of baptism by such persons as have attained the use of reason, certain dispositions are requisite, yet it is the peculiar privilege of the sacrament to bestow on the recipient a special gift of "plasticity" or "sensitivity" to the further influx of divine grace. This plasticity, therefore, becomes an important factor in conserving the gains, or graces, derived from the sacraments of the living. What is true of the sacraments in general is true in particular of many sacraments that may be repeated, notably of the holy eucharist: for each communion when made with becoming preparation and devotion not only sets a seal on the spiritual development already attained by the individual; it also disposes him to derive greater benefit from succeeding communions. In the sacramental system as applied by the Catholic Church we thus find a notable illustration of the genetic idea, or, in biological terminology, of the principle of development. The sacraments tend to conserve to the individual what is good in his past, much as habit might do (Do they not strengthen and increase "habitual," or sanctifying, grace?), and to prepare him for gaining greater profit henceforth by increasing his capacity for future good.

Nor is this realized in the case of the sacraments only, the food for sustaining the spiritual life of the Christian. It is true also of the truths which the Church proposes for his belief: they are the soil from which the sacraments spring. Indeed, the very epitome

of Christian faith which we call the Apostles' Creed exemplifies the principle of development in the succession of its twelve articles. Another instance of the same principle is evinced by the Church in her liturgy; for example, in the distribution of the great feasts over the ecclesiastical year from the first Sunday of Advent to the last Sunday after Pentecost.¹ Now sacraments and creed and ritual supply the spiritual energy to be expended in the observance of the commandments and the fulfillment of the duties special to one's state or calling. The Christian must therefore be "plastic" with reference to the sacraments, in order to assimilate to his spiritual life their general and special graces; he must be plastic in intellect in order to accept the revealed truths taught by the Church; he must be plastic in his emotions, especially in the more complex and more spiritual emotions, in order to respond fittingly to the appeal made him through the rites and ceremonies of the liturgy; he must be plastic in will in order to co-operate with both actual and habitual grace by keeping the commandments and thereby adjust him-

¹ Father Faber calls attention to this in *The Blessed Sacrament*: "The feast of Corpus Christi does not come after the Ascension in unbroken order, as one feast of our Lord following another, nor even at once after Pentecost, when the descent of the Holy Ghost had been as it were the fruit of the Ascension and the sweet token of the strange truth that it could ever be expedient for us that our Lord should go away. But it waits until the Church has led up all her mysteries into the secret fountain, the mother mystery, of the Most Holy Trinity, as if the whole collective devotion of the year rose up into the unapproachable light, and fell back again in showers of glory and in streams of celestial power and beauty upon men in the grand and consummating mystery of the Transubstantiation." (P. 23.)

self to the standard set by Christ Himself: "If you love Me, keep My commandments."¹

What we have said thus far concerns the plasticity of the novice when considered merely as a Christian. But he is called to rise above the level of mere observance of the commandments, and, by daily meditation on the revealed truths, by frequent confession and communion and by deeper appreciation of the liturgical service, to strive for the higher plane of fidelity to the Gospel counsels. With him the Christian life must be a habit, and on this solid basis he must construct gradually his adaptations to the greater demands of the religious life. He is thus called upon to illustrate in his own life as novice the two principles of organic development emphasized by Professor Baldwin and termed by him "habit" and "accommodation."² The former secures "repetition of what is worth repeating with the conservation of this worth"; the latter produces, "adaptation of the organism to new conditions so that

¹ John xiv, 15.

² *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, p. 170. He subsequently shows the application of the principles to the mental, social, and ethical development of the individual. Thus (p. 217) he makes the statement: "The law of habit is simply a generalization all the way through the facts of biology and psychology, from the various applications of this principle of imitation." On the very same page he asserts that "accommodation" is in psychology the equivalent of what is termed "adaptation" in biology. Or again (pp. 225, 226) where we read that the *genetic theory* of emotion should be brought under three principles: (1) habit, (2) accommodation, (3) dynamogenesis (a term used to designate the "regular connection between the sensory and the motor sides of all living reactions").—On "dynamogenesis," see Titchener's remarks (*Text-book of Psychology*, pp. 488 f.).

it secures, progressively, further useful reactions, which at an earlier stage would have been impossible." Although habit and accommodation are primarily biological concepts and are used in that sense in the passage just quoted, yet each of these principles must daily be utilized by the novice if he would make progress in the spiritual life, and each is thus brought under his conscious control. It is therefore advisable to postpone their special consideration to the next chapter, in which the psychological aspects of faith as a pedagogical asset for the novice are to form the subject of discussion.

To sum up, we may say that in the three departments of dogma, or truths to believe; moral, or commandments to keep; and worship, or liturgical service appealing to the emotions as well as to the intellect in order to interpret it, and to the will in order to adjust one's self to its spirit, the plasticity of the novice regarded merely as a Christian is called into daily if not hourly exercise, to the end that the Christian point of view and that type of reaction which we call Christian conduct may become habitual with him. On this habitual basis of practical Christian life he is to adapt himself to the additional requirements imposed by the religious life, which, in turn, are also to be made habitual and later to be sanctioned and confirmed by the vows of poverty, chastity, and obedience.¹ By the faithful observance of the Gospel counsels he will be enabled to adjust himself to

¹ See above, pp. 59-65, "The Spirit of the Novitiate."

still higher levels of perfection according, on the one hand, to the nature of God's special call, and, on the other, to the strength and duration of his fervor and to the constancy of his correspondence to divine grace. All this, when translated into biological terms, means that the novice receives constantly the stimulation of divine grace. To this he must respond uniformly with appropriate reactions according to the measure of his ability if he is to attain the normal development proper to members of a religious order. Accordingly as he reacts, will he be "adjusted" for the reception of still greater graces, which in turn will become the stimuli calling for more perfect reactions on his part. Each level of virtue, like each new integration of the biologist—which the novice attains after the stress and strain of spiritual combat, the analogue of the biologist's "struggle for existence"—is but a stage in the entire process of "development" to which his whole life as religious must be devoted.

Article V.—Summary.

I. Heredity, in contradistinction to environment and training, is the dominant principle of the eugenists. They insist that "nature" is superior to "nurture," that "blood" counts more than "breeding," that degeneracy in the organism can be remedied only by extrinsic influence, if indeed it can be remedied at all. Now, heredity has its analogue in the teaching of the Catholic Church concerning both original sin and its great complement, the mystery of the Redemption. By

Adam's transgression the human race forfeited its supernatural life, a far greater evil, from the Christian standpoint, for the individual and for the social organism than physical degeneracy is or can become. It likewise forfeited its right to final and everlasting association with the angels confirmed in glory. But for the coming of the Redeemer, it had been therefore condemned to a social isolation far more terrible and far more enduring than that devised by the eugenicist for the physical degenerate whom he would also reduce to the condition of a social outcast. Although, even at his best estate, man will ever retain, like scars of wounds that have healed, unmistakable traces of his fallen state, yet he has a healing remedy for his wounds ready to hand in the boundless merits of the Saviour's passion and death. When applied, these merits become an intrinsic element of man's soul. They constitute the very "life" of his soul. The opportunities afforded the novice for applying these merits are beyond human calculation.

II. Just as the qualities inherited by an organism will not develop except under favorable conditions and surroundings, so for the development by the novice of the heritage purchased for him by Christ's precious blood a suitable environment, physical, mental, and moral, must be provided. To secure the first of these conditions, it is not unusual for religious orders to choose for their novitiates sites remote from the bustle of large towns, on the one hand, and, on the other, possessed of various scenic attractions. In the former

respect they take lesson from the early "Fathers of the Desert;" in the latter, from the pioneer "Monks of the West." The construction of the desired "mental" environment is gradually wrought by selective attention to the Christian aspect, or meaning, or application of the material environment. This, in turn, leads inevitably to the utilization of one's surroundings for moral ends, especially for individual progress in the religious life and for the promotion of the spiritual welfare of others.

III. The "plasticity" of her children the Catholic Church assumes to be axiomatic. She could else have no mission here on earth. This plastic or receptive attitude must have a threefold application: to the truths proposed for belief; to the sacraments to be received as well as to the liturgic rites attending their administration; and to the commandments to be observed. The "habit" of Christian living adapts one to a higher standard than that of the mere observance of the decalogue; it "accommodates" the novice to the demands of the Gospel counsels. In proportion as he is faithful in living up to their requirements does he find opening before him ever widening vistas of greater spiritual heights to be climbed. As his plasticity is to end only with his death, so his religious development is to be the work of his whole life.

In the Religious Novitiate, therefore, in addition to that "heredity" which is involved in the transmission of original sin and is therefore connected with the mysteries of the Incarnation and the Redemption, the

principles of environment, plasticity, and adjustment, have a deeper meaning and a wider application than in the domain of plant or animal biology. They apply to higher planes of life than is possible for the mere organism or even for mere man; for they apply to a life established and constituted by the Saviour of mankind; a life into which He initiated His disciples, and to whom, as is insinuated by their very name of "disciples," He imparted the method of that all important "learning process" which transforms the mere natural man into the devoted follower of Christ.

CHAPTER VII.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF FAITH.

Article I.—General Survey.

PSYCHOLOGY is very generally said to be "the science of mind."¹ From a pedagogical point of view, such a definition is unfortunate. We may indeed admit that science is concerned with "facts," and that its method of procedure is "observation."² But, in practice, the term "mind" puts the emphasis upon the processes of cognition and, in so far, relegates to a subordinate position the equally important processes of volition.³ Under such circumstances it helps matters little to say that "the psychologist . . . describes and measures—so far as he is able to measure—the phe-

¹ Cf. E. B. Titchener, *A Beginner's Psychology* (1915), p. 5.—Father Maher (*Psychology*, p. 1) tells us that "in strict language the word *mind* designates the animating principle as the *subject of consciousness*, while *soul* refers to it as the root of *all forms of vital activity*."

² Ibid., pp. 1, 19. The same principles will be found in §§ 1-9 of his *Text-book of Psychology* (1915) for more advanced pupils.

³ This appears in Titchener's description of attention (*Beginner's Psychology*, Chap. IV, pp. 91, 92; *Text-book*, pp. 265-267); and in his account of the will (*Beginner's Psychology*, p. 225; *Text-book*, pp. 466 ff.). However, in the history of philosophic thought, we find the Scotist school decidedly voluntaristic in attitude as contrasted with the Thomistic or intellectualistic school. Cf. W. Turner, *History of Philosophy*, pp. 386, 390, 391.

nomena of his world, without assuming any active or perduring mind in the background; for him, mind is simply the *inclusive name of all these phenomena.*"¹ Such a statement, however, suggests, if it does not disclose the fact, that one reason for the preference shown to the term "mind" is really opposition, more or less covert, to the use of "soul." It further confirms a fundamental contention of Dr. F. W. Foerster, that one of the cardinal defects in our modern systems of education, outside of the Catholic Church, is just this insistence on the intellectual side, in the training of youth, to the serious detriment of the work of shaping character and conduct.² The Schoolmen followed the lead of Aristotle. Both admitted that "science deals not with values, but with facts," and "is on that account impersonal and disinterested."³ The neo-scho-

¹ *Beginner's Psychology*, p. 9.

² Cf. footnotes, pp. 17, 96-98, above.

³ Titchener, *Beginner's Psychology*, pp. 1, 2, 3. Narrowness of vision in certain psychologists has now led to the opposite extreme. Like other historic reactions, this one is "human," and consequently not an affair of mere intellect or "mind." It will be found tinged now and again with emotion. It has assumed two leading forms: Pragmatism, an offshoot of "Humean" Psychology, and Behaviorism, which must be examined in the light of Comparative Psychology. In both of these movements there are elements to commend, even if there are principles and applications to condemn. In one respect Pragmatism is a corollary of the law of adaptation and consequently, within due limits, has some correlations with the law of Christian charity. Behaviorism, too, has points of vital contact with that religion which teaches that "faith without works is dead" (James ii, 17). Cf. Matt. vii, 21; xxv, 31-46; 1 John iii, 2, 3; iv, 20. On pragmatism see Rev. J. T. Driscoll, *Pragmatism and the Problem of the Idea*.

lastic philosophers of our own day define psychology in its most general sense as "the science of the soul and its operations,"¹ including under the latter term what many leaders in this science call "conscious processes." They are careful to note that "soul" is here to be interpreted as synonymous with "life principle." For the existence of such a principle, really distinct and separable in man from the material organism, though constituting essentially or metaphysically one unitary being or nature with the living body, they give adequate arguments based upon careful observation of vital processes. Accordingly, following Aristotle, they distinguish three kinds of "soul": in plants, a vegetative principle, whose operations are always unconscious; in animals, a sentient principle, the source of conscious life and motion as also of the vegetal functions; and in man, above these and often controlling and always utilizing their functions, an intellectual or super-material principle by which he reasons and deliberates, decides and chooses.

Life, as we know it, is, for the most part, manifested in and through matter. It is a principle permeating the entire organism, and not a separate existence.² It is through the organism that it is influenced by environment; it is the source whence the organism derives its plasticity. Being in its very essence an immaterial and

¹ Cf. M. Maher, S. J., "Psychology," *Catholic Encyclopedia*. See also his bibliography.

² In the case of man, however, it is separable and actually separated at death, remaining separate until the general resurrection.

therefore a simple principle,¹ it gives unity to the nature and the operations of the organism. However, during the last quarter century or more it has become an established custom to refer questions concerning the nature, origin, duration, and destiny of the human soul to the "philosophy of mind"² and to limit the term "psychology" to the science that describes and explains the mental processes of the individual primarily, and then of the community, society, or race of which he is a member. This is the sense of Wundt's definition: "the science which investigates the whole content of Experience in its relations to the Subject."³ The differentia-

¹ St. Thomas, *Quæstiones Disputatæ: De Anima*, 1; Card. Zigliara, *Summa Philosophica*, Vol. II, pp. 106-214; J. T. Driscoll, *Christian Philosophy: The Soul*, Chaps. I, III, V, VI, VIII; J. L. Perrier, *Revival of Scholastic Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 115 ff.

² Cf. G. T. Ladd, *Philosophy of Mind*. Catholic philosophers often treat such questions under the general head of Rational Psychology: e. g., M. Maher, *Psychology, Empirical and Rational*.

³ *Grundriss (Outlines)*, p. 3. By "experience" both Wundt and Titchener, who studied under him, mean *sense-experience*. They deny any radical or essential distinction between sense and intellect (Cf. Titchener, *Text-book*, p. 8); as also between internal experience, i. e., knowledge of our mental states, and external experience, i. e., knowledge of a reality other than the experiencing subject. "If it is true," says Titchener (op. cit., p. 6), "that all the sciences have the same sort of subject-matter [an unwarranted assumption], there can be no essential difference between the raw materials of physics and the raw materials of psychology. Matter and mind, as we call them, must be fundamentally the same thing." Such tenets are diametrically opposed to the fundamental principles of Christianity. The same errors abound in the recent pragmatic movement in philosophy and psychology, which has extended into the field of education (Cf. J. T. Driscoll, *Pragmatism and the Problem of the Idea*, pp. 18, 19, 24, 25, 76, 130 and Chap. XII.) Among the educators who are typical exponents of these views are John Dewey, of Columbia University, and most

tion between these two methods of investigating "mind" is a natural consequence of the development both of modern science in general and more particularly of the application of experimental methods to the study of mental processes and mental growth.¹ Although pedagogy has received much help from various lines of investigation prosecuted in psychological laboratories, yet the results attained are as yet too detached and fragmentary to constitute a system of scientific knowledge for the actual or prospective teacher.² Accord-

followers of the late William James. Many of the articles in Monroe's *Cyclopedia of Education* are infected with the same taint.—It is to be noted that Father Driscoll uses the term "idea" in the strict sense of the scholastic philosophers, viz., that of intellectual concept, of immaterial and spiritual representation of the nature or meaning of an object.

¹ That experimental psychology as such is not at all in conflict with Catholic tenets and the Catholic spirit follows from the establishment at Louvain, in 1891, of the "Institut de Philosophie" under the direction of Mgr. (now Cardinal) Mercier, and from work done, for example, at the Catholic University of America by Drs. Pace, Shields, Moore and Ulrich; and at St. Joseph's Seminary, Dunwoodie, N. Y., by Dr. Herrick. Among non-Catholics in the United States to-day the most prominent exponent of experimental methods is Professor E. B. Titchener.

² Cf. W. James, *Talks to Teachers* (p. 7): "In my humble opinion there *is* no 'new psychology' worthy of the name. There is nothing but the old psychology which began in Locke's time [sic], plus a little psychology of the brain and senses and theory of evolution, and a few refinements of introspective detail, for the most part without adaptation to the teacher's use. It is only the fundamental conceptions of psychology which are of real value to the teacher; and they, apart from the aforesaid theory of evolution, are very far from being new." Yet Titchener, in the two works already cited, presents a fine array of facts. His interpretations, however, are at times vitiated by the "double-aspect" theory, which he confuses with "psychophysical parallelism" (*Text-book*, pp. 13-15). His "ideas" are all Locke-ian. He admits no immaterial, no spiritual concepts.

ingly, in our consideration of psychological aspects of faith, we shall have to draw largely, although by no means exclusively, from the domain of "descriptive and explanatory" psychology.

"Science seeks always to answer three questions in regard to its subject-matter, the questions of what, how, and why. What precisely, stripped of all complications and reduced to its lowest terms, is this subject-matter? How, then, does it come to appear as it does; how are its elements combined and arranged? And, finally, why does it appear now in just this particular combination and arrangement? . . . To answer the question 'what' is the task of analysis. . . . To answer the question 'how' is the task of synthesis. . . . But science . . . answers the question 'why' by laying bare the cause of which the observed phenomena are the effect." So speaks Professor Titchener.¹ Admitting his premises, we are justified in drawing these conclusions: (1) The psychologist who devotes himself especially to answering the question "what," takes "analytical" or "structural" psychology for his peculiar field of labor. Professors E. C. Sanford and E. B. Titchener are examples in point. (2) The psychologist who is busied with answering the question "how," has chosen the realm of "functional" psychology for the exercise of his activity.² Most of

¹ *Text-book*, pp. 36, 37.

² The line of distinction drawn between "structural" and "functional" psychology was suggested by that already drawn between anatomy and physiology; "structural" psychology being regarded as the analogue of anatomy, and "functional" psychology as the

the work of Professors William James and J. R. Angell takes this point of view. (3) The psychologist who attempts to answer the question "why," applies the principle of development to a most interesting sphere of research, one rich in promise, and withal of vital concern to the teacher. This is the sphere of "genetic" psychology,¹ a sphere in which Professor J. M. Baldwin worked assiduously for many years.²

analogue of physiology. The student who is familiar with the history of scholastic philosophy will go a step farther and find in the idea of "first act" as defined by the Schoolmen, viz., the entire, or, if you will, integrated, essence or nature of a thing,—the result of careful "analysis." He will therefore recognize in their attitude the same general viewpoint that characterizes the structural psychologist of to-day. In like manner, in the "second act" of the Schoolmen—the collective name for all the operations of the thing—he will perceive the philosophical ancestor of the organic "functions" which are so conspicuous in the psychological literature of our day. Moreover, since "second act" invariably gives expression in created nature (of which alone it is rightly predicable) to the inner nature of the thing, to which, consequently, it bears the relation of effect to cause, it is really the precursor of modern laboratory investigations made with a view, *v. g.*, to determine the nature of "perception" or "attention," or "memory," or "volition," etc. "The contrast (between structural and functional psychology) is really between two *aspects*, in which all mental facts without exception may be taken; their structural aspect, as being subjective, and their functional aspect as being cognitive [Cf. the distinction between *sensation* and *perception*]. . . . From the cognitive point of view, all mental facts are intellections. [Not accurate. This confuses intellections and sensations.] From the subjective point of view, all are feelings [sic]." Titchener, "Psychology, Structural," Monroe's *Cyclopedia of Education*.

¹ Titchener says rightly (*loc. cit.*) that genetic psychology "may be either structural or functional, and should rightly be both. Functional psychology stands to structural as physiology to morphology: there is no reason for antagonism between the two."

² See above, p. 149, footnote 1.—G. Stanley Hall, president of Clark University, is also an exponent of genetic psychology. His

With a view to grasping the pedagogical significance of faith, it is well for us to rehearse briefly the principal topics that form the subject-matter of psychology as presented in courses given to normal students. Many of them are paralleled in Professor James' *Talks to Teachers*, a series of lectures addressed to those who are already engaged in the schoolroom. A typical annotated list of subjects was published by Professor E. L. Thorndike in *Teachers' College Record*, Vol. II, No. 4 (Sept., 1901). It consists of twenty-two topics for lectures and research in the "elements of psychology," occupying, when taken in conjunction with the "applications of psychology in teaching," three periods a week for one year.¹ The following are the main heads of the syllabus:

1. The aim of psychology and the nature of its subject-matter;
2. common technical terms;
3. the physiological basis of life;
4. characteristics of mental life in general;
5. the function of mental life;
6. unlearned reactions or instincts;
7. learned reactions—ways of learning;
8. sensations;
9. percepts;
10. apperception;
11. attention;
12. imagery and memories;
13. the order of our thoughts;
14. discrimination;
15. reasoning;
16. induction and deduction;
17. the emotions;
18. purposive action;
19. automatic action and habit;

writings must be read with caution. He draws conclusions that are too wide for the premises on which they stand. Some of his theories are opposed to Christian principles. See below, p. 227, note 3.

¹ Both these courses are required of "candidates for all diplomas" in Teachers College, Columbia University, New York. Candidates for "the elementary and kindergarten diplomas" must also follow a course in "child study" of two periods a week for one year.

See also *Report of the Committee on the Academic Status of Psychology. The Academic Status of Psychology in the Normal School* (American Psychological Association, 1915).

20. suggestion; 21. the general laws of mental action; 22. mental training.

The syllabus of the course in "applications of psychology in teaching" is outlined under these heads:

1. General introduction; 2. plan of work; 3. means of receiving stimuli and of reaction to them; 4. general mental functions; 5. apperception; 6. attention; 7. the association of ideas; 8. comprehension, reasoning, logical and abstract thinking; 9. memory; 10. imagery; 11. the emotions; 12. the active side of mental life; 13. habits; 14. suggestion; 15. interests; 16. mental training; 17. incentives and deterrents [motivation]; 18. the application of the fundamental law of mind.¹

From these two syllabi we seemed to be justified in drawing up this tentative outline of our own:

The immediate aim of psychology is knowledge of our mental processes. Herein both experimental and descriptive psychology come to our aid. Such knowledge implies some examination into the origin of these processes, the influences by which they are modified, and the results to which they lead. These topics belong to functional and to genetic psychology,² it is

¹ On the "transfer of training," the general law of mental action, see *Human Nature Club*, p. 180; W. C. Ruediger, *Principles of Education*, "Formal Discipline," pp. 112-117; E. L. Thorndike, *Principles of Teaching*, p. 243. Cf. below, pp. 300-309.

² Professor Titchener objects to the expression "genetic method." He says: "In strictness, however, there is no such thing as a genetic method. There is a genetic point of view, as there is a static point of view. We may be interested in the sequence of mental processes, in unraveling the tangle of a special sort of consciousness. But the difference of interest does not mean a difference of method." *Text-book*, p. 34.—Yet see quotation from Professor Dewey, p. 16, above.

true, but they likewise presuppose a careful analysis of mental states performed under experimental control.

All psychologists agree that sensation is an elementary mental process. From the scholastic viewpoint, with which, in this connection, modern research is in harmony, it is, in its original form, the subjective term of the series of processes which, when looked at in its primary objective reference, may be called primitive perception. It is by perception that we are made subject to the influence of environment; and consequently both sensation and perception are phases of that general plasticity which we have already seen to be a condition of learning.¹

The study of apperception by modern psychologists² has shown that every perception leaves a "trace"

¹See above, p. 188. This is emphasized by Professor James: "Plasticity, then, in the wide sense of the word, means the possession of a structure weak enough to yield to an influence, but strong enough not to yield all at once. Each relatively stable phase of equilibrium in such a structure is marked by what we may call a new set of habits. Organic matter, especially nervous tissue, seems endowed with a very extraordinary degree of plasticity of this sort; so that we may without hesitation lay down as our first proposition the following, that *the phenomena of habit in living beings are due to the plasticity* (in the sense explained) *of the organic materials of which their bodies are composed.*" *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, p. 105.

²James, *Talks to Teachers*, p. 157, defines apperception as "the act of taking a thing into the mind." It follows the law of economy. "We instinctively seek to disturb as little as possible our pre-existing stock of ideas" (p. 159). The notion of apperception is, however, far from modern. It is embodied in the principle which St. Thomas borrowed from Plotinus, the neo-Platonic philosopher of the third century, viz., "Whatever is received is received according to the nature (or state) of the recipient." See p. 236, below.

or effect in the organism,¹ which not only modifies subsequent perceptions of the same or a related kind, but also affects the resultant motion. In the former respect it illustrates the biological aspect of learning; in the latter, it exemplifies a cardinal principle of behaviorism, viz., that "consciousness operates primarily in directing our movements and controlling our behavior."² "The selective grouping of the sensory constituents of perception, and the supplementing of the sense group by images are the cardinal points of the doctrine of apperception in the system of Wundt and Herbart."³ Apperception, therefore, presupposes sensation and perception, memory and imagination, as well as the exercise of selective attention, whether that attention be primary or secondary; whether, in other words, we are compelled to give it or we give it only with deliberate effort.⁴ Perception, in turn, is a complex process, its complexity beginning very early in the child's life. From that time on in the life of the individual, "perceptions are selected groups of sensations, in which images (themselves resulting from previous sensations) are incorporated as an integral part of the whole process. But . . . the essen-

¹ Cf. Titchener, *Text-book*, pp. 396 f.

² Colvin and Bagley, *Human Behavior*, p. 3.

³ E. B. Titchener, *Text-book*, p. 366, who cites references to Wundt's *Outlines* and Herbart's *Lehrbuch zur Psychologie*. His statement on p. 48 is open to criticism: "Images are the characteristic elements of ideas [in Locke's meaning of the term], of the mental pictures that memory furnishes of past and imagination of future experience." Man has also spiritual concepts. These Professor Titchener seems to ignore.

⁴ Cf. Titchener, *op. cit.*, pp. 268, 276.

tial thing about them . . . is this—that perceptions have meaning. Now, it takes at least two sensations [*i. e.*, cognitions] to make a meaning,”¹ since there can be no meaning without a “context.” Much less, let us add, can there be “meaning” without an intellect to apprehend it. Our feelings, interests and emotions modify our perceptions in both intensity and clearness, shifting now this detail, now that detail from the margin to the focus of attention, and *vice versâ*. Moreover, while perceptions are integral factors in the building up of habit, yet in the apperceptive “set” or “bent” which they slowly but surely give to the mind, they illustrate on the cognitive side the same propensity which on the appetitive side—that is, on the side of expression—is worked out in motor habits of mind or body. It would appear, therefore, that the one topic of perception ramifies into nearly every department of psychology. Indeed, this is what we should expect; for perception is an act of man, as man, and its exercise must therefore involve the whole man.²

Apperceptions of a given kind when often repeated tend to assume the characteristics of habit and eventually to result in what is known as one’s “personal equation,”³ that is to say, one’s customary point of view

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 367, 368. Cf. Dr. Shields, *Psychology of Education*, Lesson XVIII, “Perception and Apperception.”

² St. Thomas (*De Principio Individuationis*, 2) in discussing the nature and functions of the “ratio particularis,” considers what we to-day call perception; but he is there concerned with only its cognitive aspect.

³ See E. C. Sanford, “The Personal Equation,” *American Journal of Psychology*, Vol. II (1888), pp. 3, 89, 271, 403.

toward the matter in question and one's customary behavior in its regard. Both these aspects, the cognitive and the appetitive, or conative, are included by psychologists under the general head of reactions to a situation,¹ and it is these reactions, especially selective reactions, that determine character, "the essential part of a man."² For "character is that expression of a man which is most constant, habitual, and, in consequence, most unconscious, unpremeditated, genuine."³

¹ "A reaction . . . is a movement made in response to an external stimulus." (Titchener, *Text-book*, p. 428.) "The physical or external situation is the whole external world as an organism, at any given moment, takes it; it consists of those stimuli to which the organism, by virtue of its inherited organization and its present disposition, is responsive,—which it selects, unifies, focalizes, supplements, and, if need be, acts upon. The mental or internal situation is, in like manner, some imagination or memorial [or intellectual] complex which is fitted, under the conditions obtaining in the nervous system, to dominate consciousness, to maintain itself in the focus of attention, to serve as the starting point for further ideas [in the broad meaning of that term] or for action. To put the definition in a word, a situation is the meaningful experience of a conscious present". (Ibid., p. 369.)

² This thought is admirably developed by Mgr. Guibert in his little book, *Le Caractère*. He distinguishes and develops three meanings of the term: as the distinctive sign in a man's exterior; as his inner moral constitution; as his moral energy (p. 3).

³ J. M. Baldwin, *Handbook of Psychology*, Vol. II, p. 363. He draws his definition from the principle that "action is the only and the adequate expression of a man." As to action itself, hear Titchener: "In its most general meaning, an action is an organized movement, less generally it is a movement of a locomotor organism; for psychological purposes, it is primarily a human movement with some sort and degree of representation in consciousness." *Text-book*, p. 448. The scholastic concept of action is both more exact and more illuminating, for it represents the action as here and now proceeding *from* the agent, the efficient cause. When regarded as *modifying* the agent, it is called "quality" rather than action. When viewed as a connecting link between cause and effect, it is termed "relation." As "action," it essentially connotes an agent.

When the situation is complex and the appropriate reaction is therefore problematic, then, and then only, according to many psychologists of our day do we really "think."¹

We have now taken a brief survey of the subject-matter of psychology. It is the wont of recent psychologists to reduce all mental phenomena to three great classes. In the words of Professor Baldwin: "These three classes express the result of three distinct *functions* of the mind: *Intellect*, *Feeling*, and *Will*. They may be called: 1st, *Representative*, or intellectual states; 2d, *Affective*, or states of feeling; and 3d, *Volitional*, or states of will."² While the general plan of this division is good, provided psychology be limited to mental "processes" and the nature of "mind" or soul be relegated to philosophy, yet the nomenclature is singularly unhappy and betrays much confusion of thought. This confusion may be remedied by changing the names of the "three distinct functions" to cognition, feeling, and appetency.³ Although this tripartite division is not to be found among most Catholic psychologists of an earlier age, yet it presents no in-

¹ Cf. Bk. I, p. 59, above; also Colvin and Bagley, *Human Behavior*, Chap. XVIII; Dewey, *How We Think*, p. 205. Titchener, *Beginner's Psychology*, Chap. X; Brother Azarias, *Phases of Thought*, Chap. II.—For criticism of this view, see J. T. Driscoll, *Pragmatism*, pp. 30-38.

² *Handbook*, Vol. I, pp. 35, 36. Cf. E. W. Scripture, *Thinking, Feeling and Doing*.

³ Thus Dr. C. A. Dubray (*Introductory Philosophy*, p. 28) divides mental processes from the psychological point of view into three groups: cognition, feeling, and conation. Cf. F. J., F. S. C. *Cours de Philosophie*, p. 47.

trinsic ground of objection and indeed has much to commend it when psychology is considered solely from the standpoint of natural science. But in that event "cognition" must be interpreted as a generic term including under it two distinct, though related, orders or species of knowledge, viz., sensation and intellection. What is known by sense is the material and individual and concrete as such; viz., this color, this tone. What is known by the intellect, on the other hand, is the general or universal, the abstract, and likewise the immaterial and spiritual, such as justice and truth; or it is something that does not connote, does not include in its very concept, any direct reference to matter, such as being, nature, or substance. Similarly appetency includes two species, a material order, that of the sensitive or sensuous appetites, whose acts are "the passions," and the intellectual or rational order comprising the acts of the will. As to feeling with its direct reference to pleasure and pain, and to emotion,—the name for our complex affective states,—these likewise must be twofold,¹ viz., sensitive and spiritual. The sensitive

¹ This has been well illustrated and correlated to the older dual division of the Schoolmen by St. George Mivart, *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, Vol. III, p. 301, "Émotion." This article is too little known.—Titchener, in his latest work for advanced students, the *Text-book*, discards the usual tripartite division and substitutes one of his own. "The three classes of elementary processes are known as sensations, images, and affections. Sensations are, of course, the characteristic elements of perceptions, of the sights and sounds and similar experiences due to our present surroundings. Images are, in just the same way, the characteristic elements of ideas, of the mental pictures that memory furnishes of past and imagination of future experience. . . . Lastly, affections are the characteristic elements of emotions, of love and hate, joy

emotions are deeply rooted in the body and are common to man and the brute animal.¹ The spiritual emotions, on the other hand, are not dominated by matter, but utilize it under the guidance of intellect for the furtherance of spiritual aims. Many of them are common to saint and sage; all of them enter largely into the motives that shape behavior.

It must be admitted, however, that Catholic psychologists see no crying need for an absolute divorce between psychology and philosophy. They readily acknowledge their indebtedness to biology in general and to the physiology of the nervous system in particular for much progress in their chosen domain. Yet they emphatically deny that man is a mere biological specimen, a mere bundle of nerves. They find in him activities which, though dependent on matter and aided by matter, are nevertheless irreducible to mere organized matter. For further light on the nature of these activities they appeal to philosophy. This appeal they consider no more discreditable, no more unscientific, than is the acceptance, on the part of Wundt and his dis-

and sorrow" (p. 48). Titchener's experiments and arguments (pp. 198, 199) fail to prove that the "image," as he defines it, is an elementary process. He even admits (p. 199) that it might be "better to consider sensation and image as subclasses of a particular type of mental element [sic] than to include them outright in a single class." This would bring his classification into closer harmony with the "cognitions" of the Schoolmen. He "smuggles" in the will in his discussion of "secondary attention" (*Beginner's Psychology*, p. 95). He implies it in his "acquired" tendencies (p. 255), where he does define it so loosely as to make it equivalent in a way to the appetencies (*appetitus*) of the Schoolmen.

¹ Cf. the James-Lange theory of emotions, p. 124. For critical exposition of it, see Titchener, *Text-book*, pp. 474-489.

ciples, of aid from physiological investigations. Many of them, in consequence, reduce all mental phenomena to the two great classes of cognitions and appetencies, viz., to knowledge of facts and principles, on the one hand, and to tendencies to real or apparent good, on the other.¹ This division has the advantage also of agreeing with the present status of biological research; for our nervous mechanism has two great classes of nerves: sensory, or afferent, nerves to receive impressions from our surroundings; and motor, or efferent, nerves to control the reactions to these impressions.² What we do with the impressions which we receive will depend on the state of our whole being, body and soul, at the moment of receiving them;³ in other words, to use the terminology affected by some pedagogues, it will be determined by our "apperceptive mass."

In order, therefore, to estimate the pedagogical value of faith as the novice is trained to exercise it, it is well for us to consider his practice of faith from the viewpoints of (1) perception, (2) apperception, and (3) will, with its complement of reaction. These topics will at least serve to point the way and to suggest the rich harvest to be reaped from adjoining fields of psycho-

¹ Feeling is then described as "the affective tone" of cognition. It is not amiss to refer here to Professor James' tribute to "scholastic orthodoxy, to which one must always go when one wishes to find perfectly clear statement." (*The Will to Believe*, p. 13.)

² The association tracts are often classed with the sensory nerves as extensions of the latter.

³ See above, p. 213, note 3, and p. 215.

logical investigations, fields, however, which lie outside the limitations of this book. We have already considered the "environment" which the novice perceives, and the "plasticity" which he must possess if that environment is to be a genuine factor in his training. But he must, as novice, learn to assume a Christian and religious attitude toward his surroundings, and to adjust his actions accordingly. It is only when such an attitude and such behavior are so fully his as to be expressed easily, uniformly and with a high degree of perfection that he has really mastered this "learning process" and transformed it into a habit. It is therefore incumbent on us to consider the stages of the learning process and their bearing on the development of faith by the novice.

*Article II.—The Physiological Basis of Learning.*¹

The topic of learning is one of the most comprehensive that can engage the mind of man. It involves heredity and environment, plasticity and adjustment—all of which have their basis in biology. In psychology, it includes the various processes of association: and therefore it implies, on the cognitive side, both perception and apperception, as factors in shaping the bent

¹ Practically, the process of learning entails a consideration from the functional viewpoint—often also from the genetic—of all the leading topics that fall within the scope of descriptive psychology. It shows how mental states or elements combine to promote mental development. There is a good brief presentation of the topic in Colvin and Bagley's *Human Behavior*; a fuller treatment in S. S. Colvin's *Learning Process*.

of the mind; and, on the appetitive or motor side, expression of this bent in those words and deeds which eventually fix and reinforce habit and behavior. In pedagogy it is intimately connected with attention and interest and inhibition as factors in motivation. In sociology, too, it appears as a vital element, for even the genius must learn from his fellows as they in turn must learn from him. The schoolhouse is but a concrete embodiment of the social aspect of learning. All this holds in the purely natural order. In the supernatural order, the Catholic recognizes and respects in his Church the divinely appointed source whence he is to learn what he must know and what he must value, what he must love and what he must hate, what he must do and what he must rigidly shun, if he would be fitted for life everlasting in the kingdom of heaven. The novice must learn from his religious superiors how he is to prepare for the special field of Christian labor in which his order is engaged. So important, indeed, is the learning process that the infinite Wisdom of God came down upon earth and assumed our nature in order to train His disciples in its practice. For even supernatural truth cannot exercise its rightful sway over man until it be incorporated in his very nature: only then and thus does it become "faith like a grain of mustard-seed."¹ From every viewpoint, therefore, are we compelled to assent to the statement that learning, whether in man or in mere animal, is "a very complex affair, depending upon impression, upon associative

¹ Luke xvii, 6.

tendency, upon the retentiveness of nerve-substance, and upon cortical act";¹ and likewise, in man, upon the disposition of the "heart," that is, upon the will and the affections.

The biological factor in organic plasticity we have already considered in its general features.² In the learning process it appears more particularly both in the nerves themselves and in their connections with nerve-centers. There is, then, a good measure of truth in the statement that "education consists in the modifications of the central nervous system" (*i. e.*, of the brain and spinal cord).³ The neural basis of learning, in the broad sense of the term, is found both in the character of the nervous tissue itself and in the number and strength of the connections effected between the various nerve-centers. It appears in the character of nervous tissue; for "the most elementary and essential function of nervous tissue is to provide lines of conduction be-

¹ Titchener, *Text-book*, p. 384. Cf. note 3, p. 48, above; and Rom. x, 13-15.

² See pp. 187 ff., above.

³ H. H. Donaldson, *The Growth of the Brain*, p. 336. He adds: "In its size and development the central system is precocious" as compared with the rest of the human body. "Long before birth all the cells destined to compose it are already formed, though by no means are all developed in the sense that they have acquired the form and connections characteristic for those at maturity. At the close of embryonic life the sensory nerves rapidly extend, and the connection of the central cells with limiting surfaces of the body being thus established, all experiences become those of education. The act of living is thus the most important natural educational [sic] process with which the human body has to do."

tween receptors and effectors.”¹ It is likewise manifest in the pathways opened not only between different areas of the cerebral cortex, not only between “receptors” and “effectors,” but also between the various cells that go to make up each and every nerve; for these physiological connections are an indispensable condition of the psychical associations in which true learning consists, whether such learning be viewed in its cognitive aspect or in its motor influence.

One of the widely accepted explanations of the physiological aspect of the “learning process” is known as the “neurone theory.” Its cardinal principle is that the “unit” in the nervous system is the cell-body together with its opposite “processes” or branches (technically known as axons and dendrites).² No two cell-

¹ Ladd and Woodworth, op. cit., p. 35, who add that “conduction, co-ordination, integration and ‘learning’ (this word in a figurative sense) may be assigned as the functions of the nervous system” (i. e., of the whole system). See also above, pp. 154 f.

² Cf. Ladd and Woodworth, op. cit., pp. 108-114. It must not be forgotten that the neurone theory is an attempt to explain only the physiological correlate of the learning process; it does not apply directly to the psychic aspect. We must be on our guard, too, against accepting the telegraph or the telephone system as an explanation of even the nerve current. A. Farges, S. S. (*Le Cerveau, l'Ame et les Facultés*, pp. 29-31) notes various kinds of difference between the nerve current and the electric current. The former is living, the latter has no life. The intensity of the former increases with the length of the nerve which it traverses; whereas the electric grows weaker the longer the wire is. We must therefore relegate to the region of fairy-tales such statements as these from Reuben Post Halleck (*Psychology and Psychic Culture*, pp. 12, 13, 40, 41): “A sensory nerve conducts a message at the average rate of 111 feet a second. . . . If a man had an arm sufficiently long to plunge into the sun’s vaporous metal, 140 years would roll by before he felt any pain.” This is an unwarranted

bodies are continuous; but the axons and dendrites of one cell-body touch, but never fuse with, those of another. The point of contact is technically known as a "synapse," that is to say, a fitting together.¹ To establish a connection between adjoining cell-bodies it is therefore necessary to have a nerve current of high tension which shall overleap the interstices between "axons" and "dendrites" and thereby break down the resistance offered by the "synapse,"—the nerve-current always following the lines of least resistance.² The degree of resistance encountered at any synapse will depend upon several factors and conditions. If the nervous impulse is seeking an outlet for the first time and therefore has no contrary connection to break down, the problem is reduced to the mere overcoming of inertia. If, on the other hand, the nervous impulse has

inference from the reaction experiment, on which see Titchener, *Text-book*, pp. 432-437.

¹ "By synapse is meant the point of junction between ingoing and outgoing nerve-fibers. . . . The synapse is the telephone central, and upon its action depends the fate of the impulse: whether it shall be allowed to pass out to muscle *A* or muscle *B*. . . . In this minute mechanism, then, the very issues of conscious life, and so of character, are determined." E. P. Frost, "Habit Formation and Reformation," *Yale Review*, Vol. IV (Oct., 1914), p. 137. This article presents forcibly the mechanical side of habit formation, but in the latter part the author covertly invokes and applies that very action of "will" which he professes to treat as a purely imaginary factor in the building up of habit.

² While the nerve-fibres conduct the nerve-impulse in both directions, yet the impulse itself is conducted "from the terminations of the sensory axons to the dendrites of the motor-cells, but will not pass in the reverse direction." The synapse, therefore, acts as "a sort of valve," allowing the impulse "to pass in only one direction" (Ladd and Woodworth, *op. cit.*, pp. 133, 111).

hitherto been discharged through another channel, the difficulty of forming a new outlet is multiplied in proportion to the frequency and to the persistency with which it has discharged through the older pathway. The problem then becomes one not only of bridging over the gap presented by the synapse, but also of raising an effective resistance to the use of the older outlet. As a natural consequence, the area of the synapse is, in this theory, regarded as the seat of fatigue and the center wherein are exhibited to a noted degree the effects of the toxic poisons carried in the blood.¹

Another factor to consider is the relative complexity of the action to be done. If the action be of a simple automatic or reflex type, it is a "predictable, unchangeable, mechanical process";² for, in this case, both structure and function are inherited. If, however, it be instinctive, the response is likely to be less fixed, more plastic, and, to some extent, subject to conscious control. These conditions are realized in the higher animals and in man; for through consciousness both man and brute "sense a wider horizon and are capable of adjusting their actions more perfectly to their complex

¹ The nerves themselves seem to be incapable of fatigue. (Cf. Ladd and Woodworth, *op. cit.*, pp. 136, 137.) On the "fibrillar theory," see pp. 113, 114. "As between the neurone theory and the fibrillar theory, it is at present impossible to decide with certainty; but there is no doubt that the neurone theory still commands the support of the majority of authorities; and that it serves, for the present, the useful purpose of summing up a large proportion of the known facts that have a bearing on the connections within the gray matter of the nervous system" (p. 114). Many of its terms (*v. g.*, channel) are metaphorical.

² E. P. Frost, *loc. cit.* See also p. 188, note 2, above.

environment.”¹ Finally, beyond instinct, which it may modify and by which in turn it may also be modified, lies the realm of reason and deliberation, the province within which the chief work of formal education is prosecuted. Instinct, it is true, is more than a series of reflexes, for it is ordinarily attended by consciousness and even by desire;² but, since its exercise is often conditioned on the co-operation of the higher nerve centers, it depends on relatively complex and unstable nerve connections. Even reason itself, as man is now constituted, is powerless to operate unless various cortical areas are in some way united to contribute the matter or content of thought on which the reasoning process must be based.³

¹ According to Professor Conklin (op. cit., p. 78), “all living things [bodies], including germ cells and embryos,” exhibit (1) a differential sensitivity, responding differently to stimuli that differ in kind or quantity; (2) reflex motions, *i. e.*, relatively simple, automatic responses; (3) organic memory, by which the results of previous experiences are registered in the general protoplasm; (4) adaptive responses, resulting from the elimination of useless responses through trial and error; and (5) varied responses depending upon conflicting stimuli and conflicting physiological states. The last two groups or processes demand the intervention of consciousness as well as of organic memory, while the last of all includes what is known as inhibition (see p. 229, below).

² Cf. Ladd and Woodworth, op. cit., p. 146; Titchener, *Text-book*, p. 462.

³ Cf. G. E. Partridge, *Genetic Philosophy of Education* (p. 14): “The ideal of the new psychology based upon the dictum, *No psychosis without neurosis*, has been to discover for each mental state and process an equivalent or correlate in the body or in nature.” This book has as its sub-title: “An Epitome of the Published Educational Writings of G. Stanley Hall, President of Clark University.”

We are, therefore, justified in assuming that a certain intensity in the nerve current is requisite in order to form a new channel or deepen one already formed, and likewise to supply sufficient energy for the correlated physiological processes. The greater the intensity of the "nerve impulse," the deeper and the more unobstructed becomes the pathway which it makes for subsequent nervous discharges and the more thoroughly does it subserve the dependent mental processes. When the nerve currents are so great and so impetuous as to overflow their accustomed channels and seek new outlets for their discharge, they may register these changed conditions in the discomfort, or even pain, which the organism then experiences. It is in the light of this phase of the neurone theory that we are to interpret such conclusions as the following: "It is in the action of the synapse only that the chief modifications attributed to the nervous system, and so attributed to consciousness, find expression. . . . Modify the synapse, and consciousness is changed. Vary synaptic resistance, and one modifies, and may even reverse, behavior."¹

Even when the nervous excitation is weak, it still registers an effect. Thus when two stimuli of the same kind, each of which is by itself just too weak to arouse any noticeable reflex action, are applied at the same time, they produce the customary response. The same phenomenon occurs when the stimuli follow each other in quick succession. In other words, these stimuli "fa-

¹ E. P. Frost, loc. cit., pp. 139, 140. Cf. footnote 1, p. 225, above.

cilitate" or "reinforce" each other. On the other hand, if the stimuli taken singly lead not to allied but to opposed, or inconsistent, reactions, then each blocks or inhibits the other, and there is no responsive action at all so long as these opposing forces remain balanced. Eventually, however, one force breaks through the opposition, and then ensues a reaction made up of harmonious reflexes from which all antagonistic elements are excluded. Moreover, the inhibition itself is attended with a "rebound effect"; for "a reflex which had just been inhibited is for some time afterward much more readily excited"—it is "specially sensitive to a new stimulus."¹

On its physiological side, therefore, the "learning process" entails the forming of continuous and free pathways for the discharge of nervous impulses, preferably of high tension, and consequently the blocking or inhibition of divergent or opposite channels. How often the nerve-current must traverse this pathway before the requisite connections are thoroughly secured, must depend primarily on the relative strength of the current itself. When it flows easily and freely through the channel, the nervous connection has been "learned" and the physiological basis of habit is established.

¹ Ladd and Woodworth, *op. cit.*, p. 173. For a discussion of the experiments of Exner and Sherrington see pp. 170-174. Titchener (*Text-book*, p. 300) applies the phenomena of "facilitation" and "inhibition" to the psychical phases of attention. See also Colvin and Bagley, *op. cit.*, Chap. VII, "The Nervous System as the Organ of Behavior."

Article III.—Reflex Action as a Type.¹

The general idea underlying this article may be introduced in the words of Professor James:

"The doctrine of reflex action, especially as extended to the brain, . . . means that the acts we perform are always the result of outward discharges from the nervous centers, and that these outward discharges are themselves the result of impressions from the external world, carried in along one or another of our sensory nerves. Applied at first to only a portion of our acts, this conception has ended by being generalized more and more, so that now most physiologists tell us that every action whatever, even the most deliberately weighed and calculated, does, so far as its organic conditions go, follow the reflex type. There is not one which cannot be remotely, if not immediately, traced to an origin in some incoming impression of sense. There is no impression of sense which, unless inhibited by some other stronger one, does not immediately or remotely express itself in action of some kind. There is no one of those complicated performances in the convolutions of the brain to which our trains of thought correspond, which is not a mere middle term interposed between an incoming sensation that arouses it and an outgoing discharge of some sort, inhibitory if not exciting, to which itself gives rise. The structural unit of the nervous system² is in fact a triad, neither of whose elements has any independent existence. The sensory impression exists only [?] for the sake of awaking the central process of reflection, and the central process of reflection exists only [?] for the sake of calling forth the final act. All action is thus *re-action*³ upon the outer world; and the middle stage of consideration or contemplation or thinking is only [?] a place of transit, the bottom of a loop, both of whose ends have their point of appli-

¹ Cf. Ladd and Woodworth, op. cit., Chap. VII, "Reflex Functions of the Nervous System"; also C. S. Sherrington, *The Integrative Action of the Nervous System*.

² On the other hand, the structural unit of the *nerve* itself, according to the "neurone theory" is the "neurone;" that is, the cell-body with its outgrowing processes, viz., axons and dendrites. See pp. 224 ff.

³ Cf. Titchener, *Text-book*, p. 447.

cation in the outer world. . . . The willing department of our nature, in short, dominates [sic] both the conceiving department and the feeling department; or, in plainer English, perception and thinking are only [?] there for behavior's sake."¹

These views have obtained very wide currency. In the domain of human and animal physiology, especially the physiology of the nervous system, they are believed to throw light upon the nature not only of automatic activities, which have their stimulus and origin within the organism,² but also of instinctive actions, which are always complex and purposive in character. They have entered the field of education, through the writings of Professor Dewey³ and his disciples,⁴ where their application has been extended to the mind, at times in defiance of sound philosophical principles and in opposition to fundamental Christian tenets.⁵ These views and tendencies have developed into a kind of philosophical system, viz., pragmatism, which has an ex-

¹ "Reflex Action and Theism," an address delivered in 1881, reprinted in *The Will to Believe*, pp. 113, 114. In the last sentence which we have quoted above, Professor James gives unequivocal expression to a doctrine which was subsequently to characterize the system known as Pragmatism. This is equally evident in the three sentences which precede the last and which we have omitted. On p. 124 he refers in a footnote to C. S. Pierce's paper, "How to Make Our Thoughts Clear," in the *Popular Science Monthly*, Jan., 1878, which is generally held to be the first definite presentation of pragmatic principles.

² See footnote 2, p. 188.

³ Cf. "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," *Psychological Review*, Vol. III (July, 1896), pp. 357 ff.

⁴ Cf. Irving E. Miller, *Psychology of Thinking*, pp. 48-52, 55-58; J. Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*, passim.

⁵ Cf. J. T. Driscoll, op. cit., pp. 29-39,

tensive following in England, France and America. That the movement has a theological bearing is manifest from the very title of the essay from which we have quoted. In the very same address,¹ Professor James makes this statement:

"Theism, whatever its objective warrant, would thus be seen to have a subjective anchorage in its congruity with our nature as thinkers; and, however it may fare with its truth, to derive from this subjective adequacy the strongest possible [?] guaranty of its permanence."

In all these relations man is regarded primarily as an individual. But he is at the same time a social being. It is not surprising, then, that the "reflex arc concept" should have invaded the domain of sociology from the adjoining realm of psychology. Here, too, the third stage, viz., that of production or successful external action, has been at times unduly emphasized. In testimony thereof let us cite one passage:

"Hitherto psychologists have been more concerned with analyzing the structure of human consciousness than with developing a psychology of human action. The latest developments in psychology are, however, developments toward such a psychology of human activities or behavior; and it cannot be doubted that when such a psychology has been fully developed, it will supply the missing key [sic] for the interpretation of social phenomena."²

If there be any truth in these views, and undoubtedly

¹ P. 116.

² C. A. Ellwood, *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects* (2d ed.), p. 95. In a footnote the author quotes from Professor Max Meyer, also of the University of Missouri: "Mind is a subject fit to be studied only [?] because it is, and to the extent [?] to which it is, significant for social intercourse."

there is some truth in every system or school of thought that has disciples,¹ it is incumbent on us to look more closely into the "reflex arc concept" and to study its real implications and to trace the consequences that follow when it is assumed to be the typical learning process in its simplest form.² We may take for our text the following passage from Professor James' address: "Any mind constructed on the triadic reflex pattern, must first get its impression from the object which it confronts; then define what that object is, and decide what active measures its presence demands; and finally react."³

I. The first element in the triad, then, is getting an impression from the object. This opens up the problem of knowledge. Can we really *know* any thing? Can we know the relations between things? Has man an environment? Can he be influenced by this environment? Are there other men with whom he can hold intercourse? Can he commune with his God? Each and every science, by the very fact of its existence bears

¹ An excellent illustration of this fact, highly suggestive at the same time of the *catholicity* of the Church's doctrines in the realm of philosophic thought, is found in an article by A. de G., *The Correlation of Agnosticism and Positivism* in the *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, Vol. X (1885), pp. 65 ff.

² There is, of course, another aspect of reflex action, since it "may take place without consciousness in brain intervention. . . . Reflex action is the deputy of the brain, and directs myriad movements, thus leaving the higher powers free to attend to weightier things." R. P. Halleck, *Education of the Central Nervous System*, pp. 6, 7. See also Chap. II, "Fatalistic Aspects."

³ Pp. 122, 123.

witness to the truth that at least some things and some relations between things are not only knowable but known.¹ In psychology, in particular, this principle is a postulate that underlies every discussion of both perception and apperception; for apperception is but a development of perception, and stands or falls with the latter.² In pedagogy, the "learning process" is only an empty phrase if there be nothing real to learn. Finally, to all these questions both Christian philosophy and Christian faith give an unequivocal answer in the affirmative.

¹ The possibility of certitude, the representative value of knowledge, and the criteria of valid knowledge, are all topics of epistemology. For a brief exposition of the principles of epistemology, see Dr. Dubray, *Catholic Encyclopedia* (s. v.), and *Introductory Philosophy*, pp. 362-421. For a more extended discussion, see John Rickaby, S. J., *First Principles of Knowledge*. For the historical aspect, see Rev. W. Turner's *History of Philosophy* (Index). For a more detailed treatment of the topics in the scholastic period, see M. de Wulf (tr. P. Coffey), *History of Medieval Philosophy* (Index). For a critical presentation of St. Thomas' teaching concerning the acquisition of knowledge, see Brother Barbas, "St. Thomas' Latest Critic," *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, Vol. X (1885), pp. 36-51, especially pp. 46-51. In psychology, the question is treated under the rubric of "perception." (Cf. Maher, *Psychology*, Chap. VI, "Perception of the Material World. Critical Sketch of the Leading Theories of External Perception.")

² Much of the *interpretation* to be found in recent psychological literature is based on the assumption that the principle of psychophysical parallelism is, if not a demonstrated fact, at least a good working hypothesis. This is particularly noticeable in the followers of Professor Wilhelm Wundt. Titchener, as already noted (p. 208, note 2), confuses this theory with the "double aspect theory," which has a distinctly English origin (Cf. Maher, *op. cit.*, Chap. XXII). For historical and critical discussion of these two theories, see Dr. Dubray's excellent monograph, *The Theory of Psychical Dispositions*, pp. 144-148.

As we have already seen, the nerve center has "learned its lesson" when a free pathway has been opened for the transmission of the nerve impulse from sense to muscle.¹ This is the reflex arc in its primitive simplicity. Its investigation belongs to physiology. But, according to the teaching of scholastic philosophy, man, though constituted of body and soul, of "matter" and "mind," is nevertheless a unitary being: the human soul is the "substantial form," the "determining principle" of the body.² This is the conclusion drawn from a careful analysis of man's activities in general, and of the process of perception in particular. If then the reflex arc is really typical, it must help us to a better understanding of the act of cognition proper to man as man, viz., perception.

Aristotle was the first philosopher to teach that perception through the senses is a kind of motion.³ St. Thomas reiterated the doctrine, but with the warning

¹ See above, p. 229.

² St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 76; Thomas Harper, *Metaphysics of the School*, Vol. II, Bk. V, Chaps. II, III; J. L. Perrier, *Revival of Scholastic Philosophy in the Nineteenth Century*, pp. 96-100. That the human soul is the unique and substantial form of the body, is of faith. It was so defined at the general council of Vienne, 1311; the Fifth Council of Lateran, 1512-17; and in a brief of Pius IX, June 15, 1857. In direct opposition to this is the theory of psychophysical parallelism, that mental processes and neural, especially cerebral, processes run parallel courses, but never interact.

The principal topics of this article have already been considered in the general survey given in the preceding chapter. They are now taken up with special reference to the reflex arc concept.

³ *De Physica*, III, 1; *De Anima*, III, 2.

that such perception is something more than mere motion.¹ Now, in every motion we may distinguish three stages: the first, before the impact of the moving body with the body to be moved; the second, during the impact, when the moving body is imparting its own motion to the mobile subject; the third, after the impact, when the second body has received the motion. This theory is manifestly an application of the principle of causality. The motion imparted is an effect. It must therefore be as like the motion of the first moving body as its own nature and its condition at the time of impact will allow; for another principle also applies here, viz., "Whatever is received is received according to the nature of the recipient."² It is this theory of motion and this application of the principle of causality that will enable us to grasp the twofold truth that every act of sense-perception is a direct cognition of reality, and that the acts of perception performed by one and the same sense may yet differ among themselves owing to the diverse conditions of the sense itself at the moment of functioning. However incomplete such knowledge may be, it brings us into direct contact with a reality other than ourselves. It is the indispensable condition of intercourse with our fellow-man as well as of the pursuit of natural science.

Like all other motions, this motion which lies at the basis of sense-perception may be read in two ways: viz., toward the starting-point, the *terminus a quo*,—in this

¹ *In IIIum de Anima*, Lect. 2.

² A. Farges, *Acte et Puissance*, pp. 121 ff.

case, the first moving body; and toward the point of arrival, the *terminus ad quem*, the body which receives the motion. Considered in the first way, *i. e.*, in its objective reference to the "thing known," the act of cognition is called "perception";¹ viewed, on the other hand, in its subjective reference as a modification of the "knower," the very same act is called "sensation."² The first act of perception performed by the human individual in his life must include a minimal reference to external reality, owing to the inchoate condition of the organism and the dependence of the mind on bodily conditions. It is the subjective factor that dominates, and it dominates rather as "feeling" than as "cognition."³ But each subsequent perception, since it calls for like nerve reactions, tends to bring about a corresponding permanent modification of the nervous system.⁴ This is the physiological basis for the phenome-

¹ On the development of sense perception, see Maher, *Psychology*, Chap. VII.

² Motion, the generic term, and movement, *i. e.*, regulated motion, are the common elements to be found in the two Aristotelian categories of "action," *i. e.*, motion *from* an agent, and "passion," *i. e.*, motion as received *into* a subject. See n. 3, p. 216 above. Cf. Harper, *Metaphysics of the School*, Vol. III, pp. 275-280, 310-313.

³ "We may assume as practically beyond controversy that the simplest and the earliest manifestations of consciousness, whether considered philogenetically or ontogenetically, are at least predominantly affective states, which are probably best described as pleasure-pain feelings." T. E. Shields, *Psychology of Education*, pp. 197, 198. So also J. M. Baldwin, *Handbook of Psychology*, Vol. II, "Feeling and Will," pp. 149, 150, and William James, *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. II, pp. 7, 8.

⁴ Cf. Titchener, *Text-book*, pp. 396 f.

non of apperception.¹ It is a mistake, however, to regard perceptions in the adult man, or even in the little child, as mere "groupings of sensations under the laws of attention."² The human soul has from the first moment of its existence the power of perceiving something of the nature or "meaning" of the material object which impresses sense. This power, however, cannot operate, much less give external evidence of its activity, until the requisite conditions are given. It is usually through articulate speech that such evidence is given, and the exercise of speech demands a high degree of development in the human organism.³ Early in the life of the child the so-called act of perception becomes a synthesis not merely of present sensations from the same external object, but even of present with past sensations through imagination and memory. Moreover, wherever the perception has "meaning," it includes a true intellectual act, that of conception, by

¹ For experimental proof that after the earliest years each act of perception is influenced by previous experience, see L. Witmer, *Analytical Psychology*, pp. 3, 8, 11, 12; also M. W. Calkins, *A First Book in Psychology*, Chap. IV and pp. 336-343. Titchener, quite without warrant from his principles, since he is a partisan of the "double-aspect theory" (pp. 39, 40), uses these modifications of the nervous system to explain attention, especially secondary (voluntary) attention. (*Text-book*, pp. 39, 272, 274; cf. *Beginner's Psychology*, pp. 95, 115.)

² Titchener, *Text-book*, p. 364. On p. 367 he says: "Perceptions are selected groups of sensations, in which images are incorporated as an integral part of the whole process." He admits (p. 129) that it may be better to regard both sensation and image as "sub-classes of a particular type of mental element."

³ Cf. J. M. Baldwin, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, pp. 69-74.

means of which the mind apprehends more or less perfectly the nature of the object. The beginnings of this process are already effected when the child asks *What?* and *Why?*¹ It is the business of education to direct and to develop this native curiosity and to train the young to sustain the highest flights of science, philosophy, or religious faith. No matter how lofty be the idea, how sublime the inspiration, the matter of even man's most attenuated abstractions of thought comes to him from without, from his environment. Furthermore, if he could not attain to direct knowledge of a reality external to himself, it would be utterly impossible for him to have Christian faith. For this we have the warrant of St. Paul:

"For whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord, shall be saved. How, then, shall they call on Him in whom they have not believed? Or how shall they believe Him of whom they have not heard? . . . Faith then cometh by hearing."²

The first element, therefore, in the reflex arc concept, may be regarded as typical in its most general character, of all man's responses to stimuli,³ even of

¹ "Individual existence comprises a nature that is of itself universal, and only the intellect can show this; yet it also comprises the circumstances that individualize that nature, and these can be perceived by sense. The union of these two (formal) objects, different in nature but joined like a thing and its mode, is perceived [note this] by the concurrence of two faculties, by a kind of composite of sense and intellect, *i. e.*, by the particular reason (*ratio particularis*)."
St. Thomas, *De Principio Individuationis*, 2. Cf. Domet de Vorges, *La psychologie et la perception thomiste*.

² Rom. x, 13-17.

³ From this we are not to conclude that the formation of a concept is a "development" of sense perception. Its efficient cause is a distinctly spiritual principle, *viz.*, the human soul, not the composite of body and soul. The unit is the man. His operations

such as take the form of sense-perception or intellectual conception.

II. We must now consider the second element in the reflex arc concept. In its biological aspect it corresponds to the essential function of organic life, viz., to the changing of food into the very substance of the organism by which that food is appropriated. This is known as the process of assimilation or metabolism or integration. It is true that, according to the scholastic doctrine of cognition, assimilation is also a vital stage in every process of cognition. For, to a certain extent, the object known assimilates to itself the knowing subject in the very act of knowing, so that the knower becomes for the time being like to the known;¹ inasmuch as every effect must be like to its cause at the time to which it is subject to that cause and to the degree and after the measure in which it is so subject. But the mental integration that constitutes the second element of the "triadic" concept, is more comprehensive than this. It begins with apperception² and continues

are manifold and spring proximately from specifically different principles. It is incorrect to hold with J. M. Baldwin that percept and concept are "simply different aspects of one thing—a synthesis of elements." (*Mental Development*, p. 329.)

¹ On the other hand, the subject, by following its appetencies, becomes like the object to which it tends; man, for instance, becomes like the object of his love. As by his intellect he becomes, for the time being assimilated to the object of his thought, so by his will he is assimilated to the object beloved. For spiritual applications of this principle, see *Imitation*, Bk. III, Chaps. V, VI.

² Professor Baldwin (*Story of the Mind*, pp. 12, 13) uses the term in a very comprehensive sense: "The mind, we say, 'apperceives' the orange when it is able to treat all the separate sensations together as standing for one thing. And the various cir-

under the laws of association.¹ The process of association² itself is affected by many conditions. Among the first of these is our inherited organism with its native reflexes and instincts and its acquired habits of enforcement and inhibition, together with all the influ-

cumstances under which the mind does this give the occasion for the different names which the earlier psychology used for marking off different 'faculties.' [The last sentence evades the real issue. 'Occasions' are external to the individual. Both the 'faculties' of Professor Baldwin and the 'tendencies' of Professor Titchener are internal. As well might one say, Environment is everything; plasticity and adjustment on the part of the individual having the environment, are superfluous]. . . . Apperception, then, is the one [sic] principle of mental activity on the side of its reception [the first element in the reflex arc concept] and treatment of the materials of experience" [the second element in the reflex arc concept].

¹ Professor Baldwin (op. cit., pp. 15, 16) writes: "General psychology has reached three great principles in its investigation of knowledge. First, we have the combining tendency of the mind, the grouping together and relating of mental states and of things, called *Apperception*. Then, second, there are the particular relations established among the various states, etc., which are combined; these are called *Associations* of Ideas. And, third, there is the tendency of the mind to use its old experiences and habits as general patterns or nets for the sorting out and distributing of all the new details of daily life; this is called *Assimilation*."

² The laws of association which we owe to Aristotle are rejected by Professor Titchener as being inconsistent with scientific psychology. For associations he substitutes "associative tendencies." "When a number of psychoneural processes [*i. e.*, 'brain processes that are correlated with mental processes'], all of which are reinforced [by attention] and all of which stand alike under the directive influence of a nervous disposition, occur together under certain favorable conditions, then associative tendencies are established among them, such that the recurrence of any one tends to involve, according to circumstances, the recurrence of the others." (*Beginner's Psychology*, pp. 148, 164, 165.) He then draws up an analogous formula for the recurrence of perceptions and ideas (pp. 166, 168), and sums up both in the statement: "The brain associates and meanings are associated."

ences that unite to form our individual training and education. Besides our habitual interests there are the temporary variations due to passing interests and phases of attention, both of which may be changed not only by direct exercise of will-power, but even by the rate of blood-flow. "Association" is distinguished from that fusion of sensations which occurs in perception;¹ for the elements that "fuse" in perception are "peripherally excited" by stimulation of the external senses, whereas in "association" one or both of the terms that fuse is "centrally excited"; that is, is supplied by the imagination. While associations are often classed as simultaneous and successive, yet an attempt has been made to reduce the former to the latter, on the ground that "a simultaneous association consists essentially in the persistence of the first term of a successive association."²

Be the explanation what it may, the association of "ideas" is something more than a mere condition of mental organization or integration; for association is a fact.³ We have seen that very early in his life the

¹ See note 3, p. 239.

² M. W. Calkins, *A First Book in Psychology*, p. 359. Cf. pp. 63 ff., 116-125.

³ We do not object to Professor Titchener's "associative tendencies." Much might be said in their favor. We do insist that they cannot be reconciled with either psychophysical parallelism or the "double-aspect theory." Again we see no sufficient warrant for his antipathy to consciousness (*Beginner's Psychology*, pp. 324 ff.), nor for his definition of will (p. 255) as "the general name for the sum total of tendencies, inherited and acquired, that determine our actions." These tendencies are not "will" properly so called; they are *appetencies*, as we have

human individual not only associates sense-perceptions of one and the same object, by which he is made aware of its various sensible, concrete and individual qualities; but also associates such perceptions with some apprehension of the nature or "meaning" of the object having these qualities. In other words, the term "perception" comes to signify a complex process by which the object is known not only as individual, but also at least implicitly as member of a class. It is this class concept that is essential for purposes of definition; for the definition of a thing states, as far as possible, its proximate genus and specific difference.¹ From the very nature of the case, definition is ordinarily the crowning result of prolonged and careful analysis. Hence it is not a matter for surprise that Catholic philosophers, following the lead of that Church of which they are loyal members, should look upon "definition," and the intellectual concept of which it is the expression, as crucial tests in every system of philosophy. It is precisely here, too, that the weakness of not a little of modern philosophy and of the "new" psychology becomes apparent.² It is through the concept, the in-

learned from Aristotle and his lawful successors. Characteristics of "will" appear repeatedly in Titchener's treatment of attention (pp. 94-97). He seems to be actuated by a "bias," unwitting perhaps, to reduce every mental process to sensation or a derivative thereof.

¹ Professor James' pragmatism does not allow him to define any thing. To be consistent, he must limit himself to the "hit-and-miss" (the "trial-and-error") method. Cf. J. T. Driscoll, *Pragmatism*, pp. 18-39.

² This Father Driscoll (op. cit., *passim*) repeatedly points out with reference to pragmatism. See also Richard Clarke, S. J.,

tellectual idea, taken in its strict scholastic meaning, that we attain to certain knowledge of reality. It is an intellectual conformity to the nature of the object by which it has been impressed or stimulated, and which, in virtue of such conformity, it now knows. It therefore possesses what St. Thomas holds to be the characteristic element in truth, viz., the squaring of thought or intellect with object (*adæquatio rei et intellectus*).¹ Whereas, then, the presentation of the matter of thought through the senses belongs to the first stage of the "reflex arc," the conforming of the intellect to the object exemplifies the second stage. It is the indispensable condition of "definition," whether the term be taken in its logical or in its optical signification.

III. But the value of the intellectual idea does not end even here. It extends to the third phase of the "reflex arc concept." It is the response of the intellect to the stimulus of the object. Wherefore the Schoolmen named it the *verbum mentis*, the interior spiritual "word" whereby the intellect expresses to itself its knowledge of the nature, the "quiddity," the "what-

"The Central Error of Modern Philosophy," *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, Vol. XIII (1888), pp. 52-71, reprinted in his *Logic*, pp. 97-139. A like confusion as to the real nature of perception and of conception is seen in Dexter and Garlick's *Psychology in the Schoolroom* (pp. 60 ff., 150-156). Even Professor S. S. Colvin (*The Learning Process*, p. 307) mistakes what the Schoolmen call the "phantasm," ordinarily a product of the constructive imagination, for the concept properly so called, which is the work of the intellect, a spiritual power. Hence the point of his criticism of Dr. Moore, in the footnote, is really lost.

¹ *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 21, a. 2.

ness" of the object.¹ The concept, or intellectual idea, is indeed a "speaking likeness"—a *species expressa*—of its object.² We conclude, therefore, that, like Aristotle, the Schoolmen had their "reflex arc concept" realized in the process of cognition in general and therefore in its two great classes, viz., sense-perception and intellection. Furthermore, they were careful to teach that the third phase of the arc concept, viz., the reaction, is a vital element in every act of cognition. Desire, volition, muscular movement may or may not follow. The cognition is a complete act, a triadic process, without that sequel, for it includes (1) the action of the object on the cognitive power, which is a true "receptor"; (2) a true union of the object with the cognitive power whether the latter be sense or intellect—and in effecting this union the power becomes a true "conductor"; (3) the response of the power to the stimulus in its own proper act of knowing, wherein and whereby it becomes a true "adjuster."³

It becomes necessary here to insert a word of protest

¹ Intellectual ideas all vary in the clearness and fulness with which they represent their object. Cf. Cardinal Zigliara's classification (*Summa Philosophica*, t. i., *Logica*, §2).

² This is the real meaning of the *species expressa*. For the scholastic theory of sense-perception and of intellection, see any of the standard authors like Zigliara; also Brother Barbas, loc. cit., Maher, *Psychology*, Chap. XV; Cardinal Mercier, *La notion de la Vérité*; Mivart, *On Truth*. In its broad lines the peripatetic, or scholastic, theory of intellection is like that of sense-perception with the exception of the power of abstraction (*intellectus agens*), which is, of course, unnecessary for the process of sensation. See also Brother Azarias, "Aristotle and the Christian Church" (pp. 108-110) in *Essays Philosophical*.

³ See above, p. 155.

against a prevalent doctrine which has been appropriated by the system of pragmatism and the school of "behaviorists." This is the principle that we think only when we face a crisis, that our thought springs from doubt as to how we may or should solve the problem presented by a difficult situation.¹ This is almost equivalent to saying that mental development is the product of hesitation. Such was not the conviction of the most constructive century of the medieval period. Its attitude has been voiced by Tennyson:

*Doubt not, go forward; if thou doubt, the beasts
Will tear thee piecemeal.*²

It is also expressed in no uncertain terms by Cardinal Newman:

"Of the two, I would rather have to maintain that we ought to begin with believing everything that is offered to our acceptance, than that it is our duty to doubt of everything. The former indeed seems the true way of learning. In that case, we soon discover and discard what is contradictory to itself; and error having always some portion of truth in it, and the truth having a

¹ Cf. J. Dewey, *Studies in Logical Theory*, also various articles in Monroe's *Cyclopedia of Education*; I. E. Miller, *Psychology of Thinking*, pp. 1-3; Colvin and Bagley, *Human Behavior*, pp. 17, 18; S. S. Colvin, *The Learning Process*, p. 8. (Colvin and Bagley are moderate in their views.) Cf. Titchener (*Beginner's Psychology*, pp. 262, 263): "Most of our thought is either borrowed thought or routine thought; that is, is not (in the psychological sense) thought at all; independent, sustained, original thinking is as rare as creative imagination or as sagacious and foresighted action." It is, however, particularly in the following section on "Imaginal [sic] Processes in Thought: The Abstract Idea" that Professor Titchener is inaccurate (pp. 265-267). Yet, on the other hand, see Brother Azarias, *Phases of Thought and Criticism*, Chap. II, "On Thinking"; also Balmes' method of study (Cf. p. vii, "Notice of the Author," in *European Civilization*).

² *The Holy Grail*.

reality which error has not, we may expect, that when there is an honest purpose and fair talents, we shall somehow make our way forward, the error falling off from the mind, and the truth developing and occupying it."¹

Doubt is not a source of certainty. Such a view could obtain only where the principles of extreme evolutionism run riot. It is, of course, not more difficult to evolve mental certitude from doubt than it is to develop organized matter from mere dead inorganic matter or to produce the most refined of human reasonings from pure brute instinct. Yet all proof is absolutely wanting that either phenomenon has ever been an actuality. Psychological analysis attests, on the contrary, that the presence of doubt inhibits action. This one fact affords ground for an illuminating commentary on the blindness of pragmatism² to the interests of its own "idea" as a "plan of action."

The serried ranks of Catholic philosophy, therefore, stand firm for the intellectual idea as radically different from the sense-percept, on the one hand, and as a direct medium of knowing "reality" on the other. Without the true concept, the intellectual idea, man is isolated from the external world and therefore from all the natural science of which it is the subject-matter. He becomes kin to the brute, and is therefore debarred from mental science. For him there is no self-consciousness,³

¹ *Grammar of Assent*, p. 377 (ed. 1901).

² For trenchant criticism of this aspect of pragmatism, see J. T. Driscoll, *op. cit.*, pp. 36-39.

³ How are we to explain the strange antipathy to consciousness shown by some psychologists and some behaviorists? Cf. E. B. Titchener (*Beginner's Psychology*, pp. 324 ff.); J. B. Watson, *Behavior*, Chap. I.

no responsibility, no God. The intellectual idea is, therefore, an outpost of civilization, a condition of scientific progress, a basic principle of all true art,¹ an element of all social service, the avenue of approach to God.² It is not without reason that He who is truth itself, in His last prayer to the Father for His disciples, said: "This is everlasting life: that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent."³ Not without reason did He promise to send them the Spirit of truth.

Article IV.—Habit.

We have said that the act of perception as elicited by the human individual after he has come to the use of reason is a very complex process. It includes not only the sense-perception of which the mere animal is capable and which is itself a synthesis of sensations, but also at least one act of intellection, viz., that of conception, the formation of a true idea. This would seem to give sufficient ground for calling such a process an act proper to man as man. There are, however,

¹ Cf. St. Thomas (*Summa Theologica*, Ia-IIæ, q. 27, a. I, ad 3): "The beautiful adds to the notion of the good a peculiar relation to the cognitive powers." Art seeks to represent the spiritual under appropriate material symbols. It is "the expression of ideal beauty under a sensible form" (*Cours de Philosophie*, par F. J., F. S. C., p. 320). See also John Rickaby, S. J., *General Metaphysics*, pp. 147-157.

² "God is a spirit, and they that adore Him must adore Him in spirit and in truth" (John iv, 24).

³ John xvii, 3.

other reasons of weight. Just as the act of sense-perception comes to be influenced by past sense-perceptions which have in some way left their trace in the nervous system giving it a special "set" or "bent" or "disposition"¹ that modifies all subsequent acts having even any element in common with the earlier processes, so too our judgments of to-day are influenced by those of yesterday and by our hopes, desires or expectations for the morrow. If it be true, as indeed it is, that our passing moods affect our attitude toward persons and things, much greater must be the effect wrought by that complex of emotions growing out of heredity and experience, which we call temperament.² Moreover, "what one really *desires* is the best possible index of the sort of character one really possesses."³ Now, the chief determinant of character is habit.

The physiological basis of habit has in part been considered in connection with the beginning of the learning process, in part also in connection with perception and apperception.⁴ On its psychological side, habit, in its cognitive aspect, is intimately bound up with memory; in its motor aspect, it is, outside of reflex and instinct-

¹ Dr. Dubray, in the monograph already cited, shows how consistent this statement is with the fundamental truths of Catholic philosophy (pp. 28-32; 77-111; 151-167).

² "Whereas mood indicates a relatively transitory disposition toward a certain emotional tone, temperament refers to a permanent tendency, contributing to the very warp and woof of character." J. R. Angell, *Psychology*, p. 391.

³ Ibid., p. 433.

⁴ See pp. 213-216, 221-229, 235 ff., above.

ive action, the chief determinant of behavior. It is the psychological phases of habit that must now engage our attention. The relations between habit and instinct are close and persistent. The tendency to instinctive action, however, is inherited; it is a race possession. Habit, on the other hand, must be acquired by the individual. When it has become a "second nature," it may sink to the level of instinctive action inasmuch as it no longer demands that control by consciousness which was indispensable during its formation. Yet like many an instinctive act, an habitual act may be accompanied by consciousness. Both psychology and daily experience tell us that "habit is, in general, the outcome of practice."¹ But to attain the perfection requisite for habit, the practice must follow certain well-defined laws.² These have been reduced to three heads: "(1) *focalization* of consciousness upon the combination of movements to be made automatic; (2) *attentive repetition* of this behavior; (3) *permitting no exceptions* to occur until the habit has been established."³

The first law aims to assure a maximum degree of efficiency with a minimum expenditure of time and energy. To attain the purpose of the law it is necessary to give attention not only to the movements⁴ to

¹ Titchener, *Beginner's Psychology*, p. 170.

² Professor James' *Principles of Psychology*, Vol. I, Chap. XIV, is still a classic on "Habit." See also C. A. Dubray, *Catholic Encyclopedia* (s. v.).

³ Colvin and Bagley, *op. cit.*, p. 168.

⁴ This term must be taken in its broad sense as regulated action, and not limited to muscular movement.

be made, but also to their serial sequence, and their mutual connection. The importance of this law is enhanced by the fact that to-day psychologists look upon the "idea of movement" as the beginning of the movement itself.¹ To get the best return from the first efforts at forming a habit, it is, however, necessary likewise to heed Professor James' first maxim, that "in the acquisition of a new habit, or the leaving off of an old one, we must take care to *launch ourselves with as strong and decided an initiative as possible.*"²

The second law guards against mere repetition, and is designed to promote economy of effort. It therefore implies due consideration of the intervals between repetitions and of the relative frequency of the repetitions. As in beginning the habit, so in repeating the various steps, it is important to keep attention and interest at high tension. They are the mental correlates of that strong nerve impulse which, according to the neurone theory, overflows its wonted channel and opens up a new outlet for the discharge of this nerve energy.

Hence the wisdom and the necessity of the third law. The needed interest is best sustained when the first demands made for the building of habit are so adjusted as to fall easily within the capacity of the individual.

¹ The Catholic Church has through the centuries, after the example of her Founder, emphasized this doctrine. She still teaches that not merely bad deeds, but even evil thoughts and desires, are sinful. The overt act only consummates the sinful attitude. Does not psychology endorse this doctrine when it teaches that the "idea" of movement is the beginning of the movement itself? (Cf. J. M. Baldwin, *Mental Development*, p. 167.)

² Loc. cit.

The initial successes thereby attained encourage him to renewed and to greater efforts, and so feeling and emotion are enlisted in the service of the will. There is a world of sound psychology and of profound spiritual truth in Professor James' two remaining maxims: "Seize the very first opportunity to act on every resolution you make, and on every emotional prompting you may experience in the direction of the habits you aspire to gain. . . . Keep the faculty of effort alive in you by a little gratuitous exercise every day." —Such are the general laws of habit. To them may be added a special rule which has application even beyond the school room: "Never begin the mastery of two conflicting types of behavior [such as the learning of two foreign languages at the same period of time] unless both can be continued long enough to become permanently established habits."¹

From the laws of habit-formation we can deduce the factors that enter into the process. The first of these is repetition. This is a comprehensive topic and embraces such subdivisions as (1) the number of repetitions that prove most effective, (2) the intervals between the repetitions, (3) their frequency, (4) their uniformity.² A second factor is environment, which

¹ Colvin and Bagley, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

² With reference to experiments on the development of memory as a habit, see H. Ebbinghaus (tr. H. A. Ruger and C. E. Bus-senius), *Memory*, and E. Meumann (tr. J. W. Baird), *The Psychology of Learning*, Chaps. V-VII; for briefer statements, cf. S. S. Colvin, *op. cit.*, pp. 42 ff., 64 ff.; E. J. Swift, *Learning and Doing*, pp. 128-131. On the integration of habit in animals, cf. J. B. Watson, *Behavior*, Chaps. VI, VII.

must remain constant throughout the period required for building up the habit, or at least must be characterized by only few and gradual changes. Otherwise repetition properly so-called becomes impossible. This is true of both physical and social environment, of both material and spiritual environment. The third great factor in the forming of habit is motivation. While, in the strictest meaning of the term, motivation can refer only to man, yet by analogy it may be extended even to the brute creation. So understood, it is virtually one with Professor Baldwin's principle of "imitation," which purports to give a "motive" for repetition. He writes:

"If one of such creatures is to be fitter than another to survive, it must be the creature which by its movements secures more nutritive processes and avoids more dangerous contacts. . . . This, too, is consonant with what we know of growth. Increased vitality tends to enlargement, range of movement, activity, while lessened vitality and organic decay tend to the opposite series of effects, shrinking, contraction of range, torpidity. . . . Creatures which have, in their own method of reaction, a way of reaching after the stimulations which they need—a way of retaining contact with the source of supply, say of food, or oxygen, or sunlight, or heat, or of increasing their forces by actually moving toward it, these creatures can, in a measure, find or make for themselves the regularities which the environment may not guarantee. . . . This expansion gives, by reason of the new stimulations which it brings within range, a heightened central process which is the organic basis of the hedonic consciousness; and this issues in the varied excess movements from which the ontogenetic adaptations of the organism are selected by association, as fitted in turn to perpetuate the stimulations which give pleasure, and so again to arouse the excess process, and so on."¹

¹ *Mental Development*, pp. 201, 204. "The existence of habits implies an environment sufficiently constant to repeatedly present

In other words, this theory attempts to account for constantly recurrent repetitions of acts by the organism under relatively uniform conditions of environment. While, then, it is true that "in the life of the higher organisms, such as pre-eminently human life, the mind has superseded all other agencies and processes in aiding and securing adjustments to environment,"¹—including such adjustments as are necessary for habit-building,—yet man is still an organism, although not merely an organism, and is, therefore, subject to such conditions of organic life as are essential to that life. This theory has the further advantage of giving a sufficient reason for that strong and decided "initiative" which Professor James thinks so necessary when we attempt to inaugurate a habit. The element of the "synapse" in the neurone theory specifies the kind of inertia to be overcome. In habit-building, then, we may find that "well begun is half done." These reflections likewise suggest reasons why the forming of certain habits should be apprehended as vital issues, appealing to our deeper interests, in whose acquisition we must guard against waste of time and energy. What has been said of positive habits is equally true of the breaking of habits. In this case, the repetition is negative; that is, the act is allowed to fall into disuse, or it is inhibited by contrary acts which are themselves subject to the laws of habit formation.

to the organism the same or closely similar conditions." Joseph Jastrow, *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. XLII (Nov., 1892), pp. 35-48.

¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 233, 234.

These laws and these factors of habit help to elucidate the scholastic definition of habit as "a quality difficult to change, whereby an agent whose nature it is to work one way or another indeterminately, is disposed easily and readily at will to follow this or that particular line of action."¹ According, therefore, to the view of St. Thomas, only such spiritual powers as intellect and will are, properly speaking, capable of habit. By extension, however, and in the measure of their control by intellect and will, the term may also be applied to acquired sensory and motor qualities. It is in this sense that we are to understand Professor Baldwin: "Habit is the tendency of an organism to continue more and more readily processes which are vitally beneficial."²

The effects of habit are commonly separated into two classes: such as are advantageous to the individual, and such as are injurious. Of the former class many suggestions have already been given in treating of the laws and of the factors of habit. On its physiological side, habit means readiness to act, owing to the definite set given to the nervous system by previous energetic repetitions, and the strong associations established. On its psychological side, it therefore means a lessening of effort, attended often with a corresponding increase of pleasure at the facility with which the act is done and the skill that marks its execution. It is only when the attitude developed by habit is primarily passive that

¹ Jos. Rickaby, S. J., *Moral Philosophy*, p. 64.

² *Mental Development*, p. 476.

the habitual act moves from the "focus" to the "margin" of consciousness. When, on the other hand, the habit has an active connotation, although the feeling of effort no longer appears, the attention which the act receives is that of a master, a connoisseur¹ and expert. This absence of effort leaves the mind free to devote its energy to other pursuits, and hence it is a condition of individual education and of social progress.

The most serious of the dangers that may flow from an acquired habit is said to be automatism, whereby the individual is held firmly in the grip of the habit.² When the acquisition is a gain for man in his quest for the realization of high ideals of intellect, morals, and culture, this quality of habit is to be regarded as a natural reward for his expenditure of time, energy, and ability. It means that henceforth, in this particular field of endeavor, he may not only have a wider outlook together with broader and deeper interests, but also may command greater skill; for the laborious efforts of an earlier stage have now become quasi-instinctive reactions.³ But when such a habit is a pos-

¹ Titchener (*Beginner's Psychology*, p. 102) calls this *derived primary attention*. In his earlier *Primer*, he had called it *secondary passive attention*, a name that still obtains in many texts. Baldwin (*Feeling and Will*, p. 49) presents only one side of the case when he says: "Psychologically, it [habit] means loss of oversight, diffusion of attention, subsiding consciousness."

² "One can never say at what precise moment it may become literally impossible to shake off a bad habit." J. R. Angell, *op. cit.*, p. 78.

³ Cf. J. M. Baldwin: "Every new thing is an adaptation, and every adaptation arises right out of the bosom of old processes

session that is injurious to man as man, then is he a slave indeed. His lot is more pitiable than that of the most wretched serf that ever lived. For his captivity is from within. It is bred in bone and blood, in nerve and sinew. Then, indeed, must he place his trust in the power of the Most High if he would be free from this thralldom. If he be a Catholic he will find in the sacrament of penance a channel of divine grace, which, although it does not take away all the effects of evil habit, yet lessens the malignity of their influence and gives the penitent special help to fight against his bonds and to acquire the opposite virtue. Merely from a pedagogical point of view the penitent saints whom the Catholic Church honors every year are a splendid stimulus to all who read the lesson aright. They encourage him who has gone astray, to return to God "with his whole heart"; and they support the steps of the faint-hearted. Hence the memory of their example is a social asset of the highest value.

It is the external aspects of habit that engage the popular mind. This, indeed, is to be expected; but it is not an unmixed blessing that the same phase should be emphasized by behaviorists like Professor J. B.

and is filled with old matter" (*Mental Development*, p. 218). "Apperception" limits this principle to the field of knowledge directly; indirectly, however, even here, it extends to attitudes and behavior so far as these are affected by one's knowledge, convictions, and point of view. For this there is a neural basis: "Each new accommodation secured by central nervous development is not new at all in principle, but rests directly upon imitation [in its broader meaning] and association. Its characteristic feature, however, is its complexity" (p. 287).

Watson and pragmatists who follow the lead of Professor James. Such an attitude, in fact, must eventually run counter to the very tendency of mind which behaviorist and pragmatist seek to propagate.¹ It has long been known, it is even demonstrated by experiment, that the "idea" exercises a controlling influence over the external action. The principle lies at the root of Christian teaching: the decalogue is the corollary of the creed. But the sole purpose of the idea is not the mere control of our outward actions. Not even when the idea is interpreted in the sense of John Locke is this true. The cognitive activity of the animal—rational or irrational—always tends at least to emphasize its motor activity. Were this not true of man, he could not be influenced by ideals. How profoundly the individual, through slight initial cognitive "variations" or points of view, may eventually come to differ from his fellows, is a study that falls under the heads of apperception and the personal equation.² It is aptly illustrated in the divergent mental "set" of the typical literary man and the scientist,³ a difference that is manifested, but in a lesser degree, by many children very

¹ Cf. J. T. Driscoll, *op. cit.*, pp. 26 f., 38 f., 93 f.

² See above, pp. 36-38, 56, note 2. A good Scriptural illustration is found in the parable of the good Samaritan (Luke x, 30-37); another, in the conduct of Christ's hearers when the mystery of the holy eucharist was first broached (John vi, 60-72).

³ Cf. Brother Azarias, "Literary and Scientific Habits of Thought," Chap. V, in *Phases of Thought and Criticism*. A like difference is drawn by Cardinal Newman (*Grammar of Assent*, *passim*) between the Christian believer as such and the theologian as such; *v. g.*, "Credence," pp. 53-58 (ed. 1901).

early in the schoolroom in their antipathy for arithmetic (often an indication of literary bent) with a corresponding liking for language study, and *vice versa*.¹

Moreover, since right habits are ordinarily the result of enlightened practice, the following observations of Professor Titchener are here timely, since they emphasize the intellectual aspects of practice:

"In psychological experiments, the practiced observer has a threefold superiority over the unpracticed: his attitude to the stimuli, in successive observations, is more nearly uniform; his attention is sustained at a higher level, and his discrimination is more refined. This means that the focal mental processes are few in number; that they are extremely vivid; and that they are protected by strong inhibitory forces, against intrusion from the outside."²

Finally, the importance of right intellectual habits is insisted upon by scholastic philosophers, notably by St. Thomas Aquinas, and by the Catholic Church herself. The doctrine of the Angelic Doctor on the subject has been presented with discriminating comment under three heads by Father Joseph Rickaby, from whom we quote:³

"An intellectual virtue [habit] gives one a facility in doing a good act; but a moral virtue not only gives facility, but makes one put the facility in use [*i. e.*, disposes one to exercise the facility]. . . . The special intellectual habit called *art* disposes a man to act correctly toward some particular end, but a moral habit toward the common end, scope and purpose of all human

¹ For this reason it is often wise to have a "double standard" of classification in the lower grades in order to secure symmetry of mental development for the child.

² *Beginner's Psychology*, p. 170.

³ *Moral Philosophy*, pp. 73-77.

life. . . . The grand distinction . . . seems to be this, that moral habits reside in powers which may act against the dictate of the understanding, . . . whereas the power which is the seat of the intellectual habits, the understanding, cannot possibly act against itself. . . . Absolutely speaking, intellectual virtue is the greater perfection of a man. But moral virtue is the greater safeguard. . . . Sin is worse than ignorance, and more against reason, because it is against the doer's own reason."

Whence he concludes: "The moral virtues are the virtues of this world, intellectual virtue is the virtue of the life to come."

The attitude of the Catholic Church may be shown from two viewpoints: 1. She teaches that there are truths which we are bound to know either as means of salvation or because of positive precept; 2. She condemns heresy as a most grievous sin against Him who said, "I am the truth." And it was the Redeemer Himself who declared: "You shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free."¹

Just as grace takes nature and transforms man into the Christian, so the function of habit is to control, co-ordinate, and ennoble instinctive behavior and thus develop the human animal into the cultured and upright man. In both cases, the basis is the same; but, under favorable conditions the operation of grace begins on a higher level than that of mere sentient life. Of the ways of modifying instinctive behavior, three may here be specially noted.² Each of them illustrates very clearly the motive power of feeling and emotion.

I. The first of these has to do with an undesirable

¹ John xiv, 6; viii, 32.

² Cf. Colvin and Bagley, *op. cit.*, Chap. X.

instinct for the individual and for society; as, for example, the impulse to appropriate to one's self what rightfully belongs to another, whether the thing coveted is material or spiritual, whether it be money or honor. Here the problem is to associate a feeling of deeply rooted aversion for the object which now excites cupidity and thereby to inhibit the tendency to appropriate it.¹ The process must be continued until the desired modification of the instinct has been established as a habit. The doctrine of "moral training by natural consequence" may sometimes be applied here with good effect.² In general, this method of modifying instinct in children, and even in mere animals, is regarded as belonging to the process of learning by trial and error, the motive for getting the new habit being chiefly the pleasure that is made to attend every approach to its acquisition and the penalty with which failure is visited. While the method applies especially to children,³ it has its place throughout life in the work

¹ Cf. W. James, *Talks to Teachers*, pp. 40-43, who there represents the problem as the attempt to change the *middle* stage of a reflex action, sensorimotor action in the case that he chooses, to the level of conscious deliberation, and thereby *delay* the response to the stimulus. A good illustration in the spiritual order is found in the means which St. J. B. de la Salle recommends to his Brothers (*Collection*, pp. 121, 122) to enable them to perform their actions well. See p. 99, above.

² Paul Monroe (*Text-book in the History of Education*, p. 559) formulates the doctrine thus: "Allow the child to suffer the natural results of his own acts without the intervention of human beings to protect or to punish." It is associated with the names of Rousseau and Spencer, who, however, do not agree in their interpretation of it.

³ The tendency to sensorimotor and ideomotor actions, *i. e.*, the tendency to react upon impression without due reflection, is char-

of perfecting one's character. Here, too, success must prompt to more earnest endeavor, and failure must be met with a penalty which is not easily forgotten, and which will prove to be an adequate safeguard against future relapses. Pleasure and pain exercise the simplest and the most direct influence in modifying instinctive reactions. They are also the most general means, both in space and in time, for they apply to both man and the brute creation; and they lie at the root of all education, whether primary or advanced. Indeed, the great problem of education, as it is the great question of life, is simply this: How may the appropriate feeling be permanently attached to each of the great objects of human endeavor? It is not enough to link pleasure so inseparably with an object that we no longer perceive the reality except as tinged with the associations arising from agreeable experiences. Fear, too, must ever be held in reserve as an essential motive. For there are moments in life when man tends to fall to the level of his so-called "primitive" state. Then whether one be adult or child, he

acteristic not only of children in years, but also of many who have become children through the infirmities consequent on old age, who are in their "second childhood." One of the great evils attending the patronage of moving-picture shows is precisely the prolonging of this period of sensorimotor reaction—a period when animal instinct dominates and reason remains inactive. This is confirmed by the testimony of the State Board of Censors in many parts of our land. See editorial, *Catholic Standard and Times*, Feb. 26, 1916. A like statement might be made of not a few vaudeville performances.—The action is called sensorimotor "if the object is still *perceived*, as it is in the impulsive action proper, and ideomotor, if the perception is replaced with an *idea* of object." Titchener, *Beginner's Psychology*, p. 243.

needs the restraint of a great and salutary fear.¹

While, then, the Christian dispensation teaches the law of love, it also proclaims far and wide the doctrine of everlasting punishment for the grievous sin in which one dies; for that sin persists as a state, it endures as a habit of rebellion against man's Creator. It was a profoundly Catholic spirit that moved Dante to write on the gates of hell the words which that abode of the lost may be conceived as addressing now to man:

"To rear me was the task of power divine,
Supremest wisdom, and primeval love."²

For the power of the Father, the wisdom of the Son, and the love of the Holy Ghost have conspired to make hell a strong buttress for man's tottering will. In the Catholic Church also from the very beginning of her existence penalties have been inflicted upon such of her children as refused to conform to the law and to cultivate the habit of upright living. The character of these punitive measures has naturally varied with place and time, since disciplinary rules are enacted and enforced for the benefit of the governed. Moreover, the example of the Church in this respect has been followed by all the religious orders in their efforts to approach their respective ideals.

We have said that this method of modifying instinct is exercised chiefly through pleasurable and painful reaction; and this is true. But such a statement ex-

¹ Rom. vii, 23-25.

² *Inferno*, Canto III (Cary's trans.).

presses but a part of the truth. The method really consists in "*the attachment of another feeling with its appropriate response to an object that naturally arouses an undesirable instinct.*"¹ This suggests a broader outlook, one, indeed, that is perfectly reconcilable with ripe scholarship, genuine culture, and sterling spirituality.² For in this method there are three factors: (1) the object which is retained; (2) the feeling toward it which is to be changed permanently and is to prompt the opposite reaction to that which springs from nature; (3) the point of view, which is to transform the feeling. When so presented the method is seen to be fundamentally one with the work of the Christian Church from the very beginning.³ The first duty of the Christian is to look upon his environment, material and spiritual, physical and social, natural and supernatural, with "the eyes of faith," as the Saviour Himself would look upon it. Then he is to "enlarge his heart," loving what Christ would have him love, and hating what his divine Teacher would have him hate. These emotions then release the "heightened discharge" of energy which makes the reaction a decisive gain. Have we not here reduced the scheme of the whole Christian life, when dominated by living faith, to

¹ Colvin and Bagley, op. cit., p. 150.

² Cf. *The Imitation* (Bk. I, Chap. XXV, 4): "Two things especially conduce to great improvement; namely, forcibly to withdraw oneself from what nature is viciously inclined to, and fervently to follow up the good one is most in need of."

³ This has been described by T. W. Allies with great philosophic insight and historic evidence in *The Formation of Christendom*, Vol. I.

the elements suggested by the "reflex arc concept"?

II. A second method may be used to modify instinct. Whereas the essence of the first method lies in changing the feeling which the object naturally excites, the efficacy of the second consists in bringing about a change of response, although the object and the feeling remain unchanged. To a certain extent, this plan of action presupposes the fruitful use of the first method. It assumes that the child, for example, knows something of the real worth of the object, that it is attracted toward what is good and feels aversion for what is evil, and that it is gradually giving to this attitude of mind the stability that is characteristic of habit. There remains, then, the response to the object. Hence the problem is one of better or worse. It opens up the discussion of a second great function of education, viz., substitution:¹ the substitution of what is better for what is merely good, of the higher mode of action for the lower, of the rational and deliberate, for the sensorimotor and reflex, of what is also social for what is purely individual, of the supernatural and Christian for the natural and merely human; finally, of the viewpoint, the sentiments, the conduct of the typical religious for the thoughts, the emotions, and the behavior of the ordinary believer in Christ. It is a region where every solid gain that is made means for its possessor a wider outlook, a higher ideal, a more

¹ "Educationally, this method is important in connection with most of the individualistic instincts, with some of the adaptive instincts, and especially with the sex instincts." Colvin and Bagley, *op. cit.*, p. 157.

thoroughgoing sense of duty. Just as the first method may, as we have seen, be used with great effect by the Christian as such, so this second method seems to have a special value for the novice in the religious life.

Dr. F. W. Foerster¹ draws a suggestive lesson from decerebrate frogs. When acid is applied to the toes, the frog immediately reacts, contracting its leg. So, too, the average hot-tempered boy is prone to "hit back" under supposed provocation. Is he not also "decerebrate" when he yields to this impulse? Should he not rather act according to the moral law, act as becomes a human being? Better still, should he not hearken to the divine voice that said: "But I say to you, love your enemies, do good to them that hate you"?² The novice professes to be seeking the higher way. This method will lead him thereto. At its lower levels and in the natural order it is made the subject of an urgent plea by all educators who have the welfare of the country at heart. But it is only in Catholic schools, especially when taught by religious, that the principle can receive its normal development. How important it is to favor and further such unimpeded growth may appear more convincingly when we have traced its relation to what Professor Baldwin calls the principle of "accommodation," and which is intimately

¹ *Jugendlehre*, pp. 261 ff. About one-third of this book, consisting of selected portions, has been translated into English and published under the title, *The Art of Living*. It is a subject of sincere regret that the whole book has not been done into our tongue.

² Matt. v, 44.

bound up with habit in the work of education and of life.

"Accommodation . . . is opposed to habit in two ways: first, it has reference to *new* movements,—a prospective reference,—while habit has reference always to movements more or less old, a retrospective reference, and so it runs ahead of habit; and second, it tends, by the selection of new movements, to come into direct conflict with old habitual movements, and so to disintegrate habits. . . . But continued accommodation is possible only because . . . habit all the time conserves the past and gives *points d'appui* in solidified structure [*i. e.*, in the nervous system] for new accommodations. Inasmuch, further, as the copy [for imitation] becomes, by transference from the world to the mind, capable of internal revival in memory, accommodation takes on a new character—a conscious, subjective character—in volition."¹

If we now connect "accommodation" and "habit" with the "neurone theory," which has many points of resemblance to Professor Baldwin's "law of dynamogenesis,"² we find that "accommodation" arises where habitual actions take place under conditions of high nerve-tension on their physiological side and interested attention on their psychological side. Under such conditions of "heightened discharge" of the nerve-currents and of either voluntary attention or the attention due to long practice and resultant skill,³ it is possible for one to improve on his previous record; that is, to make new "accommodations." These may bear primarily an intellectual aspect, conferring deeper insight into

¹ *Mental Development*, pp. 478, 479; cf. pp. 384, 387.

² *Ibid.*, p. 167.

³ Titchener calls these phases of attention respectively "secondary" and "derived primary" (*Beginner's Psychology*, pp. 95, 97; *Text-book*, pp. 268-276).

the nature of things, or they may chiefly affect conduct. In other words, they may be classed as illustrations of the two great types of reaction—the sensory and the motor.¹ When the environment remains constant and the subjective conditions are practically unchanged, then this new “accommodation” may in turn become fixed as a “habit.” Paraphrasing Tennyson’s lines, we insist, therefore,

That men may rise on stepping stones
Of their set habits to higher things.

This is the method of which the artist makes use in developing his talent. This is also the method employed by the scientist for attaining skill in the technique of observation and experiment. This is the way which the saints took in climbing to heights of sanctity. “We think little of little things,” says Father Faber. . . . “Yet this is the only road to solid virtue. It is not what we read of in the saints that made them saints: it was what we do not read of them that enabled them to be what we wonder at while we read;”² and again: “The saints were men who did less than other people, but who did what they had to do a thou-

¹ See “Reaction,” Baldwin’s *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*; also Titchener (*Text-book*, pp. 433 ff., *Beginner’s Psychology*, pp. 239 ff.), who adds a third, or mixed, type. It would seem that Mary as presented to us in Scripture by St. Luke (x, 38-42) belonged to the sensory type, while her sister Martha was distinctly motor in tendency. The former is a model for the contemplative religious orders; the latter, for those that follow the active life. The third type would thus concern the great majority of the orders. See also Baldwin, *op. cit.*, pp. 460-466, *Social and Ethical Interpretations*, p. 26.

² *Growth in Holiness*, p. 297.

sand times better.”¹ This therefore is the way which the novice must regularly pursue if he would be true to his calling.²

III. The first two methods of modifying instinctive behavior agree in this, that the object remains the same. Yet they differ in important respects. The first method seeks to modify response by changing the feeling toward the object, the motive for the change being pleasure or pain, *i. e.*, feelings that man possesses in common with the mere animal order. The second method, however, retains both the object and the feeling which it excites, but seeks to elevate the tone of the response. It is, therefore, a more difficult method, and presupposes some progress already gained in the control of instinctive reactions. The third method retains only the feeling, but detaches it both from the object by which it is naturally aroused and from the response to which it is naturally allied as being the motive for that response, and attempts to graft it upon another trunk; that is, upon a totally different object and a widely different response. “This process is sometimes called the *sublimation* of the instinct, and its importance lies in the possibility of thus enlisting in the service of an important social [and religious] ideal the powerful force that the native feeling represents and the energy that it may set free.”³ Holy Writ presents us with

¹ *Spiritual Conferences*, p. 280.

² Later, in the sociological section of this book, we shall see another aspect of this principle. See pp. 323 f., below.

³ Colvin and Bagley, *op. cit.*, p. 159. As examples of effective attempts to “sublimate” primitive instincts they cite the Salvation

an admirable illustration in the person of St. Paul. All that intensity of feeling which, as member of the "most strict sect of the Pharisees," he discharged in unwearied labor for the cause of Judaism, he transferred, after his conversion (the word is most apt in this case), to the defence of the Christian Church and the propagation of Christian teaching. Even more striking is the instance of Mary Magdalen. By the influence of divine grace her love was lifted up from earthly degradation and so purified and transfigured as to be, according to the Saviour's promise, a subject of reverent wonder for all ages to come. Passing beyond the apostolic age,¹ we find another great example of this third method in St. Augustine. According to his own testimony, as given in his *Confessions*, motivation here operated very slowly. Finally grace triumphed over nature and enabled him to transfer all the ardor of his carnal love to an object worthy of the highest and noblest offering the heart of man can give. It was then that Augustine exclaimed: "O Beauty ever ancient, O Beauty ever new! Too late

Army and the Boy Scout movement. These examples are good so far as they go; but to the Christian spirit they are very pathetic, because they are not so much better. They illustrate, too, the sad limitations to which the religious spirit is subjected in a "public school" atmosphere, and the weakness in the motivation of conduct which is therefore inevitable.

¹The *Imitation* gives this pertinent suggestion (Bk. I, Chap. XXV, 5): "Turn all occasions to thy spiritual profit, so that if thou seest or hearest any good examples, thou mayest be spurred on to imitate them. But if thou observe anything that is blameworthy, take heed thou commit not the same: or if thou at any time hast done it, labor to amend it out of hand."

have I known Thee; too late have I loved Thee!"¹ Then, too, he gave expression to his characteristic "integration" of the law of charity: "Love God, and do what you please."²

These, then, are the three ways in which instinct may be yoked to habit and made to carry man to the higher levels of human life: (1) change the instinctive feeling, (2) change the instinctive response; (3) change the object—provide another and better object for both feeling and response. When studied from these three viewpoints, the great characters of Scripture and the saints honored by the Catholic Church become subjects of absorbing interest to the novice. Therein he will find abundant food for the sentiments and emotions that should sway his own conduct and draw him nearer to their likeness. In the measure to which he assimilates the spirit by which these great heroes of the higher life were animated will he express in his own personality an excellent type of the reflex arc concept. With an eye to perceive what is worthy of imitation in the leaders of men, he will labor calmly and persistently to make it his own in thought and affection. Then when the occasion calls, he will not be remiss in confirming the inner disposition with those outward deeds which not only express one's mind but impart to it new insight and power.³

¹ Bk. VIII, Chap. V, Bk. X, Chap. XXVII.

² T. W. Allies, *Formation of Christendom*, Vol. I, pp. 175-215, makes an interesting contrast between the pagan and the Christian spirit and ideals as typified respectively by Cicero and St. Augustine.

³ Cf. G. H. Betts, *Mind and Its Education*, p. 250.

It is in this connection that Professor J. M. Baldwin's principle of "imitation" may be used with great profit.¹ He maintains that to perform any action, to make any movement, we must have a mental picture, no matter how crude it may be, of the action to be done, of the movement to be made; otherwise, "we cannot succeed in making it." In the language of scholastic philosophy, we need an exemplar cause, an ideal model. It is chiefly by imitation that young animals and young children learn. They have, indeed, an instinctive general tendency to imitate, which, in the case of children, replaces or supplements many special instincts. Because of its general character, this tendency demands of them a corresponding degree of plasticity, in virtue of which they can respond suitably to changes in their environment. But it is only by "persistent imitation," by the application of the "try-try-again" method, that they gradually eliminate useless, wasteful, and uncouth movements.² Moreover, persistent imitation has a much deeper significance than Professor Baldwin seems to imply. This is the value of expression as an agency in mental, moral, and religious development. As we have already implied in speaking of perception, it affects even our way of looking at things. "In the act of expression the cognition itself is lifted into the life

¹ Cf. *Story of the Mind*, pp. 20, 28, 29, 39.

² Even these uncouth movements, when "massive and diffused" are of direct use; for "They increase remarkably the chances that among them all there will be some movements which will hit the mark, and so contribute to his stock of correct equivalents." (P. 39.)

of the mind and rendered functional in the subsequent mental development.”¹ It is because of just this fact that persistent imitation under conscious control does produce skill, does excite interest, and does fix habit. Even in the supernatural order it is true that faith is dead unless it be given expression in works.²

Two other aspects of habit deserve notice, both of which illustrate the general meaning of Weber’s law that “equal increments of sensation result from relatively equal increments of the stimulus.”³ Hence we must not expect to be aware constantly of the progress that we are really making in the formation of a habit. It is only the more notable stages of advance that we can perceive. The moral is obvious. Far from being discouraged when we fail to note any progress, we must persevere in the regular performance of the acts by which the habit is formed. Each act is a true stimulus and each, taken with the acts that precede it and those that follow it, contributes its influence to produce the total effect. Each is a factor in the summation of the stimuli. The converse is also true, viz., that negligence as to the necessary acts, whether in their regu-

¹ Dr. Shields, *Psychology of Education*, Less. XX, “Expression,” p. 266.

² Cf. James ii, 17.

³ G. T. Fechner sought to give this law further definition in the form: “As sensation increases in arithmetical ratio, the stimulus increases in geometrical ratio.” For the limitations of both laws, see Baldwin’s *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*. For other illustrations of E. H. Weber’s law, see Titchener, *Beginner’s Psychology*, pp. 68, 69; *Text-book*, pp. 219-223; W. Wundt (tr. J. E. Creighton and E. B. Titchener), *Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology*, Lecture II.

larity, their frequency, or their intensity, has already been undermining the habit for some time before we notice the deterioration. Hence Professor Titchener formulates the principle in this wise: "The less you have of anything, the less need be added, and the more you have, the more must be added, to make an appreciable difference; or, on the negative side, . . . you are not likely to notice any difference in your surroundings, so long as the relations of the stimuli remain unchanged."¹

The summation of stimuli may also have a social bearing. It is a matter of common knowledge that one's character is influenced by the company which one keeps. When his associates are numerous and upright, one's own nature responds through its nobler traits to the cumulus of stimuli coming from the whole gathering. The same principle explains in part why, on the other hand, it is the baser elements of one's personality that reveal themselves when one is but a unit in a crowd or a mob.

What has been said of habit in general applies also to the infused virtues which are received at baptism and which are called supernatural habits by the Church. They differ from other habits in that they are merely powers and, of themselves, do not connote any facility for the function for which they are bestowed. This facility is, however, developed by systematic repetition of the necessary acts; that is, by correspondence to divine grace.

¹ *Beginner's Psychology*, p. 69.

There can be no doubt that the reflex arc concept applies to the whole region of habit. For the matter of the habit comes directly or indirectly as a suggestion from either one's physical or one's social environment. This is the sensory or cognitive element. The building of the habit represents the central stage, that of integration. The motor element is found not so much in the act that flows from the habit, as in the facility to perform the act, the attitude, or "set" of both mind and organism.

Article V.—Summary.

Psychology, as the science of mental processes, connotes the subject from which the processes arise, the agent that produces the actions. The processes may be conveniently reduced to the three classes of cognitions, feelings, and appetitions or conations. All three are elements in perception as exercised by the individual after he has come to the use of reason. Perception may therefore be considered as typical of man as man. By it he attains some direct knowledge of the external world as well as of himself. Christian faith supposes the reliability of both senses and intellect under normal conditions, for "faith cometh by hearing," and the message has to be interpreted by a duly authorized teacher.

The reflex arc concept may be applied in a manner entirely consistent with Catholic philosophy and the tenets of the Church, not only to sense-perception, but also to intellection, to the formation of the intellectual

idea. It may be extended beyond the natural order to the supernatural, since it is by the truths of the latter that man is to square his life. It applies to habit as well as to the acts by which the habit is formed; for all habit has at least a remote sensory basis, it must become a second nature, and it must include the attitude of readiness to act. A habit is consequently a state. The Christian character is marked by certain intellectual and moral habits; that is, by virtues. These are expressed outwardly in the Christian life. "For, with the heart we believe unto justice; but, with the mouth, confession is made unto salvation."¹ These acts of virtue in turn react upon the mind, defining more clearly its perception of what the habit really means. In this way it happens that impression and expression, becoming by turns cause and effect, set up that "circular process," which, according to Professor Baldwin's view,² characterizes persistent imitation. The greater the perfection and fervor with which these acts are performed, the more effective is the circular process.

¹ Rom. x, 10.

² He says (*Mental Development*, pp. 24, 25): "The self-repeating or circular type of reaction, to which the name imitation is given, . . . is seen to be fundamental and to remain the same, as far as structure is concerned [?], for all motor activity whatever: the only difference between higher and lower function being, that, in the higher, certain accumulated adaptations have in time so come to overlie the original reaction, that the conscious state which accompanies it seems to differ *per se* from the crude imitative consciousness in which it had its beginning."—This is not quite accurate. Man is a unit, constituted such by his soul. His acts of sensitive consciousness and sense-perception first prepare for and then accompany his intellectual acts, but the latter are not developed out of the former.

Moreover, it is constantly adding to its strength by means of the new material which, in the form of suggestions,¹ the mind is ever gathering from the example of others.²

In the development of the Christian character, and therefore in the formation of the typical novice, habit has a rôle of surpassing importance. It must transform instinctive behavior, and make it the servant or the ally not only of right reason and ethical conduct, but of a life conformed to Christian and religious standards. In the accomplishment of this task there are three successive stages of perfection to be attained according as the essence of the new habit is concerned with the substitution of a new feeling for the old instinctive attitude, or a new response, or a new object for both feeling and response. After the example of his divine Master, the novice must be ready to say: *Behold, I make all things new.*³ As in the reflex arc, the first element is the sensory impression, which is also the indispensable condition of the other two elements, so in the acquisition of Christian virtue, the first requisite is a knowledge of the truths of faith. How the


¹ Professor Baldwin defines "suggestion" (*Mental Development*, pp. 105, 106) as "the tendency of a sensory or an ideal state to be followed by a motor state." Elsewhere (*Feeling and Will*, p. 297) he says it is "typified by the abrupt entrance from without into consciousness of an idea or image, or a vaguely conscious stimulation, which tends to bring about the muscular or volitional effects which ordinarily follow upon its presence."

² See pp. 228 f., above, on the "facilitation" or "reinforcement" of stimuli. Cf. Titchener, *Beginner's Psychology*, pp. 106 ff., 164, 249 ff.

³ Apoc. xxi, 5.

novice is trained to change these truths from subjects of mere study into impelling motives of conduct must now engage our attention. We must study the very process by which he develops his personality and becomes a power for social betterment. Obviously the topic is not without interest to all those who either are or who hope to become worthy teachers of youth. Not so obviously, but none the less truly, does it likewise concern all those to whom the brotherhood of man is not a mere figment of the mind, but a fundamental reality of life.

BOOK IV.
MEDITATION.



CHAPTER VIII.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MEDITATION.

Article I.—The Nature and Matter of Meditation.

MEDITATION is a form of prayer in which the human soul cleaves to God with all its powers, organic and spiritual.¹ It is an oblation to God not only of mind and heart and will, but also of the powers by which the matter for cognition, affection, and resolution is supplied and conserved. Even the forces that guide and strengthen the necessary functions of mere organic life must contribute their share to make the offering complete; since, as Father Faber reminds us, “spiritual strength is very needful for praying well.”² We have said that perception is a process peculiar to man as man. We must now add that mental prayer in some form is a work proper to man as a rational creature. If he be also a Christian, then he is doubly bound to apply himself to meditation; for he has been taught the great truths of which the Catholic Church is the

¹ Cf. St. John Baptist de la Salle, *Explanation of the Method of Mental Prayer*, pp. 1, 2. Father Faber says: “Mental prayer means the occupation of our faculties upon God, not in the way of thinking or speculating about Him, but stirring up the will to conform itself to Him and the affections to love Him.” *Growth in Holiness*, pp. 245, 246.

² *Growth in Holiness*, p. 243.

custodian, and through prayer, which is of divine ordinance, and through the sacraments, which are of divine institution, he receives special help from on high not only to know the truth more perfectly, but also to love it more ardently, and practise it more faithfully.¹ In his life as Christian, therefore, he is daily, nay hourly, called upon to exercise the functions that mark the three great divisions of psychology as the empirical study of the mind.² If he be not only a Christian, but also a novice preparing to assume the obligations and to practise the virtues of the professed religious, then meditation is absolutely indispensable to him; for he must live in a Christian atmosphere, he must habitually look at the circumstances of his life, the situations in which he is placed, from a Christian viewpoint, he must set his affections upon those things that are dear to the heart of Christ. Only thus will he be disposed to follow the example of his divine Master. Moreover, each generous endeavor to walk in the footsteps of his Saviour will give him new insight into His teachings and move him to greater loyalty³ in His service. In

¹ Cf. Father Faber (op. cit., p. 245): "The most serious business of the interior life is mental prayer. . . . Spiritual writers, and even saints, have sometimes spoken as if meditation were almost necessary to salvation. . . . It is, however, quite certain that mental prayer is necessary to perfection, and that there can be nothing like a spiritual life without it."

² Cf. C. A. Dubray, S. M., *Introductory Philosophy*, p. 22.

³ Cf. *Imitation* (Bk. I, Chap. I, 2): "He who would fully and feelingly understand the words of Christ must study to make his whole life conformable to that of Christ." Modern psychology confirms this admonition of St. John Baptist de la Salle (*Collection*, p. 182): "Do not be so much concerned about knowing how

other words, constant striving to approach the Christian ideal sets up a process of persistent imitation, and keeps one in the "way of perfection." It is precisely from this point of view that meditation is of such transcendent importance. It not only conserves the habitual dispositions that mark the Christian life, but it makes them the basis for new "accommodations." In the words of St. Francis de Sales, one of the doctors of the Church:

"Reflection on different subjects, for the purpose of discovering their nature, their causes, effects, and properties, is called study. Our minds then resemble young bees, which being yet unable to make honey, rest indiscriminately upon flowers and leaves to feed on them. When we reflect on divine truths, not precisely to acquire a knowledge of them, but to draw holy affections from them, we meditate. In this exercise of meditation our mind . . . imitates the bees which labor in making honey, by reflecting on divine truths and mysteries, to extract the sweetness of divine love from them. . . . We may then define this exercise of mind to be a thought continued and maintained with a voluntary attention for the purpose of exciting the heart to produce holy affections and form salutary resolutions."¹

Meditation is therefore an exercise which is of interest to the psychologist, since it employs all three of the kinds of process which it is his business to study: viz., cognition, feeling, conation—thought, affection, and deed. It is of interest to the behaviorist also; for the chief purpose of the thought in which the mind is then engaged is to excite the feelings and emotions,

to do things perfectly as about doing them as perfectly as you know how; for, by doing them as well as you know how, you deserve to learn and to know that which you do not yet know."

¹ *A Treatise on the Love of God* (O'Shea's ed.), pp. 260, 261.

especially an ardent desire to acquire the special good which one needs most and to shun the special evil into which one is most exposed, or disposed, to fall. This desire is the great moving force in effecting the fervent amendment of one's life.¹ In the words of Professor Angell, already quoted: "What we really *desire* is the best possible index of the sort of character one really possesses."² Meditation has at least one line of connection with the work of the experimental psychologist; for it is pre-eminently a reaction experiment.³ Finally, it is a practice whose value the sociologist cannot afford to ignore, since it is one of the principal means by which the Christian spirit is fostered and strengthened in the individual. It is therefore one of the chief sources of peaceful social intercourse, one of the strong supports of all co-operation that aims at the highest good of the race.⁴

We have just asserted that meditation is a reaction experiment, and such it really is. For it is a series of movements made in response to an external stimulus.⁵ The stimulus is divine grace, the intimate touch of the very spirit of God Himself. The movements are the thoughts, the affections, and the resolutions freely and fervently made under the impulse of this grace. Like

¹ The *Imitation* (Bk. I, Chap. XXV, 6) emphasizes the importance of the *resolution* taken by the religious.

² *Psychology*, p. 433.

³ Cf. above, pp. 216, note 3, and 268, note 1.

⁴ For aspects of meditation that concern the teacher, see above, pp. 56-58 and below, Art. III, p. 300.

⁵ Cf. Titchener, *Text-book*, p. 428.

all reaction experiments, it demands careful preparation on the part of the reactor to dispose him to react properly.¹ This preparation is both external and internal. Externally it consists, first, in the removal of distracting stimuli or in withdrawal from their influence. This is the negative phase. Under this head also belong both silence² and solitude, whether actual or virtual. In the practice of both these means the "Fathers of the Desert" have been the great exemplars for all succeeding ages of religious. External preparation likewise includes, as a corollary of silence and solitude, the shunning of all distracting occupations that are not dictated by duty or intelligent charity. On the other hand, external preparation has a positive phase, which consists in attention to the holy presence of God. For in prayer the soul holds converse with its Maker. This attention is voluntary and deliberate.³

¹ On the history and technique of the reaction experiment, cf. Titchener, *Experimental Psychology*, II, i (1905), pp. 141 ff; ii, pp. 326 ff., 356 ff.; in briefer outline, *Beginner's Psychology*, pp. 236-242.

² It is worthy of note that "silence" retains its Latin signification of refraining from unnecessary noise, as contrasted with taciturnity or the mere refraining from speech.

³ See above, pp. 54, 214, n. 4, 238, 256, n. 1. According to Titchener (*Text-book*, pp. 271-273), primary or passive or involuntary attention is rooted in biological conditions. Stimulated as it is by novelty and suddenness and movement, "these have a special biological meaning, for the new and the sudden and the moving are probable sources of danger, and the creature that failed to attend to them would soon have ceased to exist." On the other hand, "secondary attention is a consequence of a complicated nervous organization," capable of being acted on by two or more stimuli at the same time. . . . "There is yet a third stage in the development of attention; and this consists in nothing

When the novice makes regular and frequent and fervent acts of attention (all three qualities are requisite)¹ he lays the foundations for a habit of attention. The habit may even start from ejaculatory prayer made at short intervals if the words be said slowly and feelingly. From this humble and semi-vocal beginning may be developed that interest and absorption in divine things which marks the third and crowning stage in the development of attention.² Thus the "habit" of ejaculatory prayer becomes the basis for "accommodation" to a higher level of prayer, whose special characteristic is "derived primary" attention to the things of God. When this is supplemented by that form of "selective attention" which habitually seeks out the Christian aspects of environment, both physical and social, it becomes the "spirit of faith," the distinguishing trait of the deeply Christian life. "The just man liveth by faith."³ Since this spirit of faith is the very soul of

else than a relapse into primary attention" (due to increasing interest and absorption in the work). Difficulties gradually disappear and distraction dies away. "There could hardly be a stronger proof of the growth of secondary out of primary attention than this fact, of everyday experience, that secondary attention is continually reverting to the primary form." Hence he calls the third stage "derived primary" attention. Cf. *Beginner's Psychology*, Chap. IV.

¹ See p. 267, above, for a brief statement of Professor Baldwin's principle of "accommodation" as a factor in improvement upon "habit."

² Here too the laws of habit building and the methods of acquiring habits that modify instinctive action (in this case, instinctive, or passive, attention) are to be applied. See above, pp. 250-255, 260-271.

³ Heb. x, 38.

the religious vocation, it must find expression. This it does, according to St. John Baptist de la Salle, in three distinct ways, the first of which has to do with the environment of the Christian and religious, while the other two have to do with his experience either as an agent, or as affected by the action of other agents—*i. e.*, they apply to his active or to his passive experience.¹ Now the exercise of the spirit of faith indicates a high degree of internal preparation for the making of mental prayer. It thus appears that careful attention to the requisites of external, or objective, preparation will lead insensibly to the realization of the internal, or subjective, conditions of meditation.

But this result cannot be accomplished without inhibition, without the exercise of that “activity of the higher centers in the nervous system that checks, represses, and holds in control some of the activities of the lower centers.”² In the spiritual life this inhibition is known as mortification, and comprises more particularly mortification of the senses and of the intellect. It consists essentially in the cutting off, first, of such gratifications of sense and of intellect as injure the spiritual life and put obstacles in the way of meditation; and then, of such as substitute a lower good, from the viewpoint of faith, for a higher one.³ “If any man

¹ There are three “effects which the spirit of faith produces in those possessing it”: “first, to regard everything with the eyes of faith; second, to do nothing but with a view to God; third, to attribute all to God.” *Collection*, p. 53, ed. 1890.

² Colvin and Bagley, *Human Behavior*, p. 124.

³ For analogy, cf. Angell, *Psychology*, p. 69, “Inhibition of Useless Movements.”

will come after Me," says Christ, "let him deny himself." ¹

There is still another requisite which must be included as part of the remote and habitual preparation for meditation. It is humility. For it is in and through meditation that the soul really "learns" the great truths of religion. In the lower forms of organic life plasticity is a correlate of environmental influence. In the pupil this disposition to be guided and instructed by the teacher is known as docility, the quality of "teachableness." In the Christian it is the virtue of humility, the great lesson which his divine Teacher formally enjoins upon him as Christian.² If we accept St. Teresa's definition of humility as "truth," and consider in the light of that truth the absolute dependence of the creature on the Creator, then we may see that this attitude is akin to the sincerity, the honesty which should actuate every scientist in his observations and experiments.

Three things, then, are essential constituents of the remote preparation for mental prayer: 1, the removal of distracting stimuli or withdrawal from their influence (this is what ascetic writers call "detachment from creatures"); 2, application to the presence of God (mortification, or self-discipline, is an indispensable means to attain both these results); and 3, humility, the one quality that specially befits the intelligent creature as such when in presence of its Creator—the

¹ Matt. xvi, 24.

² Matt. xi, 29.

virtue ignored and desecrated in their fall by both Lucifer and Adam,¹ the correlate in the supernatural order of plasticity in the order of nature. "For God resisteth the proud, but to the humble he giveth grace."²

Besides the remote preparation for meditation,—a preparation that is really a phase of "habit,"—there is a proximate preparation by which the novice "accommodates" himself to the requirements of this spiritual exercise. It consists in preparing over-night the principal points of the meditation, in foreseeing the fruit to be gathered from it, the obstacles thereto, especially such as may arise from one's predominant fault or "ruling passion," and finally in exciting in the heart a fervent desire to profit to the full from this prayer on the morrow. This is the first half of the proximate preparation. It has a value for the novice which he is likely to overlook and which, nevertheless, has been conclusively demonstrated by psychological

¹ Although the order is different, the substance is the same as that given by St. Teresa (*Way of Perfection*, tr. J. Dalton, pp. 23 ff.): 1. fraternal charity, 2. disengagement from creatures, 3. humility. "More admirably sufficient means from the psychological point of view could hardly have been devised," says Anna Louise Strong (*The Psychology of Prayer*, pp. 67, 68). "First, create a need for companionship by emphasizing the social nature of self; second, deprive this need of its usual satisfaction, that all the energy of desire may go into the outlet that is allowed. Third, determine the outlet which this companion-seeking shall take by assuming an attitude of mind which could only admit as alter [in the Latin sense of the term] a self great enough to inspire humility."

² 1 Pet. v, 5.

experiments. Professor Titchener reminds us¹ that "schoolboys, with a keen sense for economy of effort, learn their lessons only partway overnight, and find that a hasty review next morning is enough to fix them; the associative tendencies work while their owners sleep." But the novice does not limit his preparation to the night before. He renews it in the morning, keeping his mind intent upon it until the time for prayer has come. This is the second half of the proximate preparation. He thereby secures for himself all the associative benefit which the schoolboy derives from his method of study and in addition such an increase in the depth and the number of associations as is guaranteed to him by his greater interest and higher purpose in meditation.²

To these two preparations which stimulate so powerfully the "habit" of Christian faith, St. de la Salle added for his Brothers a third, or immediate, preparation, which, as its name indicates, so directly precedes the mental prayer as to be virtually an integral part of it. He was moved to do this both from his own experience of the difficulties and distractions that beset the teacher's life, and from his careful study of the

¹ *Beginner's Psychology*, p. 158; cf. *Text-book*, p. 387. Both texts discuss the results of experiments in "association."

² Father Faber says that what we have called the "proximate" preparation is "concerned with three times, the time when the subject of prayer is given overnight, the time which elapses between then and the waking in the morning, and the third is from our waking to our beginning of our prayer. The first requires attention; the second a review of the subject and a strict silence; and the third the affections of love and joy wherewith we should approach prayer" (op. cit., p. 257).

results attained by the first Brothers. This preparation he divided into three groups of three acts each: the first group, referring to God and exercising the spirit of faith; the second group, concerning the religious and disposing him to greater humility; the last group, relating to our Lord, and tending to inspire confidence in His merits.¹ These acts are therefore a kind of intensive epitome of the dispositions that are requisite for the remote preparation.

Article II.—Constituent Elements of Meditation.

Father Faber assures us that,² “there can be nothing like a spiritual life” without mental prayer. The novitiate is the training school for a special form of the spiritual life. The novitiate must therefore aim to make the aspirants for the religious life proficient in mental prayer. In view thereof it teaches the novice that prayer, and in particular, meditation, is a sacramental; that, after the analogy of the sacraments, it consists of matter and form, or “body” and “soul”; that the remote matter of mental prayer consists in cognitions, feelings, conations, the general subject-matter of psychology; that the proximate matter consists of such thoughts, affections and resolutions as refer to a given mystery of religion, or to a Christian and religious virtue, or to a Gospel maxim. These

¹ The first group includes acts of faith, adoration and thanksgiving; the second, acts of humility, confusion and contrition; the third, acts applying Christ's merits, seeking union with Him and invoking His Spirit. (*Collection*, pp. 24-27.)

² *Growth in Holiness*, p. 245.

thoughts, affections, and resolutions possess a kind of unity arising in part from the subject of meditation itself around which they cluster; in part also from their psychological relationship, since the resolution is prompted by the affections,¹ and these in turn spring from reflection on the mystery, or virtue, or maxim. The absolutely indispensable unifying principle, however, is the form or "soul" of the meditation, viz., the Spirit of God, who is invoked at the close of the immediate preparation.²

¹ Motives are ideas that stir us to desire, to resolve, and to act. Their "driving power" is due not only to their objective value, but also, and even to a greater extent, to the dispositions of the agent here and now. The *one* great purpose of mental prayer is to suggest, reinforce, and assure right "motivation." In this lies the whole secret of spiritual progress. The subjective "pull" or "push" of the motive, from the viewpoint of the natural order, will be determined in part by the personal equation of the agent ("habit"), in part by his present disposition—*i. e.*, by apperception ("accommodation"). Cf. pp. 55 f., 82, above.

² The method adopted by St. de la Salle with a special eye to the difficulties and advantages of religious teachers is a modification of the Sulpician method. Father Faber believes that all other methods may be reduced either to this or to the Ignatian method. (*Growth in Holiness*, p. 247. On the differences between the two, see pp. 248-262.) He holds that the Sulpician method draws its inspiration and fruitfulness from the older traditions—in other words, from the very traditions that St. Philip Neri, "the apostle of Rome," the founder of the Oratory, looked upon as so vital a factor in developing the Christian life in his own day. If the method of mental prayer helps to form a special religious type, we should expect that in the case of the Jesuits and the Christian Brothers, for example, however closely their pupils might be respectively graded in their studies, however much grades might be duplicated, yet each group would bear the stamp of a different Christian type. Each group order makes a different spiritual appeal. "These two methods of prayer are both of them most holy, even though they are so different. There is a different spirit in them, and they tend to form different characters. But

Having glanced at the constituent elements of mental prayer, we may now look to the integral parts of the "body" of prayer, since it is only the body that is directly within the control of the novice. After the analogy of the human body, which we may divide into head, trunk, and members, we may distinguish the integral parts of the meditation as the considerations, the affections, and the resolutions.¹ It is in the considerations that the novice is especially called upon to exercise attention, usually secondary or voluntary attention. Here also he utilizes the ideas and principles which he has drawn from his spiritual readings, from the instructions of his superiors, and from the example of his companions. Here, too, shines out conspicuously the worth of careful preparation, for the special trait of attention is "clearness."² The vague, the obscure, the indefinite, cannot excite emotion and urge on to action.³ Hence the novice is counseled to make the particular examen⁴ an efficacious means for the carrying out of the resolutions which he makes in meditation.

they cannot be set one against the other. They are both from one Spirit, even the Holy Ghost, and each will find the hearts to which they are sent. Happy is the man who is a faithful disciple of either!" (Faber, *op. cit.*, p. 262.) Cf. Newman, *Sermons on Various Occasions*, pp. 224, 227, 242.

¹ When the subject is a mystery, one is often helped by picturing the scene, and even, after the fashion of the great Catholic painters, by introducing oneself into the scene. A like practice may be followed for the virtues and the maxims, if our Lord be pictured as practising the virtue or teaching the maxim.

² Cf. Titchener, *Text-book*, pp. 278 ff. See also above, p. 56.

³ Cf. 1 Cor. xiv, 7-9.

⁴ See above, pp. 50-53.

The matter which the novice utilizes in making the "considerations" in his meditation comes from his own experience. As we have already seen, "experience" is, according to Professor Wundt, the subject-matter of psychology;¹ according to Professor Dewey, the determinant of both curriculum and method in the school-room;² according to many pragmatists,³ the basis of truth and the criterion of morality. It is well then to look more closely into the characteristic traits of that "experience" which the novice brings to his meditation. These have been described by the philosopher, Léon Ollé-Laprune not only with great "clearness of thought and lucidity of expression,"⁴ but also with a penetrating insight into their relations to faith.

"Everything," he says, "begins with experience, although experience itself neither is everything nor contains in itself the reason of things. Everything begins with experience, because all reality is *given* to us before we can make it the object of speculative thought,"⁵ and all reality is given to us just as it is in its inmost nature, viz., active and in action. We are subject to the action of real objects, and, since we are real ourselves, we act upon them. In the

¹ See p. 207.

² Cf. *Studies in Logical Theory*; also "Curriculum," "Method," "Philosophy of Education," in Monroe's *Cyclopedia of Education*.

³ Cf. W. James, *The Meaning of Truth*.

⁴ Father Driscoll (op. cit., pp. 247, 248) insists that owing to his pronounced lack of these two qualities Henri Bergson is not a French philosopher, but only a philosopher who writes in French. —Ollé-Laprune, on the other hand, not only had a firm grasp on the subjects on which he lectured, but he was an exemplary Catholic as well. He has been called "the greatest Catholic layman who has appeared in France since Ozanam."

⁵ This is but another form of Aristotle's dictum, "There is nothing in the intellect that has not been in some way in the senses." Cf. p. 119, above.

one case as in the other, there is experience. To have experience of anything is to test it, to receive its action, or to feel some of its effects. But we also experience what we do ourselves. Moreover, is not the very act of making a trial of anything a kind of experiment in which we put our powers to the test and thereby become intimately acquainted with what we really are? Experience is, therefore, the first condition of every intellectual act, because experience is the point of contact where objects and the soul meet. . . . To pretend to certitude and yet take no account of actual experience is equivalent to willing that man be other than he actually is. . . .

"Imagination is bound up with experience. . . . Of the soul as a principle of action, and of action itself taken in its own intrinsic nature . . . no representation is possible; for how can we really imagine what is simple? What we do experience momentarily in ourselves is a multiple and diverse life, a series of spiritual movements, so to say—a ceaseless diversity in the very continuity of existence. Hence it is that imagination is always associated with consciousness and memory. Ever present to ourselves and, in a sense, present also to our past and even to our future, we, on the one hand, recall what we have experienced or done, and, on the other, we feel that we are capable of enduring or of producing a thousand like events. Thus it comes to pass that we continually have in our minds a more or less distinct image of our interior life. We are thus enabled to unite to the conception of truths that are wholly speculative, the living image of our personal experiences.¹ On every side, therefore, we meet with that reality without which there can be no certainty for us. . . .

"Every truth of the moral order is first of all an object of experience, in the sense that it is first received in a *fact* or event that may properly and expressly be called *practice*. . . . Every

¹ Cf. Chaps. XXI, XXII, *Combattimento Spirituale* (the Spiritual Combat). This excellent little book written by the pious Theatine priest, Lorenzo Scupoli, in the sixteenth century, was for over eighteen years the constant companion of St. Francis de Sales, who drew from its pages the principles by which he was guided in his direction of souls. The book, because of its practical character, forms an admirable complement to Thomas à Kempis' *Imitation*. Cf. Bp. Camus, *Spirit of St. Francis de Sales*, p. 92.

injunction that has the character of obligation moves us and solicits us to act. Our will then either submits to the command or resists it. Were it apparently to remain indifferent, it would even then elicit an act of self-determination, for it would follow a particular mode of resistance. Thus it is that in every practical event there is an influence exercised upon us by the irresistible power of conscience, and that varying degrees of action are always emanating from us in response to the appeal addressed to us."¹

In the view of St. de la Salle, the Sulpician method of meditation was specially adapted not only to foster the spirit of prayer in his own Brothers, but also through them to keep it active in the breasts of their pupils. It is, in fact, this general plan that his disciples follow not only in teaching catechism to their classes, but even in making the morning reflections in the schoolroom on the great truths of religion and on the Gospel maxims of conduct, by which they seek to excite their pupils both to say the beads well and to form practical resolutions for their conduct throughout the day.^{2 3} It is opportune, then, to cite a page

¹ *De la Certitude Morale*, pp. 28-34. Cf. H. Joly, *Psychologie des Saints*, Chaps. IV, V.

² This is, of course, an illustration of the "social" value of meditation, but it has a place here. Other illustrations are found in the ever-increasing number of persons who flocked to the great Christian solitaries—some to beg prayers and receive advice, others to be enrolled as disciples.—Should we not look here for the source of that loyalty to the Brothers of the Christian Schools that marks the typical "Brother's boy," and that is summed up in saying, "Once a Brother's boy, always a Brother's boy"?

³ That the catechism lesson and the class "reflection" are examples of applied meditation will be evident to any one who reads attentively even the Table of Contents of the *Catechist's Manual*. In nearly every chapter he will find abundant confirmation of this fact. See also the "Model Catechisms," pp. 201-237.

from Father Faber¹ on the "body" of this form of prayer, in which the novice utilizes so many psychic "processes," and by which he "learns" the "habit" of prayer. If he is faithful to the practice, his daily meditations become both a cause and an effect of that spirit of faith which is the very heart of his calling. He, therefore, comes to realize in his own daily practice and in the supernatural order that "circular process" of "persistent imitation" which Professor Baldwin considers essential for the mental development of the individual.²

"It is in the body of the prayer that its chief characteristics are to be found. It consists, as the Ignatian does, of three points [but they are developed in another way than that followed by the Ignatian method]; the first is called adoration, the second communion, and the third co-operation. In the first we adore, praise, love and thank God. In the second we try to transfer to our own hearts what we have been praising and loving in God, and to participate in its virtue according to our measure. In the third we co-operate with the grace we are receiving by fervent colloquies and generous resolutions. The ancient fathers have handed down to us this method of prayer as in itself a perfect compendium of Christian perfection. They call it having Jesus before their eyes, which is the adoration; Jesus in their hearts, which is the communion; and Jesus in their hands, which is the co-operation: and in these three things all the Christian life consists."³

¹ Op. cit., p. 258.

² See above, p. 52. Cf. Baldwin (*Mental Development*, p. 133): "The essential thing, then, in imitation over and above simple ideomotor suggestion is that *the stimulus starts a motor process which tends to reproduce the stimulus and, through it, the motor process again*. From the physiological side we have a circular activity—sensor, motor; sensor, motor; and from the psychological side we have a similar circle—reality, image, movement; reality, image, movement."

³ Since these are the views of the "ancient fathers," the "reflex arc concept" is very old indeed. See also above, pp. 56, 57.

The novice confirms his resolutions by uniting his dispositions with those of his divine Teacher and Model in the performance of the mystery, or the practice of the virtue or the maxim which has been the subject of meditation, begging the special grace or spirit of the mystery or virtue or maxim from God Himself, and asking the intercession both of those saints who excelled in this spirit and of those who are specially interested in his own religious progress.¹ These petitions are well adapted to increase the humble confidence which St. Teresa considers an essential condition of advancing in the way of perfection.² He concludes his meditation by a summary review, followed by three special acts. In the first, he thanks God for the favors received during this time of prayer. He thereby produces in the supernatural order a state of soul analogous to that of intensified interest in the subject and increased attention to it on the plane of purely natural psychology, a psychic condition which is often attended on the physiological side by a "heightened discharge" of nerve currents. The act of thanksgiving may be followed by an entire oblation to God of the meditation and of all one's thoughts, desires, words, and deeds of the day; for it is the holocaust which the novice owes to his Lord and Master. Just as gratitude disposes the religious to profit more fully by favors

¹ Here again one of the "social" aspects of faith appears.

² Cf. Faber (op. cit., p. 31): "St. Teresa says humility is the first requisite for those who wish to lead an ordinarily good life; but that courage is the first requisite for those who aim at any degree of perfection."

from on high, since it increases, so to say, his spiritual "plasticity," so the act of offering inclines God to be generous to him who gives his whole heart.¹ Last of all, the meditation is placed in the hands of our Blessed Lady, whom Scripture presents to us as a perfect model of prayer² and as an advocate having transcendent power over the heart of her divine Son.³

Such, then, briefly is in outline one of the oldest forms of meditation in use in the Catholic Church. In its essential features it led to heights of spirituality not only the great hermits of the desert, not only the throngs of cenobites who followed close upon them, but great doctors of the early Church, like Augustine and Jerome, Gregory and Basil, Athanasius and John Chrysostom. It developed that type of Christian heroism which St. Philip Neri, one of the modern saints, engaged in "modern" educational work, longed to emulate.⁴ It is manifest, then, that mental prayer is one of the greatest agencies for spiritual progress which the novice has in his power. But to justify more fully the attention given here to the subject, it is now in order to ask whether it has also any pedagogical value as such.

¹ Thus the psalmist sings (Ps. cvi, 8, 9): "Let the mercies of the Lord give glory to Him: and His wonderful works to the children of men. For He hath satisfied the empty soul, and hath filled the hungry soul with good things."—Cf. Faber, *op. cit.*, pp. 75 ff.

² Luke ii, 19.

³ Luke, i, 38; John ii, 1-11.

⁴ For indications of the characteristic features of other forms of meditation, see Faber, *op. cit.*, Chap. XV, especially pp. 248-265.

Article III.—The Pedagogical Value of Meditation.

In his instructions to his Brothers, St. John Baptist de la Salle tells ¹ them to hold mental prayer in great esteem. For this attitude of mind he assigns two reasons: one of which appeals to all Christians as such, since meditation is the "foundation and support of all virtues;" the other, to his own disciples, since mental prayer is the source of the light and grace that they need. Lest he be misunderstood, he is careful to specify that meditation is the source of the light and grace needed not only for personal sanctification, but also for the fulfillments of one's duties. On first reading, even on second or third or tenth reading, the statement seems extravagant. Even when grace is interpreted as signifying supernatural help only (and this is manifestly his meaning), and as necessarily implying the natural order which it perfects, the words are such as to give one pause.² Yet de la Salle had intimate experience, not only of the difficulties of teachers as a class, but also of the trials of the gifted and the mediocre, of the fervent and the lukewarm. He was not a man to make rash statements. With a view then to explain certain principles of education, it is eminently proper to take this page not from his life only, but from the history of education, wherein he also occupies a place that is not without importance.

I. (a) In order to form some appreciation of its

¹ *Recueil de différents petits traités à l'usage des Frères des Ecoles Chrétiennes* (ed. 1902), pp. 123, 124. (Eng. tr. *Collection of Short Treatises* (ed. 1890), pp. 96, 97; (ed. 1906), p. 124).

² The French text says "toutes les grâces."

pedagogical value, it is well to consider meditation from two points of view: (1) that of method; (2) that of elements. Both may be regarded as aspects of the principle known as the "transfer of training."¹ In its technical sense, transfer of training is "the ability to use in one act the elements used in another act."² As regards the method of mental prayer, we have distinguished the period of preparation from that occupied by the meditation itself. Furthermore, we have noted three stages in the very process of preparation. In these respects, as well as in its elements, meditation is akin to "study."

(1) It is admitted by leaders in educational psychology that the student who has gained the "concept of method" by the right pursuit of one subject will to that extent be benefited when applying himself to another subject where a like method is to be used.³ What, then, is common to the method of meditation and the method of study? Study has been defined as "the vigorous application of the mind to a subject for the satisfaction of a felt need."⁴ This, and

¹ Transfer of training is an offshoot of the perennial discussion of "formal discipline." A good examination of the pros and cons of the value of such discipline may be found in W. C. Ruediger's *Principles of Education*, pp. 76-116, 156, 157, 163. Cf. above, p. 212, note 1.

² Fracker, *University of Iowa Studies in Psychology*, June, 1908, p. 85.

³ Cf. W. C. Ruediger, op. cit., pp. 113 ff.; E. L. Thorndike, *Principles of Teaching*, pp. 243 ff., who speaks of this as "identity of procedure."

⁴ F. McMurry, *How to Study and Teaching How to Study*, p. 283.

much more is meditation, which, when rightly conducted, helps us to "feel" the need and to foresee the means both of supplying the need and overcoming the obstacles that may arise thereto. It includes that "higher meaning" of study, which, according to Miss L. B. Earhart,¹ is "mental activity directed toward the assimilation of ideas, the reorganization of experience." As we have already seen, the whole purpose of meditation is to "assimilate" the fundamental ideas of the Christian religion so thoroughly as to make them the directing and controlling factors of one's whole life. There is, therefore, sufficient warrant for assuming, if not "identity of procedure," at least similarity of method,² between what is to-day held to be the proper method of study and the formal ways, or "methods," of meditation which the Catholic Church approves.³ A closer relation is found to exist between

¹ *Systematic Study in Elementary Schools*, p. 11.

² Cf. W. H. Heck (*Mental Discipline and Educational Values*, pp. 94-100): "A general benefit can be derived from specific training in so far as the person trained has consciously wrought out, in connection with the specific training, a general concept of method, based upon the specific method used in that training. The building of such a concept follows the same laws as does the building of other concepts. . . . As the general concept of method can be used for guidance in several activities, it can be considered a common, transferable element in them all; but this common element, this connecting link, is one of knowledge of how to do, not of ability to do. . . . Therefore, it is well to urge a careful, systematic procedure both in specific training and in the formation of general concepts of method."

³ In its strict and proper sense, "studying" is held to be not *psychological* merely, as involving the employment of mental processes, but *logical* also, as involving "a thought-situation or problem, and thinking which is influenced by the nature of such a sit-

study and meditation when we examine the "factors of logical study."¹ The first of these is the recognition of a "problem." Every meditation which the novice makes presupposes such a problem. How, he asks, am I to correct what has been amiss in my conduct? how supply what has been lacking? The example of Christ and of His saints supplies an ideal to be reproduced, and therefore presents a problem to be solved; viz., How, on the one hand, am I to remove the obstacle to the realization of this ideal in myself; and, on the other, how am I to secure and to apply the means requisite to attain my ideal? These very questions show the connection between meditation and the second factor in logical study, viz., the "gathering of data bearing on the problem." They also imply the third factor, viz., the "organization of this material into groups of related ideas." As to the fourth factor, "the exercise of scientific doubt," or judging of the soundness of statements, there would at first seem to be less resemblance between meditation and study; yet this is not really the case, for the novice has to test his tentative resolutions by the standard of the Gospel precepts, counsels and maxims. In so doing, he proceeds to utilize the fifth factor, the "verifying of conclusions," appealing to the practice of the saints in like circumstances. The sixth factor, the "fixing of knowledge by thoughtful memorizing" is replaced in meditation by

uation" (L. B. Earhart, op. cit., p. 6). Paul Klapper, in *Principles of Educational Practice* (pp. 363-372), presents much useful and practical material. Cf. also p. 301, above.

¹ Cf. L. B. Earhart, op. cit., pp. 21, 22.

the gathering of what is called a "spiritual bouquet," viz., a saying of our Lord or one of the saints, or a prayer, which concentrates the essence of the meditation, especially on its affective or emotional side, and thus stimulates the novice to live up to the ideal presented in the meditation. What is presented as the seventh and last factor of logical study, viz., the "preservation of one's individuality throughout the process," is rather in meditation an essential condition of mental prayer itself; for, as we have seen, the very purpose of the mental prayer is the spiritual progress of the novice. Hence the processes of meditation tend to be essentially concrete, and the resolutions must be present, particular, and efficacious,—the desiderandum and desideratum of every serious study on the part of the earnest student, and, from the viewpoint of the teacher, of every fruitful recitation.

(2) As to their elements, there is also much in common between meditation and study. In both, there must be clear apprehension of the leading thoughts, earnest appeal to the nobler and deeper interests of man, and confirmation of both in one's attitude toward life and one's efforts to live up to ideals.

I. (b) Meditation has also points of contact with the method of recitation made familiar by the disciples of Herbart.¹ This method has five steps or stages. The first is preparation.² Its very name suggests an

¹ H. Suzzallo, "Steps, Five Formal," in Monroe's *Cyclopedia of Education*.

² Cf. C. A. McMurtry, *The Method of the Recitation*, pp. 92-117.

affinity to meditation. The teacher prepares his lesson for his class. The novice prepares to "recite his lesson" to his divine Master. The second stage consists in the presentation of new matter. Here the skill of the teacher is called into active play, for he can "present" matter that is new for the pupils only in so far as he associates it intimately with what is already old and familiar to them. He must solve a problem in apperception. But the novice must perform a like process. He must study the old truth with new vision, from a higher vantage point, with renewed interest; else he will find his affections dormant and his resolutions weak. The third step is known as comparison and abstraction. The teacher might, for example, compare the life processes of several plants with those of typical animals and then "abstract" the processes common to all organic life. In like manner, the novice compares his conduct with reference to the virtue of faith with that of the apostles, with that of the doctors of the Church, with that of his own founder, and then deduces the attitude becoming to him as Christian and religious. The fourth step the Herbartians call "generalization." It puts forth explicitly what is given implicitly by the very process of abstraction. For the novice it means that when he is placed in circumstances like those wherein our Lord specially commanded the exercise of faith, or like those wherein the saints practised faith so meritoriously, he is thenceforth to heed the divine behest, to emulate the example of his great spiritual predecessors. The last step, "application,"

corresponds, in the method of recitation, to the resolutions of the meditation.

Lest these steps be considered too formal by the dynamic teacher, the Herbartians are careful to remind us that their order is not fixed, nor is it invariably essential to include them all. They are means to an end; that is, to the thorough assimilation of the principle or truth to be taught. In like manner, the novice learns that the sequence of acts or affections in his meditation is a suggestive plan rather than a mandatory order; that the good religious, like the skilled teacher, must have in mind a definite outline of what he is to do, and yet keep it so flexible as to be always free to follow a better suggestion or to "accommodate" himself to the spiritual requirements of the actual situation.¹

II. We have given indications of the fact that, when sedulously followed, the method of meditation will give the novice an accredited plan of procedure for his own studies² and a pattern which he may pre-

¹ Besides its connection with the method of study and the method of recitation, the method of meditation is allied to the general methods or "types" of teaching (Cf. L. B. Earhart, *Types of Teaching*, passim). As we have already hinted meditation presents an effective plan for teaching a live catechism lesson, for making class reflections that "count"; in general, for giving such a lesson as is really worth while.

² The works on study by Professor C. A. McMurry and Dr. L. B. Earhart, already cited, grew out of their investigations into pupils' method of study. Both discovered that the method was conspicuous by its absence. Further investigation revealed the more astonishing fact that even the pupils' teachers had no definite method of study—another verification of the old saying, "Such a pupil, such a teacher."

sent to his future pupils in order to assure to them the priceless boon of a right method of study. It will further equip him with the broad outlines of a good plan to follow in conducting recitations in class, and, better still, with the contour of a flexible pattern or type of teaching, which is applicable to many subjects. The pedagogical value of the meditation does not end even here. In its three elements, viz., the considerations, the affections, and the resolutions, it is, indeed, one of the higher illustrations of the reflex arc concept. The considerations correspond to the "incoming impression"; the affections, to the "middle term"; the resolutions, to the "outgoing discharge."¹ Meditation, therefore, includes the three staples which the pupil should be trained to look for in all his studies; the three ingredients which the teacher should blend in every lesson which he wishes to make fruitful for his class.

Systematic preparation for meditation will develop in the novice a habit of logical thinking, which the right use of the considerations will easily strengthen. The sincere and intelligent desire to profit by the meditation will give him a practical exercise in motivation, extending its efficacy not only to the preparation, but also the actual conduct of the prayer itself. Furthermore, he can by attention and diligence cultivate the habit of "associating" considerations, reasonings and even impressions, with the affections, and these in turn with the Christian attitude toward life and with that readiness to give expression to his convictions which are

¹ Cf. p. 230, above.

indispensable for true progress. In a word, then, the diligent and faithful preparation and performance of mental prayer are fraught with precious benefits to the novice from the pedagogical viewpoint and in the merely natural order. By analogy one may argue to the supernatural order. In addition to these values, there is one of social import. The more earnest the novice is in the fulfilment of this duty to God, the better is he equipped to emphasize spontaneously, effectually, and by the force of his own example, those Christian values to the appreciation of which it is at once his duty and his privilege to train his pupils. Can we doubt, then, that meditation rightly and faithfully pursued is a prominent factor in developing some of the special qualities of which the teacher stands in need? Can we not see here also some explanation of the fact to which Dr. Foerster¹ has called attention, that religious orders develop great efficiency in persons of even mediocre talent?

In respect, then, to both method and content, to both form and matter, meditation is capable of diffusing its excellence far beyond its own immediate sphere into that of subjects having either a like method or similar matter,—or, to adopt Professor Thorndike's terminology,² having "identity of procedure" or "identity of substance." To these two classes of subjects affected by transfer of training, Professor Rued-

¹ Cf. *Marriage and the Sex Problem*, footnote pp. 142, 143, quoted above, pp. 142, 143.

² Loc. cit.

iger adds a third, where the subjects have "identity of aim."¹ From this viewpoint, the utility of meditation may be extended to every occupation of the novice, to every branch which as a religious he may later be called upon to teach. For, as the one great purpose of the Christian life is to grow into more perfect resemblance to Christ Himself, so the dominant aim of the religious educator whether in studying or in teaching is to gain or to impart a clearer vision of the Christian ideal and of the place occupied by creatures in the attainment of that ideal.²

Article IV.—Summary.

After a general survey of the subject-matter of psychology, we selected perception as a typical human process. We found that in adult life it includes not only the cognitive elements of sensation, imagination, memory, and even intellect, but also affective elements that cluster round interest. When denominated apperception, perception plainly entails an attitude toward things and therefore implies the third division of mental processes, viz., conations. The consideration of perception led naturally to that of "learning" with special reference to its physiological basis. Learning itself, when reduced to its simplest terms, implies the "reflex arc," and even in its highest estate presupposes the law of "habit." One of the important functions of habit in any adequate plan of education is to modify

¹ Op. cit., p. 110.

² Cf. E. J. Swift, *Youth and the Race*, p. 126.

and control instinctive action. The purpose of the novitiate is to develop in the novice an "apperceptive mass" in and by which he will regard the occurrences and the duties of life from the viewpoint of faith. This is an attitude he must learn to make habitual, and, in the process, he constantly attains to a higher expression of the reflex arc concept. The chief means by which the novice learns to make the viewpoint of faith habitual, is meditation, an exercise which exemplifies in an excellent way the three elements of the reflex arc. By virtue of the principle known as the transfer of training he can extend beyond its own proper limits the benefits accruing from the faithful and habitual practice of mental prayer. He can make the method of mental prayer doubly valuable, viz., from the pupils' viewpoint, as suggesting a plan of study to follow,¹ and from the teacher's, as outlining a plan for conducting a recitation. The matter, or content, of medi-

¹ Dr. Shields, Lesson II, in his *Psychology of Education*, enumerates nine steps in "the Art of Study": 1. Reflect on the title of the lesson; write out a brief forecast of what it should contain. 2. Read the text carefully; compare it step by step with your forecast. 3. Write out brief *index titles* to the main thoughts in the lesson, observing the order of the text. 4. Arrange these index titles in the form of a diagram to show their logical connection. 5. If there be review questions, write out answers to them. 6. If collateral reading is indicated, take it up in the order suggested. (This will promote general development along the line of the text and restore symmetry of mind). 7. Discuss the subject with others *who have studied it*. (This is the "seminar" method.) 8. Write out answers to any research questions that may be suggested. 9. Note down the unsolved problems suggested by the study. If they be numerous, the study has been effectual.—It is easy to see that the first four of these steps are closely related to the "preparation" for meditation.

tation contains the three kinds of process implied in the reflex arc concept and is therefore an illustration of the thorough assimilation by the mind of a fact or principle. Lastly, the excellence of the aim of meditation suggests to the novice the ideal which he is to keep before him in all his actions and which later he is to propose to his pupils.

BOOK V.

SOCIOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF FAITH.

CHAPTER IX.

FAITH AS A SOCIAL FORCE.¹

Article I.—Faith as a Social Force in the Novitiate.

As a working definition of sociology, Professor C. A. Ellwood proposes for our acceptance, "the science of the organization and evolution of society."² It should be interpreted so broadly as to include the "origin, development, structure and functions of the forms of association."³ The religious order, of which the novice seeks to become a professed member, is a form of social "organization," having a definite origin, development, and structure, and seeking to perform functions useful not alone to its members, but also to larger groups of men. Religious orders, in turn, are but divisions of a more comprehensive organization, the Catholic Church, from which they derive their rights and privileges, and whose mission they help to extend and to strengthen. The group spirit puts forth its claim to the novice from the beginning of his life. He is born into the family and he is at the same time a potential citizen. Besides the family and the state, which are

¹ Cf. above, pp. 141-145.

² *Sociology in its Psychological Aspects*, p. 7. By "evolution" he means "orderly change of any sort."

³ P. 8. The essence of this definition he credits to the biologist, Professor J. Arthur Thomson (*Heredity*, p. 508).

societies in the order of nature, there is the supernatural society into which he is admitted by baptism; for the Catholic Church claims to be supernatural in origin, constitution and mission.¹

Sociological aspects have recurred persistently in the earlier sections of this book. Even the very terms faith,² religion, novice, and pedagogical value,³ have sociological implications. Environment⁴ is not physical only, but social as well. Plasticity,⁵ therefore, has likewise a social connotation, and a large part of one's natural success in life must depend on his native or acquired power of adjusting himself to the social conditions in which he lives. The "learning process"⁶ is also social in its implications, since the simplest forms of learning entail imitation of one's fellows. Even the large, confused, and random movements of a child, giving place gradually to attention to the details of the act and showing increased skill in execution, are paralleled in the life of the religious.⁷ When the novice seeks for an illustration of the principles of the spiritual life, when he looks for an interpretation of his rule, it is to the example of his confrères that he turns

¹ On the Catholic Church, see *Apologétique Chrétienne*, 3^e partie, Brothers of the Christian Schools, and, in general, standard works of Apologetics. F. J. Koch, *Manual of Apologetics* (A. M. Buchanan, tr., C. Bruhl, ed.), presents the case briefly in Chap. VII.

² See Bk. II, above, especially pp. 108, 114, 116 ff., 120 ff., 129, 133 ff.

³ See above, Chap. V, p. 133; also, p. 149.

⁴ Cf. pp. 171, 178-183, above.

⁵ Cf. pp. 192 ff., above.

⁶ Cf. pp. 221 ff., above.

⁷ J. M. Baldwin, *Story of the Mind*, pp. 76-80, 167 ff.

for light and for answer. The more perfectly he imitates them, the better does he grasp the principles that are fundamental to his order, and the keener becomes his vision for the details of conduct. He, too, acquires the "habit" of regular observance, which is perhaps the most emphatic as well as the most difficult expression, on the part of the novice, of the unchanging verities of the spiritual life.

In proportion as the novice masters the significance of the novitiate exercises, his relations to the group, to his fellow religious, undergo corresponding changes. He becomes less passive and more active as a member; the ratio of "give" and "take" becomes more nearly equalized. His growing knowledge of his duties and his greater zeal for their fulfilment lead to their more exact performance, and so he, too, contributes to the community the social asset of good example and helps to strengthen the social solidarity. Apart from the grace received in the sacraments, it is from mental prayer rightly made that he is to draw both the strength and the constancy requisite to produce these results.¹ It is well also to note that the community spirit, the group spirit, into the realization of which he grows from day to day, is of the more perfect kind: it is reflective. Three kinds of social groups have, in fact, been distinguished.² In the first, the social tendency on the part of the individuals is inherited, the modes of action are "fixed and unprogressive," the re-

¹ See above, pp. 307 ff.

² Cf. J. M. Baldwin, *The Individual and Society*, pp. 36 ff.

actions are instinctive. Here reason has little or no sway, and the group as such is animal, not human. In the second, the tendency to collective action is transmitted by social heredity; that is, it is taught. Hence the individuals must be "plastic," learning, so far as they are members of the group, precisely the same things, and therefore tending to show conservative traits,¹ yet withal retaining their spontaneity. The third form of group is held together by the bonds of reflective life. The more thoroughly the members understand the principles of the organization, the more heartily do they accept them and the more earnestly do they strive to live up to them. This is the social group proper. The mere statement of its distinctive traits suffices to show that it is into such a group that the novice is admitted.²

¹ It is sometimes maintained that this stage of group life is characteristic of religious orders, and therefore that they are intrinsically, if not essentially, conservative. We have already contended that fidelity to the spirit of the religious life, especially by the fervent and regular practice of meditation, is a safeguard against routine and a condition of spiritual progress. Our Lord condemned both the conservatism of the Pharisees, who professed reverence for only the "letter" of the law, and the radicalism of the Sadducees, who, abjuring all respect for the letter, claimed to be guided by the "spirit" of the law. Herein He set for all time and for all religious of all stations and offices the difficult example of holding in honor both the letter and the spirit of their rules and constitutions, by *respect for the letter as "informed," or vivified, by the spirit*. From the viewpoint of genetic psychology the *origin* of a prescription will often help to set forth what its real spirit should be. Here, too, the golden mean between "letter" and "spirit" may be difficult to attain and to keep.

² The novice is not allowed to pronounce vows until he has become acquainted with the rules and constitution of the order and publicly professed his determination to respect their observance.

The individual and society are complementary forces. Just as the normal growth of the individual tends to solidarity and strengthens the social bond, so the normal exercise of his social duties by the individual tends to develop his own personality. It is by the mental bond of conscious intention and voluntary co-operation that human society is held together.¹ There is a common fund of knowledge, which is expressed in "public opinion"; of feeling, which is revealed in the accepted æsthetic canons; and of action, which sets a standard for "public morals." It is according to this threefold norm that the individual is trained; it is by his conformity to its requirements that his social influence will be chiefly determined and gauged. Yet, in the very work of assimilating this common knowledge, feeling, and action, he displays "variations"; in the very process of "imitating" his fellows, he discloses traits of individuality. In the words of Professor Baldwin:

"He is not a repeating machine. His mental creations are much more vital and transforming. Try as he will, he cannot exactly reproduce; and when he comes near to it, his self-love protests and claims its right to do his own thinking. So the new form, the personal shading, the embodiment of individual interest, the exhibition of a special mode of feeling—all these go to make his result a new thing, which is of possible value for the society in which it arises."²

These individual differences, so humble in beginning and so slight in character, are the very condition of that social rivalry which has been designated as "the

¹ Cf. J. M. Baldwin, *The Individual and Society*, Chap. I.

² P. 152.

means of selection for mental and moral purposes in the environment of the social order.”¹ It is upon the higher and nobler forms of this rivalry, “urged on by motives of advancement, personal and social, and gratified by both personal and social excellence, that the life of society depends.” Hence “the most urgent problem of to-day in the world of labor [and beyond it] is that of saving the individual qualities of men, that society may profit by them. By suppressing the free exercise of personality, the group suffers a return to mediocrity in all its activities.”²

It will readily be granted that the novice in the novitiate is subject to the essential conditions of human society. Even a certain measure of interplay between individual and group may be conceded, since he not only takes example from his fellows, but also in turn sets them patterns to follow, whether for weal or woe, for better or worse. But that he retains his individuality, that he even develops it,—this is not so generally admitted. Is he not specially subject to authority? Does he not himself confess that, as a candidate for the religious life, he must regulate all his actions by obedience? Does he not thereby “suppress the free exercise of personality, and contribute his share toward sending his group back to mediocrity in all its activities”?³ The objection is specious; it may even get

¹ P. 115.

² P. 89.

³ It does not enter into the scope of this book to consider the case of conflict between the individual religious and the superiors of his order. Such misunderstandings are rare in the novitiate,

confirmation from individual instances. On the other hand, we have already quoted testimony to the effect

for the novice is in a state of religious pupillage. It is later in his career that such a condition may arise. Conflicts of this nature are so characteristic of group life and, we may add, of group progress, that it would be passing strange if they did not occur from time to time in religious orders. The individual *may* be in the right; and the group, in the wrong. To deny that is to deny the beginnings of Christianity. A quotation from Professor Baldwin (*Social and Ethical Interpretations*, pp. 565-567, 3d ed.) is pertinent: "The social order represents the generalized ethical sense. The only way for a man to carry out his protest is to persuade other men, until he gets his opinion adopted. Then the conflict ceases, since then the reform which he proposes receives ethical [sic] and social sanction. But in the case of ethical protests of single men against the social order, we have a different phenomenon. This sort of conflict is more serious and profound, because the sanctions involved are more comprehensive. The ethical in the man represents the essential and highest outcome of his individual nature; this on the one hand. The socially established represents the highest outcome of the collective activities of man; that on the other hand. What then can be done in the case of conflict between these two? *Nothing!* Nothing can be done. It is the case of the fountain running higher than its source. . . . *This is the final and irreducible antinomy of society.* It shows at once the law of social growth, its direction and its goal. It shows the dialectic of growth in its concrete social form, as in the child's obedience we see it in its concrete private form. Society must simply listen to such a man, for her weal or woe, as the child listens to his father. . . . But in listening to him, and in doing with him, she is reaching for her own by right. He is of her, she has made him."—Eventually, however, both individual and group undergo modification, and so the period of adjustment is ushered in.

As for distinctly religious groups that need reformation, we have but to refer to the practice of St. Francis de Sales, who "urged upon them a sedulous exercise of mental prayer, spiritual reading, and a frequent approaching to the sacraments of penance and eucharist" (*The Spirit of St. Francis de Sales*, p. 220). For the group, then, as for the individual, the quickening of faith is the indispensable condition of Christian progress. And the quickening of faith is secured and maintained by the sincere and constant practice of meditation (cf. pp. 281-309, above). This is a consideration that does not enter into Professor Baldwin's scheme.

that, given the same material, the religious orders obtain superior results.¹ How are we to explain the discrepancy?

The psychologist who attempts to trace the development of the child's mind, notes that its attention is first directed to external moving objects.² Then there comes a differentiation between objects whose movements are regular and those whose movements seem to be exempt from law. In the latter class are persons. All such objects in the environment have been termed "projects." When, however, the child imitates the actions of a given person, he thereby acquires a perception of the meaning of the action—a state of mind unattainable otherwise. Henceforth when he perceives other persons performing similar actions, he ascribes to them mental states like those which he himself experienced in making the motions. Both he and they are now "subjects"; *i. e.*, they possess, in so far, common mental traits and experiences. From this small beginning grows up the habit of considering other persons as the same with himself, not merely in this one experience, but in their whole nature. Such persons are then "ejects." The whole process is the psychologist's accounting for the fact that we do, as in a sense we must, judge others by ourselves. Now, what happens to the child in the family group is also in its

¹ Cf. second quotation from Dr. Foerster, p. 142, above, especially second sentence.

² Cf. J. M. Baldwin, *Mental Development*, pp. 119, 338 ff.; also *Story of the Mind*, pp. 80 ff., where he treats it under the topic of "personality suggestion."

larger outlines the experience of the novice in the religious group to which he has been admitted. He, too, learns from the performance of the prescribed acts, as illustrated by his fellow-novices (his "projects"), what it is to be a religious "subject." His own mental experience he may "eject" into his associates and so form a truer estimate of their spiritual helps and hindrances, trials and triumphs. Herein he finds a psychological justification for the Christian commandment of fraternal charity. But the value of this experience is not limited to his own plane of existence, it extends also to higher and to lower levels. It is to become for him, on the one hand, the fruitful means of interpreting, later on, the difficulties which his pupils will meet; and, on the other, the key to an understanding of the lives of the saints.¹ It is this personal experience, as we have already seen,² that he brings to his morning meditation. And it is by means of his meditation that he preserves and develops what is best in his individuality. Hence it is that all founders of religious orders are so insistent on fidelity to meditation. They, too, exercise in their own sphere the wis-

¹ Some day, let us hope, a Catholic, gifted with clear vision and eloquent pen, will be inspired to develop this topic in a manner worthy of its social significance. Why is it, for example, that St. Catherine, a virgin of an obscure family in Siena, should become the counsellor of popes? Why should the humble and unlettered member of the Third Order of St. Dominic be chosen a special patron by St. Aloysius, a Jesuit of noble birth? The whole series of *Meditations for Sundays and Festivals* written by St. John Baptist de la Salle is an excellent presentation of values that are at once social and pedagogical.

² See above, pp. 294 ff.

dom of sociologists; and, consequently, they maintain that since, outside of sacramental grace, meditation is the chief source of individual "variation," in the best meaning of that term, so it is also the chief guarantee of progress for the community.¹ Lest, however, the individual variations should become so pronounced as to interfere with the harmony of the group and embarrass co-operative work, whether manual or mental, many of the daily spiritual exercises in the novitiate have for their secondary purpose the strengthening of the community spirit.² Five centuries ago the saintly Thomas à Kempis summed up in a few words the concentrated wisdom of eleven centuries of community life:³

"Observe the good common medium of those with whom thou livest. Thou oughtest not to beget weariness or tedium in others, but keep the common way, according to the institution of superiors; and rather accommodate thyself to the utility of others than follow thine own devotion and affection."

Just as individuality is fostered and strengthened by faith as developed by the daily meditation, so the community spirit is conserved by the exercise of fraternal

¹ Father Faber gives a pertinent passage (*Spiritual Conferences*, p. 274): "The lesson is, that holiness depends less upon what we do than upon how we do it. [These words embody the essential distinction between the artist and the copyist—or even the amateur.] . . . It sounds commonplace enough; but it has sufficient matter in it for the study of a life and for the practice of eternity."

² The Catholic Church, in condemning heresy, exercises a similar office on a higher and more extended plane.—Cf. note 3, pp. 320 ff.

³ *Imitation*, Bk. IV, Chap. X, 7.

charity which, in its turn, is based on faith.¹ The spiritual life of both novice and community, of both individual and group, is nurtured at the fountain of faith. With a view then to appreciate more fully the blessings conferred by Christian and religious faith, it is well to ponder the advantages which flow from natural faith also. Both have been given eloquent expression by Chateaubriand in the following passage:

"And what were the virtues so highly recommended by the sages of Greece? Fortitude, temperance, and prudence. None but Jesus Christ could teach the world that faith, hope, and charity are virtues alike adapted to the ignorance and the wretchedness of man. It was undoubtedly a stupendous wisdom that pointed out faith to us as the source of all the virtues. There is no power but in conviction. . . . What wonders a small band of troops persuaded of the abilities of their leader is capable of achieving! Thirty-five thousand Greeks follow Alexander to the conquest of the world; Lacedæmon commits her destiny to the hands of Lycurgus, and Lacedæmon becomes the wisest of cities; Babylon believes that she is formed for greatness, and greatness crowns her confidence; an oracle gives the empire of the universe to the Romans, and the Romans obtain the empire of the universe; Columbus alone, among all his contemporaries, persists in believing in the existence of a new world, and a new world rises from the bosom of the deep. Friendship, patriotism, love, every noble sentiment, is likewise a species of faith. Because they had faith, a Codrus, a Pylades, a Regulus, an Arria, perform prodigies.

"For the same reason they who believe nothing, who treat all the convictions of the soul as illusions, who consider every noble action as insanity, and look with pity upon the warm imagination and tender sensibility of genius—for the same reason such hearts will never achieve anything great or generous; they have faith only in matter and in death, and they are already insensible as the one and cold and icy as the other.

"In the language of ancient chivalry, to *pledge one's faith* was

¹ Cf. Matt. xxv, 31-46; Luke x, 29-37.

synonymous with all the prodigies of honor. Roland, Duquesclin, Bayard, were *faithful* knights. . . . Shall we mention the martyrs, 'who,' to use the words of St. Ambrose, 'without armies, without legions, vanquished tyrants, assuaged the fury of lions, took from the fire its vehemence, and from the sword its edge'? Considered in this point of view, faith is so formidable a power that, if it were applied to evil purposes, it would convulse the world. There is nothing that a man who is under the influence of a profound conviction, and who submits his reason implicitly to the direction of another is not capable of performing. This proves that the most eminent virtues, when separated from God and taken in their merely moral relations, border on the greatest vices. . . .

"Of this truth we shall be thoroughly convinced if we consider faith in reference to human affairs, but a faith which is the offspring of religion. From faith proceed all the virtues of society, since it is true, according to the unanimous acknowledgment of men, that the doctrine which commands the belief in a God who will reward and punish is the main pillar both of morals and of civil government."¹

Where the Christian spirit has taken deep root and the Church has not been hampered in the exercise of her functions, there religious orders have attained vigorous growth. Although they may not be essential to the Church, they are an index of her vitality.² Hence it is not surprising that in times of social upheaval they should be the special objects of bitter persecution. Their very presence in times of peace teaches an eloquent lesson on the life to come, of which even non-Catholics are not unmindful. Their removal confessedly lowers the moral tone of society and obscures its perception of spiritual ideals. It is in the novitiate

¹ *Genius of Christianity* (tr. C. I. White), pp. 95, 96.

² This position is clearly demonstrated by Balmes (*European Civilization*, Chap. XXXVIII).

that religious receive the training which enables them to exercise this elevating influence. Consequently, even if the aim of education were merely "social service," the novitiate would deserve well of society.¹

*Article II.—Faith as a Social Force in the School.*²

Although our treatment of the sociological aspects of faith must be so greatly restricted by the limitations of this book as to be merely suggestive, yet it is necessary to give some indications of the meaning of faith for the school. Our whole discussion points to this. There is a threefold sense in which education is a social process.³ First of all, by this means society preserves the culture of the past. In so doing, it makes a twofold act of faith: (1) an act of faith on the part of the pupil, who believes in his teacher; (2) an act of faith on the part of the teacher, who believes that teaching is a mission or profession. If he be Catholic, he will reckon it an apostolate. The thoroughness with which the work of education is done determines the degree of progress made possible for the rising generation. Indeed, this truth is but an extension to society of the principle which we have already found valid for the individual in the order of grace as well as in that of nature; viz., that the regular and perfect fulfilment of daily duties is the indispensable condition of those "variations" which make for advance and improve-

¹ See above, pp. 79-82.

² Cf. pp. 133 ff., 137 ff., above.

³ Cf. Irving King, *Social Aspects of Education*, p. 2.

ment. From this principle follow certain consequences. The school curriculum should not, indeed, be overcrowded, but it should be comprehensive,—embracing, according to the ability of the pupils, studies representative of our fivefold spiritual inheritance; viz., religion, literature, æsthetics, science, and social institutions.¹ Besides the content of the curriculum, there is also the method of imparting it. This calls not only for correlation of the different branches, but also, from the Christian standpoint, for the vitalizing of all by the spirit of faith.²

In the second place, the school is obviously a group, and is subject to the essential conditions of group life. It is therefore to be expected that its work will be more efficient when directed by teachers who have some knowledge of the meaning of social institutions. According to Catholic philosophers and theologians, there are three “perfect” societies: two in the natural order, viz., the family and the State; and one in the supernatural order, the Church, for each of these institutions

¹ Butler, *The Meaning of Education*, pp. 17 ff.; Dr. Shields, *Psychology of Education*, Lesson IX, “Balances in Development,” pp. 111-114.

² See above, pp. 64, 65, 84, 85, 130, 131, 140-145.—Cardinal Newman (*Sermons Preached on Various Occasions*, V, “Dispositions for Faith,” especially pp. 69-73) calls attention to the common and fatal error of the “world” in constituting itself judge of religious truth without any preparation of heart for the reception of that truth. We have seen that the religious novitiate does effectually prepare the heart of the novice for the proper reception of divine truth. What the novitiate has done for him, the young religious teacher, in due proportion, seeks to do for his pupils. Only under such or analogous conditions can the truths of divine faith be and continue to be social forces.

is complete within its own sphere.¹ Since without the family there could be neither State nor Church as we know them, it is the duty of the teacher to use the means at his disposal for the strengthening of family ties. He will thereby deserve well of both State and Church. If the teacher be Christian, and especially if he be also a religious, he is bound to prepare his pupils, according to his position and opportunity not only to fulfill worthily their duties as members of the State and of the Church here on earth, but also to become "fellow-citizens with the saints and the domestics of God" in heaven.² In the third place, since the pupil is by nature a social being, the social viewpoint has to be kept before him if he is to be trained for the fulfillment of his social duties as they arise in life. This viewpoint reveals a threefold service which is at once the condition and the cause of genuine development in the pupil. Service at home may be a good preliminary to "social service;" while to her own children as also to the world at large the Catholic Church proposes the example of Him who said: "I am among you as he that serveth."³

From what has been said in the preceding pages it is clear that the novice is trained to some appreciation of these three social phases of school life. In a special way also has he been made to realize the value of what we have called the "summation of stimuli,"⁴ whereby

¹ See also pp. 315 f., above.

² Eph. ii, 19.

³ Luke xxii, 27.

⁴ See above, pp. 273 f.

the lessons of faith imparted and practised in one exercise add to the value of those that follow. He sees, therefore, that the Sunday school is not adequate for proper training in Christian faith, nor does he find such a compromise as that implied in the "Gary system" to be much more satisfactory. He knows that religious belief should be part of the very life of the pupil: it should guide his intellect, strengthen his will, purify and ennoble his affections. He has learned that all vital progress is conditioned by a due restraint of the less perfect or less complex powers and functions. If the tree is to bear abundant fruit, the sap must not be allowed to run waste in the production of foliage only. In the animal, even the vegetal, or purely organic, functions minister to sensation and motion; and these in turn, as found in man, are valuable aids to intellect and will. When, however, the novice views man as a being having a supernatural destiny, he is forced, by parity of reasoning, to conclude that all man's natural gifts should subserve the interests of the supernatural life. Hence he maintains that a certain measure of restraint, of self-discipline, of self-denial,—in other words, of "inhibition"—is a necessary factor in the daily life of the pupil in school as well as at home. A "religion of feeling"¹ he adjudges incompetent for such a purpose, and opposed to the true social interests of the young. It is too individual, too subjective, and too variable. It lacks an objective standard of values.

While the novice learns from his own experience, as

¹ See above, pp. 111-113.

well as from divine revelation, that a religion of feeling will not suffice for any future pupils he may have, he perceives also that a "religion of understanding" is not the natural fruit of genuine doubt. The maxim, "Prevention is better than cure," is valid for health of soul as well as health of body. Hence the treatment favored by the religious teacher is a spiritual prophylaxis. Not a few educators who have made investigations into the religious education of children¹ hold that the tenth year marks the turning point from so-called "primitive credulity," or belief on authority alone, to the attitude of inquiry and even of doubt and distrust. According to the present discipline of the Catholic Church, children are admitted to the sacraments of confession and communion before they have reached this age, and therefore they have at hand a special divine help to meet this period of disintegration.² As the pupils approach high school age, the wise and zealous teacher, recalling his own studies in the novitiate, will gradually adopt the plan used with so much success by St. Francis de Sales. This great doctor of the Church disliked

¹ Cf. J. B. Pratt, op. cit., pp. 206 ff., who discusses several of these investigations. So far as we know, the sources are all non-Catholic. That, however, does not destroy their value.

² A very suggestive plan to strengthen the spirit of faith in pupils from their earliest school years is worked out in Dr. Shields' *Catholic Education Series*. The First Book appeals to the instincts of the child and draws lessons from Nature. The Second Book develops the idea of law and inculcates obedience. The Third sets forth the work of Redemption and the sacramental system of the Church. For the relation of this method to the teaching of catechism, see discussion by Brother Chrysostom, *Catholic Education Association Proceedings* (Cincinnati Meeting), 1908, pp. 227-231.

controversy and rated it very low as a means of conversion. Yet he is credited with bringing 72,000 Calvinists into the Church.¹ He preferred a constructive plan (enforced by personal practice of the faith)—viz., the presentation in clear and persuasive language of the true teaching of the Church on the point of real or supposed attack, and of the place of this doctrine in the whole economy of the Church.² The result was that without realizing the full significance of his method, his hearers found themselves armed against false and dangerous doctrines. If we admit that a “primary wave” of doubt may sweep over the youth at fourteen or fifteen, “followed by two or three years of comparative calm,” and that “for many men the great wave of doubt comes at about eighteen, and for many women about two years earlier,”³ then we must grant that

¹ Cf. *The Spirit of St. Francis de Sales* (tr. from the French of Bishop Camus), p. 5.—The following passage contains sound advice for teacher as well as preacher: “It was not enough, in our Saint’s opinion, that a preacher should aim at doing good in a general way; but he should always have some particular point in view; as, for instance, the knowledge of a truth, the clearing up of some doubt, the destruction of a vice, or the practice of a virtue” (p. 87).

² Op. cit., p. 279.

³ Cf. Pratt, op. cit., pp. 214, 215, who tersely sums up the situation in these words: “More than two-thirds of Starbuck’s respondents (see his *Psychology of Religion*) had passed through a period of skepticism, and G. Stanley Hall reports that in over 700 returns from young men religiously reared and in Protestant colleges there were very few who had not wrestled with serious doubts on religious questions.” Although Professor Pratt is concerned with Protestant conditions, his words may well give pause to Catholic teachers, whose pupils are human also.—One wonders why the assistant professor of philosophy in Williams College (such was the author’s position when he wrote the book) did not resist the

to the religious teacher a really apostolic mission is entrusted.

Aside from such a consideration of studies as will strengthen the faith of the pupils, the future teacher, who is now in training in the novitiate, will find that a regular recurrence of religious suggestions will prove most fruitful in building up a "habit" of faith. This habit of faith is really the infused theological virtue of faith as developed by regular and frequent acts of faith. The pedagogical significance of its formation early in life appears from the fact that, according to biologists, our latest acquisitions are the first to disappear from mental life.¹ The hourly pray-

temptation to scoff at mediæval monks (p. 296) and mediæval "visionaries" (p. 297). Even capable professors of history may speculate in vain about the premises from which he infers that the religion of mediæval Christians was a typical phase of "primitive credulity" (pp. 149, 150). By what *authority*, we ask, does this professor of philosophy justify this statement: "The Middle Ages, as every one knows [sic], were pre-eminently characterized by the dominance of authority in all fields of thought" [sic]? Moreover, St. Augustine did not belong to even the "early" Middle Ages; much less did he give "quia impossibile" as his motive for belief. Were Professor Pratt to turn back the pages of history to a period three centuries before the time of St. Augustine, he might find in Tertullian of the second century some connection with "quia impossibile"; but the connection is distinctly not mediæval. Cf. H. Pope, "Faith," *Catholic Encyclopedia*, Vol. V, pp. 753, 754. To correct the professor's defective presentation of the cosmological argument and the argument from design we would suggest such a book as Boedder's *Natural Theology* (see Bk. I, Chap. V).

¹ Cf. H. H. Donaldson (*The Growth of the Brain*, p. 331): "When it is remembered that the last developed cells [of the brain] are the smallest, and have but a small quantity of cytoplasm, that the very tardiness of their development indicates their environment to have been less favorable, and finally that those conditions which retard growth also favor senescence, the hypothesis appears plausible" [viz., that the capabilities of the central

ers¹ in the classes conducted by the Brothers of the Christian Schools are a distinct reminiscence of the sequence of religious exercises in the novitiate; the admonition given every half hour to remember the holy presence of God is an adaptation to the pupils' capacity of that remote preparation for mental prayer which is so significant for the development of the novice.² Even the annual retreat, one of the most efficacious means for the nurture of the spiritual life in the religious, is copied in the retreat made by children when preparing for their first communion, and in the yearly retreat now generally given to students of upper grammar, high school, and college grades.³

If, however, we seek to translate into the language of sociology the special purpose both of the Catholic school and of the novitiate—the latter is practically the

nervous system tend to disappear in an order inverse to that in which they developed].—This view of biologists seems also to harmonize with the experience of missionary priests, who find that when persons have been well trained in the practice of their faith when young, they are more likely, even after years of neglect, to return to their religious duties. In the words of one such penitent, "When one has had a good Catholic mother and has attended the Christian Brothers' school, it is hard for him to keep away from God."

¹ See *Exercises of Piety in use in the Christian Schools*.

² It is also an adaptation of the "summation of stimuli" spoken of on pp. 273 f. and 329 f.

³ The late Brother Exuperian, assistant superior general of the Brothers of the Christian Schools, inaugurated in 1882 a regular system of retreats for Circles of Catholic Young Men. (*Biographical Sketch of Brother Exuperian*, pp. 124-129.) In recent years a similar plan has been put into successful operation in this country. The retreats for men have their counterpart in the retreats and recollections given to women in many convents.

chief source whence the former draws its strength—we must call it Christian “like-mindedness.” The term itself we owe to Professor Giddings.¹ The qualifying epithet which we use, marks the higher plane on which we study the principle of which he has been so ardent an advocate. The idea is at least as old as Christianity itself. For its realization the Saviour Himself prayed with all the ardor of divine zeal guided by infinite wisdom, when at the Last Supper He addressed to His eternal Father this touching appeal for His apostles and for all Christian teachers: “And not for them only do I pray, but for them also who through their word shall believe in Me; that they may all be one, as Thou, Father, in Me, and I in Thee: that they also may be one in Us; that the world may believe that Thou hast sent Me.”² Whether in heaven or on earth, can there be any “like-mindedness” more sublime or more devoted than this? This is the ideal, the “social” ideal, which the religious novitiate adumbrates. It is rooted and grounded in the first of all mysteries, the mystery of the Blessed Trinity. This is the ideal which religious teachers, individually in their classes and collectively in their school, make the great goal of their endeavors. In so far as they really approach their ideal, they truly help to make the Church militant on earth a genuine preparation for the Church triumphant, where both individuals and groups will possess the most perfect “like-mindedness” compatible with the spiritual

¹ *Elements of Sociology*, Chaps. XI-XV.

² John xvii, 20, 21.

progress which they have made here below in the great school of earthly life.¹

These considerations suggest another phase of the social working of faith which is cultivated in Catholic schools.² This is the organization of sodalities or associations having a religious or a charitable purpose. Through them it is possible to initiate the pupils into those Christian forms of social service which find expression, for example, in the Society for the Propagation of the Faith and in the Conferences of St. Vincent de Paul. By fidelity to the duties which membership imposes, these young clients of the Church find their faith strengthened and developed. Moreover, by God's mercy, not a few of them receive the germ of a vocation to a higher life. Because they have been faithful over a few things, they are now about to be placed over many things.³ This is a "variation" which gives unfeigned delight to the zealous teacher. It is also a very noble and Christian application of that principle of "persistent imitation" which we have already encountered more than once.⁴ It is likewise an effective an-

¹ Cf. Eph. iv, 5, 6: "One Lord, one faith, one baptism. One God and Father of all, who is above all, and through all, and in us all." Cf. also St. Augustine's maxim: "In necessariis unitas, in dubiis libertas, in omnibus charitas."

² If a plan were organized whereby missionary priests could place at the service of Catholic teachers what their experience tells them are the chief sources of the loss or the weakening of religious faith, on the one hand, and of its growing strength and vigor on the other, the religious training given in the school would be much more efficient. In this work the Catholic press could co-operate to the mutual benefit of press and pupils.

³ Matt. xxv, 21.

⁴ See above, pp. 272, 276, note 2, 283.

swer to the attack made by Sir Francis Galton on the celibacy of religious orders.¹ In such cases, Father Gerrard's words are doubly verified: "What the virgin sacrifices in the joy and glory of bodily generation, she gains a hundredfold in the joy and glory of spiritual generation."² Is not this another illustration of that principle of development which we have been considering throughout this book, whereby the material and sensile becomes the symbol of the spiritual, nay even of the divine?

The most important work in which the religious teacher can engage is the work of strengthening and developing the Christian faith of his pupils. It is therefore for the worthy performance of this function that the novice must prepare himself by the exact and fervent discharge of his various duties in the novitiate. If he is later to diffuse an atmosphere of faith about him in the schoolroom, he must now sedulously cultivate the spirit of faith in his daily life. Let him recall that divine faith is a "social" bond; that to it we owe the true brotherhood of man as well as the fatherhood of God. Let him know that, according to sociologists, the group spirit is stronger in small groups, and that, in consequence, his future work in the Christian education of youth will be helped rather than hindered by the limitations of the classroom. All the great founders of religious orders began their work for the propagation or the development of faith by gathering about

¹ See above, pp. 72, 73.

² *A Challenge to the Time-Spirit*, p. 22.

them a small band of devoted followers and imbuing them with the same spirit of zeal and sacrifice. In this they but followed the example set by the very Founder of Christianity. In his own more modest sphere, the religious teacher strives to imitate the founder of his own order and in so doing to reproduce in himself and in his pupils the spirit of Christ Himself. If in attaining this result he secures the earnest co-operation of those of his pupils who have most influence over their comrades, he is doubly blessed. He fosters in the classroom a spirit that is at once Christian and apostolic, and he trains these more promising pupils for the responsible and meritorious office of Catholic leadership if they respond generously to the opportunities afforded by nature and to the solicitations that come from divine grace.

The novice, too, is preparing within his own sphere to be a leader of men. If he remains faithful to his trust, he will throughout life possess the double advantage of being at once leader and follower: leader, for the pupils who will be committed to his care; follower, with respect to the great saints who are gone before him and who intercede for him before the throne of grace. His social group, therefore, whether viewed in the natural or in the supernatural order, is not limited to his companions in the novitiate, nor even to the whole religious body to which he belongs. Neither are its confines bounded by the Church visible on earth; for it includes also the Church triumphant in heaven. As creature, as man, as Christian and as religious, the

novice is a member of social groups marked by increasing sharpness in the definition of their obligations, and by increasing complexity of organization. All, however, have their ultimate origin in God, and through all, by the grace of the Author and Finisher of our faith, is he to attain the reward of social service conceived in a Christian spirit, embraced with Christian zeal, and executed with Christian fidelity and perseverance.

CHAPTER X.

GENERAL SUMMARY.

IN BOOK I a comparison was instituted between the Normal School and the Religious Novitiate in aim, curriculum, method, spirit, and limitations. Personality was found to be the most valuable asset for the active or prospective teacher. The religious novitiate professes to develop the personality of its subjects according to the standards of Christian faith and to strengthen their faith itself by regular systematic exercise—one of the chief means being meditation.

In Book II we saw the danger lurking beneath a current theory of religious belief, and then considered the nature, origin, and exercise of divine faith and some of its pedagogical values.

In Book III we began a more detailed examination of these values. In Chapter VI we studied the chief biological aspects of education, viz., heredity, environment, plasticity, and adjustment; and then considered some of the relations existing between these topics and the truths of divine faith. In Chapter VII,—under the general title of psychological aspects of faith,—perception, the learning process, habit, and the reflex arc concept were treated first in themselves, then with reference to their pedagogical significance, and finally in the

light of the special value which they acquire from the practice of Christian faith.

In Book IV we studied the nature, the matter, and the elements of meditation as a religious exercise, and we discovered that the chief psychological processes which we had already considered, were actually included and utilized in the daily meditation, one of the chief exercises by which the novice cultivates the spirit of faith. Furthermore, in virtue of the principle of the transfer of training, the habit formed by the diligent preparation and faithful practice of meditation, was found to have a genuine pedagogical value which was applicable to other subjects having either a similar method, or similar matter, or a similar aim.

In Book V a rapid survey was taken of some fundamental sociological aspects of education. The development of the novice was found to grow apace with his assimilation of the community spirit, while the spiritual progress of the community itself was seen to depend on the Christian acceptance of his responsibility by the individual novice. The perfection of his individuality, according to Christian ideals, the novice endeavors to effect by the assiduous practice of meditation, the great conservator of religious faith. The group spirit, with its community of knowledge, feeling, and action, is best cherished by the diligent exercise of Christian charity, which also springs from faith. Christian and religious faith, therefore, is at once the safeguard and the strength of both the novice as an individual and the order as a society. In view of the prominence given to-

day to the social aim of education, it is opportune to note this social aspect of the pedagogical value of the virtue of faith as developed in the religious novitiate. It crowns and supplements the values which faith is discovered to have when measured by biological and psychological standards.

L' ENVOI.

IT MAY be asked what message the preceding pages have for teachers in the schools of our land. In answer, let the following points be suggested for reflection:

All educators concede to-day that "social service" is at least an aim (if not the aim) of the educative process. But the highest type of social service is inspired, sustained, and directed by religious ideals.¹ Even where its immediate individual exponent does not profess a creed, yet he is, at times in spite of himself, oftener unknown to himself, deeply influenced by the Christian atmosphere in which he lives; he shares in the spiritual heritage bequeathed him and his fellows from the ages of faith. Even if Christian dogma be for him like the light still coming to our planet from extinct stars, yet it actually does guide his conduct. Now if, even when supported by this social aid, he often finds it difficult to pay his meed of social service, let him beware lest, by depriving the younger generation not merely of religious truth, but also of the religious affections that spring from it, he blight the practice of righteous living and destroy the vitality of those ethical ideals by which alone genuine individual and social development is made possible.

The personality of the pupil may be shaped by the teacher, but the teacher's personality must be doubly

¹ Cf. Balfour, *Foundations of Belief*, pp. 331, 332.

protected if it is to withstand the insidious attacks of degenerate or debased social ideals. Our teachers are, or should aim to become, "the salt of the earth. But if the salt lose its savor, wherewith shall it be salted?"¹ One means of developing and conserving the personality of the teacher is presented in the foregoing pages. It is a means that has stood the crucial test of ages; but it demands persistent attention and unflagging devotedness on the part of the teacher. Is it impossible for our day and generation to profit by the salutary lesson?

Recurring to the reflex art concept,² let us hope that the ten chapters of this book have supplied the first element of the triad and even favored the second. But the third element, the reaction, must come from the teacher and from those who are interested in the teacher's work. What will their answer be?

¹ Matt. v, 13.

² See pp. 230 ff., above.

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
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